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i 
USE OF THESIS 
 
 
The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis. 
ABSTRACT 
 
A Bell in the Storm - Persistent unexplained pain and the language of 
the uncanny in the creative neurophenomenal reference is a doctoral 
work comprised of three parts. Part 1 is an exegesis Persistent 
unexplained pain and the language of the uncanny in the creative 
neurophenomenal reference; Part 2 is The Plays, A Bell in the Storm 
(produced by deckchair theatre in May, 2005) and the radio play To 
Fall Without Landing (produced by the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission for Radio National in October 2005); and, Part 3 the 
book of monochord poems, Secrets of the Driftwood.  
 
The exegesis begins with specific anecdotes of my experience of a 
serious car accident in May 2000 and a subsequent persistent 
unexplained pain state that nonetheless pose deeply theoretical 
questions about the human experience of pain. The body-mind dualism 
of Renes Descartes’ L’Homme and its inculcation into the classical 
specificity theory of pain in medical discourse is examined. The body-
mind classical pain theory is then critiqued initially in light of the mid 
1960s’ literary theories of Jacques Derrida and then Melzack and 
Wall’s medical Gate Control Theory (1965), through to more recent 
neurobiological evidence from Szentagothai, Erdi, Maturana and 
Varela (and others). These recent neurobiological theories challenge 
the classical theory’s supportability through the brain’s ability to self-
organise, in complex and unpredictable ways that defy the 
commonsense of medical discourse. Pain and other phenomenal 
states may emerge in uncanny ways that amounts to a self-referential 
neurophenomenology that is inseparable from our ontology.  Pain and 
the problem of reference in both language and neurophenomenology 
are considered in light of the writings of Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, 
Cathy Caruth and others in what de Man and Caruth describe as the 
fall.  This cooperation between the self-referentiality of language and 
the brain is theoretically explored, particularly through the creative 
reference of Lacan, Kristeva, and Scarry. This creative reference is 
then referenced through both the aleatory photographic creations of 
Nick Djordjevic and their presence in the stage play A Bell in the Storm 
and Caruth’s fall into the radio play To Fall Without Landing. 
  
In part 2, both plays attempted the practical creative relation of the 
difficulties and joys, the lack and the gain, the uncanny and the bathos, 
the fall from and to ‘the other’ (and how these binaries are never in 
opposition) that the exegesis theoretically uncovered, within the 
different mediums of the multi-media stage and radio. The monochords 
of Part 3 relate to the inexpressibility of pain and its self-referentiality 
(in particularly the English language) and the uncanny moments 
glimpsed in single line or chordal expressions.        
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Part 1 
 
 
 
 
Exegesis 
 
 
 
Persistent unexplained pain and the 
language of the uncanny in the 
creative neurophenomenal reference 
 
 
 8
 
 
Introduction 
The world becomes its language and its language becomes the world. But it 
is a world out of control, in flight from ideology, seeking verbal security and 
finding none beyond that promised by a poetic text, but always a self-
unsealing poetic text. 
 – Murray Kreiger. A Re-opening of Closure: Organisation Against Itself. 
 
 
The thesis of this study enabled me to bring two aspects of my 
professional life together. The first, as a professional clinical and 
research nurse of twenty years in psychiatric health care and, the 
second, as a playwright, poet and musician. When my own body 
became so painfully volatile after a car serious car accident in May 
2000, I was catapulted into a world I was used to professionally 
observing. Not only that but the very profession I was involved in 
was the profession that so disbelieved my pain state. I also found 
there was very little language available to express my pain to my 
doctors, colleagues, friends, my wife and my children. What was so 
obvious to me seemed to engender doubt in the others of my life 
because there seemed no empirical evidence of tissue or bony 
damage or lesion to explain my persistent pain. 
 
The dominant medical discourse’s explanations of pain rely on a 
drawing in L’Homme by Renes Descartes in 1644. In this modest 
drawing, a boy has his toe too close to a fire. The fire burns the toe 
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causing pain to ring in the brain through the nerves being pulled like 
a rope ringing a bell at the other end. Pain, in this discourse, is 
specifically caused by a lineal and upward process of bodily 
damage or lesion. My question, then, is how one can have 
persistent and severe pain without any verifiable bodily lesion – that 
is to say – obvious damage to the body? Furthermore, if this 
question has been impossible to prove beyond the sufferer’s own 
experience, then how could the sufferer communicate and 
functionally live in a world that defies the common sense of the 
above explanation?  
 
I examine and critique the discourse of medicine’s specificity theory 
of pain, which I argue, is based upon the body-mind dualism of 
Rene Descartes. That is, either the pain is caused by verifiable 
damage or lesion to the body or in the absence of this damage or 
lesion, the pain must be all in the mind. This interpretation also 
attempts to sweep pain’s unexplained and persistent presence 
under the carpet of the mind. I examine the mind’s inability to 
escape the play of language and affirm its presence outside of 
metaphysics. I deliberately employ Jacques Derrida’s mid-1960s 
linguistic theories of play, noncentredness and supplementarity to 
examine current linguistic and epistemological attributions and 
definitions of ‘the mind’. Since ‘the mind’, despite Descartes’ res 
cogitans, is not comprised of atoms and cells, it lacks a corporeal 
centre and becomes subject to Derrida’s sense of play, as any 
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structurality of the mind escapes its own structurality. The centre of 
the mind is always ‘elsewhere’ because it is trapped in an 
epistemological and linguistic circle: ‘for mind see mind’, which is in 
a never-ending circular search for its noncentred and playful identity 
and presence. Play, in this sense, is the disruption of the mind’s 
presence. 
 
Co-operating with Derrida’s linguistic and metaphysical play, I 
further critique the body-mind problem of pain in light of the Gate 
Control Theory developed by the medical pain theorists Melzack 
and Wall, also in mid-1960s. The specificity theory’s body-mind 
explanation of pain relies on the brain being a passive and 
hardwired mechanism much like a computer. The mind then 
mysteriously reads the printout. The corporeal pain signal is 
therefore always travelling up predictably to the brain from some 
lesion in the body. If no lesion is detectable then it is axiomatic that 
any pain must be all in the mind and therefore other than a 
[corpo]real pain. Melzack and Wall however, explored what they 
termed the variable link of pain, wherein they examined the 
presence of severe pain without obvious lesion, as well as the 
absence or delay of pain in the presence of severe injury. They 
postulated there was some corporeal interference or greater 
nervous system complexity that behaved like a gate at the dorsal 
horn (of the spine) along Descartes’ rope. Pain signals from a 
lesion below the dorsal horn could be inhibited or allowed to pass 
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up to the brain. These signals however, to open or close the gate, 
had to involve some activating downwards causation from the 
central nervous system or the brain itself. Furthermore they 
theorised that pain signals themselves could originate from the 
central nervous system and descend through the dorsal horn to the 
body. This meant that the brain did not predictably reflect the 
painful severity of a lesion but radically modified and in some cases 
engendered the human experience of pain. 
 
The Gate Control Theory caused much vituperation and division in 
medical discourse in the 1960s and 1970s but by 1983, this 
reaction had to acknowledge the growing evidence of dorsal horn 
modulation and the deep involvement of, to borrow from Freud, the 
dark continent of the neuroplastic brain. In 1984, Janos 
Szentagothai published his paper Downwards Causation in the 
Journal of Theoretical Medicine.  By 1993, Szentagothai, along with 
his colleagues Michael Arbib and Peter Erdi, had found the brain to 
be autopoietic, or self-organising in ways that were neither monist 
nor dualist in nature. They also found that this self-organisation 
occurred in non-centred ways that required the help of professional 
philosophers to interpret, especially considering they also 
signposted negentropy as an extra phenomenon of the self-
organising brain. Negentropy is negative entropy where the output 
from the brain could exceed the input of the stimulus to it. In terms 
of pain this may mean pain states can and do emerge from the 
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brain that exceeds the predictions of input-equals-output reflexive 
models. Such emergent phenomena though, are in no way, limited 
to pain but, given the self-referentiality of the brain, defiant of any 
universal theories of prediction.  Erdi argued that no structural 
theory – no matter how dynamic - could cope with the brain’s global 
self-referentiality and he concluded that the brain ought to be 
considered as post-structural. 
 
The exegesis then investigates a cooperation between the theories 
of poststructuralist or self-referential linguistics and the self-
referential brain. Both engender rather than reflect the phenomenal 
world in uncanny ways through three essentially cooperative 
properties: 1. self-organisation or play; 2. this self organisation or 
play takes place in the context of a noncentred heterogeneous 
complexity that Derrida termed the presence of the noncentre; and, 
3. both linguistic and neural phenomena emerge in uncanny or 
unpredictable negentropic ways that for linguistics, Derrida termed 
supplementarity and, for neural phenomena, the discourse of 
neuroscience terms emergent properties.  
 
I pursue an inquiry into the cooperative processes between the self-
referentiality of language and neurophenomenology through the 
work of Humberto Maturana’s Biology of Cognition that argues our 
neurophenomenology goes the core of our epistemology and 
humanness as languaging beings. Our neurophenomenology 
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engenders our ontology and our ontology engenders our 
neurophenomenology and they are both inseparable from the other. 
A problem of reference ensues however, because if both our 
language systems and neurophenomenology are self-referential 
and, by definition, they are doing more than we know, then how can 
we gain meaningful access to the world and even consciousness 
itself? I engage the work of Cathy Caruth and Paul de Man to 
vantage what Caruth terms the problem of reference through a 
literal and figurative understanding of falling.  I consider the 
important differences between a constative and performative text 
within the creative reference, which is always engaged in doing 
more than it knows. Reference to world, de Man tells us, is gained 
not through access to an objectively stable universal truth but 
through a literal and theoretical falling. What self-referential theory 
does is fall, and in falling, it refers.  
 
I examine the creative reference within the aporia of unexplained 
persistent pain through Elaine Scarry’s creative frame and pain’s 
inexpressibility and, the Lacanian and post Lacanian ideas of Julia 
Kristeva. I engage the creative acts of Nick Djordjevic’s storm 
photography in both their theoretical and practical involvement in 
the play A Bell in the Storm, the radio play To Fall Without Landing 
and the writing of the monochords for Secrets of the Driftwood.    
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This exegesis is a contribution to a co-operation between literary 
theories of self-referentiality and creativity and interpretations of 
unexplained and persistent pain, in light of the neuroplastic brain’s 
self-referential involvement in such a pain and creativity’s mystery.   
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Chapter 1 
The Big Bang 
 
On the evening of Friday the nineteenth of May, 2000, I was driving 
my wife’s Saab home from a poetry reading. At a red light only a 
minute from our home, I wondered which Friday night film I would 
watch with our children, then aged ten and seven, and if I would be 
back in time for its start at eight-thirty. I noticed the car clock 
displayed 8.28 pm. David Sylvian’s Secrets of the Bullfight was 
playing on the car stereo. I put my left hand on the volume knob to 
turn the music down and ring my wife just as ‘Simon’ did in the 
opening scene of the play A Bell in the Storm:  
Simon (To himself) Come the Sabbath??? (Long 
Pause… then into the mobile) Steph? It’s me… 
(Pause) Yes I’m driving, but it’s Ok… I’m stationary 
at a red light… (Pause) Yes… (Pause) About a 
minute and half away… Tell her I’m sorry I’m 
late…I’ll watch the movie with her just as soon as I 
get home… (Pause) How was the reading? (Truck 
headlights are incoming like munitions. Music 
up to effect this) The poetry was Ok but she’s got 
this big name now and…  
The lights explode into Simon…  Stage effects to effect The 
thinning… (Buchanan, 2005, p 185). 
 
I am still unsure about the bang, the impact, the concussion of 
sound and energy caused by a four wheel drive hitting my car 
without braking, doing what one witness described as at least 
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‘90ks’. I say ‘unsure about the bang’, because I cannot, even now, 
distinguish between the external event of the impact, in what I have 
come to call the big bang and my deeply perturbed, confused and 
synaesthetic apprehension of what happened to me in the driver’s 
seat of that car. The explosion of metallic sound emanated from 
deep inside me, as the sheer violence of the accident seemed to 
have been always already in my every blood cell, something that I 
could at once taste, see, smell as well as hear: colourful, pungent, 
bitter. I could neither inhale nor exhale an air that seemed so 
instantly charged with this energy of a storm raging in a space that 
was neither internal nor external but, whatever it was, I was 
somehow strewn across both as if the external and internal had 
never been in opposition. I knew that if I were to be strewn too 
much, too far, too widely that I would probably die. I do not recall 
feeling anxious, or sad, or fearful, or even curious because what 
was happening to me seemed so obvious and inevitable that it was 
simply the way of the big bang. What I do recall though is the 
profound presence of something that I would come to know 
intimately over the coming years that would though elude any 
language I used to describe it and conjure doubt in everyone else I 
loved, knew, or was clinically treated by: pain.  
 
Pain was with me when I woke in the ambulance and again in 
hospital. As I was stabilised (as one nurse in the Emergency unit 
put it), I recognized that this pain wasn’t something external, that is 
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something that was with me but, something that was me. I 
complained of this pain to the nurse and then again to the 
physicians treating me. They were highly concerned and attentive. I 
was given morphine and taken to be X-rayed and CT scanned. As 
the orderly pushed me through the hospital corridors, I thought I 
was flying through the air looking down at the ceiling which I 
thought to be a map of this dynamic new world I had entered. I 
smiled, undoubtedly stoned, and the orderly in noticing gave me a 
look that was to become the most familiar non-verbal expression I 
would notice in others relating to my pain over the next five years: 
the eyes narrowing, the gaze straying slightly in Elaine Scarry’s 
edict on pain:  
To have pain is to have certainty. To hear about pain is to have 
doubt. (Scarry, 1984, p 13). 
 
Scarry’s edict of doubt concerning the validation of pain in others 
became institutionalized in my case when all the X-rays, CT scans, 
MRI scans revealed No Abnormalities Detected (NAD). This 
institutional doubt would become a concentrated and aggressive 
ideological disparagement (Merskey and Teassel, 2000, p 259). 
Such disparagement is redolent of Louis Althusser’s notion of 
interpellation: “Hey you – why are you in pain?” or even worse, 
“Hey you – you can not be in pain” (Althusser, 1962, p 152). An 
ideology concerning whether or not the suffering of pain is bona 
fide, seems to exist and pervade a discourse that operates within 
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insurance agencies, medico-legal practice, the workplace, and 
even within the ‘institution’ of my marriage. 
 
I was sent home from the Emergency Department the following 
morning, with no medications for pain or anything else. I was told 
there was nothing wrong with me, and if I did need follow-up to see 
my GP. By then the morphine had well and truly worn off. I could 
barely walk. As I left the unit a nurse approached me and said “I’d 
buy a lottery ticket if I were you… You were lucky… Hardly 
scratched.” This was a sentiment echoed by the investigating police 
officer over the phone on the Sunday evening: “You’re lucky mate – 
I can’t usually talk to people who have been hit as hard as you 
were… Ya car’s completely written off. We’ve charged the joker 
who hit you – he left the scene of the accident and fronted up at the 
station with his father, who’s a lawyer, at one-in-the-morning, 
drinking from a bottle of Scotch. I can’t tell you what he’s been 
charged with – that’d be a breach of privacy – but here’s his full 
name and address, date of birth and place of work…” Still 
concussed, I scribbled down the driver’s details through the fog of 
an obtunded consciousness, unable to keep up with the officer’s 
ever-growing impatience. When I hung up the phone I scrawled in 
large letters: HIT AND RUN… DRUNK DRIVER… PRIVACY! 
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Either/Or 
 
From the horrors of World War 1 and its high explosive detonations 
pounding a concentration of men in their trenches, and in the open 
carnage of no-mans-land (Le terraine vagues, as the French called 
it), came three groups of those who were afflicted by something 
that was named War Neuroses and Shell Shock (Mott, 1919, p 1 – 
47). The first group was killed instantly “yet no visible injury has 
been found to account for it.” (Mott, 1919, p 1). The second group 
had external and visible injuries that were however, incongruent 
with the symptoms suffered, which “… leads one to consider that in 
a large proportion of cases of shell shock… there are factors at 
work in the production of the nervous symptoms besides the actual 
aerial forces generated by the explosive.” (Mott, 1919, p 1). “The 
third group includes affections of the central nervous system 
without visible external injury.” (Mott, 1919, p 1). In the play A Bell 
in the Storm, Andrew’s expert medical testimony addresses the 
court on these mysterious afflictions: 
Andrew In World War 1 soldiers were subject to high 
explosive blasts that caused no obvious injuries yet 
they fell either unconscious or were killed instantly.  
Sally I still can’t work out why some were killed and some 
weren’t! 
Andrew  It was a mystery. It was termed commotio cerebri: 
meaning a commoted brain or shell shock. But the 
many soldiers who survived these blasts, woke up 
in pain, sometimes not being able to talk – they 
even lost the use of limbs. Many of them, including 
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the ones who were killed, had any obvious injuries. 
So, their symptoms were diagnosed as being “all in 
the mind”, when it was a brain and nervous system 
disturbance all along. (Buchanan, 2005, p 230). 
 
Mott then divided up the causation of shell shock into two 
categories: Physical trauma, which he described as commotio 
cerebri and Psychic trauma, which he described as emmotio 
cerebri. Mott actually considered the psychogenic factors to be:  
…by far the most frequent and important cause of shell shock 
followed by a psychoneurosis, particularly hysteria… being 
dependent in a great measure upon the personality of the individual 
soldier, his mental attitude, and bodily condition at the time of the 
shock (whether of emotional or commotional origin) which led to his 
collapse.” (Mott,1919, p 2).  
 
Mott was to later describe these men as “naturally of a timorous 
dispossession.” (Mott, 1919, p 16). I still recall my grandfather 
sitting at his kitchen table in the 1960s. He had his head in his 
hands, unable to cope anymore with his pain that was ‘all through 
him’ and had plagued him since those same battles had seen him 
‘blown to hell and back’:  
“What’s wrong with Grandpa?” 
“Nothing… He has one of his headaches again.” My Grandma 
would reply. 
 
These headaches were never discussed openly. In contrast his 
dramatic episodes when newly married were recounted around the 
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dining table like myths. My grandmother would recall with pride how 
he would wake to the roars of the lions in the South Perth Zoo 
across Matilda Bay, and, would throw her on the floor, with him on 
top to protect her from the dawn shells raining in from the Somme, 
Passchendaele or Pozieres. Such actions were considered not only 
heroic but readily understandable. His pain however was neither 
heroic nor understandable. No obvious physical injury was 
detectable. Even less obvious, that is to say, kept hidden and 
secret was his suffering the shame and indignation in being denied 
a Veteran’s pension in the 1960s, on the grounds he suffered from 
no discernable injury even though he had been twice decorated for 
valour and bravery with the Military Medal and Military Medal with 
Bar from the battles of Passchendaele and Pozieres (one of only 
437 soldiers from the AIF to be so decorated throughout the entire 
war). The suffering of persistent pain is often kept hidden and 
secret because as Patrick Wall put it:  
They move like draught horses, uncomplaining, heads down in 
continuous driving snow. Not only have their multiple treatments 
failed, but they have suffered the indignity of being told that their 
pain will go away and/or that it is all in their heads. (Wall, 1999, p 8 
– 9). 
 
Implicit in this suffering is a sense of shame as for Scarry’s edict: 
“To hear about pain is to have doubt” (Scarry, 1984, p 13), that is it 
is all in their heads and this leads to an explicit personal shame. 
Even so he was determined to fight the decision that denied him 
not only his pain and a heart attack he suffered in his fifties, but, his 
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actual experience of a war he had never really recovered from 
since 1919. Indeed, 1919 was the same year Dr Frederick Mott 
M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P., ; BREVET LT.-COL. R.A.M.C. (T)  
concluded about such afflictions: 
…from a far greater experience I have come to recognize the fact 
that the psychogenic factor is the predominant causal agent in “War 
Psychoneuroses,” and that a large proportion of cases which were 
regarded as shell shock did not owe their condition to any 
pathological changes which would have been recognizable in the 
central nervous system by any known methods of microscopic 
investigation; in fact, they were functional psychoneuroses.  (My 
italics, Mott, 1919, p 5). 
 
For Mott, like so many others that followed him, such afflictions 
were a case of “either-or”. That is, either the pain my grandfather 
suffered was evidenced by bodily damage or it was not. If it was 
not, then it was axiomatic: it was psychogenic, that is, all in his 
mind. 
 
In this sense there is a body-mind dualism at work here that 
predicates Mott’s conclusion of more than eighty years ago. This 
dualism was at work to deny my grandfather’s pension in the 
1960s, and was still at work in my own case, in all but one of the 
specialist physicians I saw in the first months after my accident in 
the year 2000. This one doctor was Dr John Quintner; a 
Rheumatologist and Pain Medicine Physician who had joined 
forces with a colleague in Pain Medicine from the University of New 
South Wales, Associate Professor Milton Cohen to, “make our 
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colleagues in medical practice see beyond the dualism which limits 
their practice and prejudices their patients” (Personal 
correspondence, Quinter, 2000). 
 
Prove it… 
 
My introductory session with Dr Quintner however, did not start 
well. It was some six weeks since the accident. I was in increasing 
difficulty and tremendous pain. I felt my life had changed so much 
that the person I was before the accident was almost 
unrecognizable to me let alone to my wife and children. I couldn’t 
sleep, I wasn’t eating properly and occasionally the pain would flare 
up to such a degree that it left me without prospect of comfort. The 
medications I had been given were not only unhelpful but gave me 
side effects that compounded the pain.  
 
Above all though, I had this awful feeling that has never really left 
me since the accident. This feeling is difficult to describe, but I 
sensed the accident had strewn me or some how disrupted or 
ontologically dislocated my sense of self. I sensed that things were 
greatly disturbed. I couldn’t see properly; my bowels were not 
working as they had and they leaked an almost clear fluid. I couldn’t 
empty my bladder and despite sometimes standing over the toilet 
for many minutes I would have what was to be called terminal 
dribbling for up to half an hour later. I also couldn’t think very clearly 
at all, sometimes mangling sentences that would have flowed 
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before the accident. Mostly though, the pain manifested itself 
through my neck, particularly the left side and, it would spread 
down my left arm to make my thumb, fore and middle finger tingling 
sore. It would continue down my back, into my left leg to produce a 
strangely painful semi-inflated balloon for the sole of my left foot. 
The headaches too were literally and figuratively blinding. On the 
few occasions my wife and I had tried to make love, what had been 
for me, the most beautiful of dances was horribly staggered, and 
pain flared down my neck, left arm, back and left leg before inflating 
the balloon that had become my left foot.  
 
What really worried me however, was this feeling of being strewn 
too far, too wide. Secretly I felt I might even after such a period, be 
dying. I also had flashbacks of the accident itself. I was suddenly 
lying down in the car. The backseat was under the front seat, the 
boot was where the backseat used to be and my driver’s seat had 
collapsed over it all. I couldn’t breathe. There was a man starring in 
at me from the middle of the road. He had a lit cigarette and 
breathed smoke onto the pane. I tried to get him to help me but I 
couldn’t move. He turned away with a numbing indifference. I still 
couldn’t breathe and I started to become thin, to again spread out. 
Then I was in the ambulance with an oxygen mask on my face with 
this officer reassuring me. I heard the siren going every now and 
then and each bump in the road striking through me like lightning. 
Then I was getting thin again, strewn again.  
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I still have the greatest difficulty discussing this with trained 
psychologists let alone loved ones. The following excerpt from the 
play between Sally and Simon portrays such an experience: 
Sally Simon Sharrin? 
Simon I used to be… 
Sally Tell me about your pain? 
Simon It was a four wheel drive… 
Sally He was drunk. 
Simon I got so… thinned… like I was becoming a gas  
Sally  Tell me about your pain. 
Simon It’s the price I pay… 
Sally For not dying?  What is it – your pain? 
 Simon  There aren’t the words… 
Sally Never?  
Simon There are no words… 
Sally There’s always hope… (Buchanan, 2005, p 186). 
 
I walked into John Quintner’s office and wanted to tell him about all 
these things. Instead I found myself telling him the usual facts 
about the accident. I was hit by a hit-and-run drunk driver who left 
the scene of the accident. He had hit me doing 90 kilometres per 
hour. He couldn’t have seen my car stationary at a red light. I was 
knocked out and taken to Fremantle Hospital by ambulance.  
 
I was gob-smacked when he replied “I don’t care what the accident 
was like.” I had an inclination to stand up and walk out then and 
there. Instead I said: “I’m in terrible pain!”  He just looked at me and 
said: “Prove it…” I looked at him as if he was mad, but then I saw in 
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his eyes that this clause, “prove it”, was the great issue surrounding 
my ‘condition’. 
 
I left his office feeling something that has never left me since. How 
could my pain, which was so overwhelmingly obvious to me be the 
cause of so much doubt in others? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
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Ringing the Bell… 
 
Immanuel Kant argued that the experience of pain was proof of life: 
Pain is the spur to activity, and only through pain do we feel 
ourselves to be fully alive. Without pain we should be lifeless. (Kant, 
1798, p 392).  
This is a maxim summed by the aphorism: in life is pain, in pain is 
life. Proving however, that pain exists in any one person at any one 
point in time, is a matter that has confounded and indeed still 
confounds the full spectrum of multi-disciplined healthcare 
professionals, legal systems, insurance and governmental 
institutions right down to the sufferer and their most intimately 
known and lived relationships and subjective experiences (Scarry, 
1984, p 3). The empirical conundrum of pain can be summed up by 
the notion that while we know that it exists, we have little idea how 
it works (Chapman, 2004). Pain represents theoretically at least, an 
aporia or a space to which we are denied access if only because 
we are denied access to the space of its secrets, and yet, it will not 
allow us to be free of it either (Derrida, 1994, p 12) [1]. Like 
Derrida’s vantage on death – ‘My death cannot be held as death 
itself holds what I am’ (Derrida, 1994, p 54), my pain cannot be held 
as pain itself holds what I am.  
 
In terms of clinical practice what may be happening with people in 
pain has been and often is still informed by the single most 
influential hermeneutic for pain: the classical specificity theory of 
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pain (Melzack, 1977, p 126 – 7). [2]. The classical specificity theory 
undoubtedly owes its origins to the drawing L’Homme and 
subsequent explanation by Renes Descartes in 1644: 
Descartes’ L’Homme (1644)
Rene Descartes (1644), L’Homme
 
(Descartes, 1644, cited in Melzack, 1977, p 127) 
  
We can see above that this boy has his toe, marked B, too close to 
the small fire, marked A. The line (or rope) drawn between B and a 
small circle or centre in the brain marked F, is marked C. Melzack 
and Wall consider this single drawing and its lineal and mechanistic 
explanation of pain to be the rock upon which the classical theory of 
pain has been built. (Melzack and Wall, 1984, p137) As Descartes’ 
own explanation attests, pain is, for this classical theory, always the 
predictable result of an obvious lesion caused by an equally 
obvious external force: 
28 
 29
If for example fire comes near the foot, the minute particles of this 
fire, which as you know move with great velocity, have the power to 
set in motion the spot of the skin of the foot which they touch, and 
by this means pulling upon the delicate thread which is attached to 
the spot of the skin, they open up at the instant the pore against 
which the delicate thread ends, just as by pulling at one end of a 
rope makes to strike at the same instant a bell which hangs at the 
other end. (Descartes, cited in Melzack, 1977, p 127).  
 
There is a syllogism at work here in the ringing of Descartes’ Bell 
that entails more than just without fire there can be no pain. Indeed, 
this syllogism is bound to the idea that the brain and its nervous 
system are hardwired, that is to say a causally reflexive and 
structured mechanism that is inherently predictable in terms of any 
input reflecting a congruent, predictable and reflexive output. 
(Melzack, 1973, p 127). As the terminal clause of Descartes’ 
explanation suggests; there must be a fire or some external spatial 
phenomenon that causes material tissue damage. This tissue 
damage (A &B) in turn is lineally and temporally relayed as an 
upwardly mobile message that is at the same instant conveyed by 
the nerves (just as by pulling at one end of a rope) C, strikes a bell 
which hangs at the other end, F. The syllogism is, then, unless you 
have fire in real time causing actual tissue damage, the rope of the 
nervous system cannot be pulled and the bell of pain in the brain 
cannot ring. In short, without tissue damage of the instant there can 
be no physical pain as the following dialogue from the play explores 
this as it is inculcated into psycho-medical discourse: 
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Andrew …In 1644, he drew a little bloke with his toe getting 
burnt by fire… which pulled on a bloody rope that 
was attached to a bell in the brain!  Fire, pulls the 
rope, rings the bell – pain!  (He goes through the 
routine) Descartes’ bell. And the moral of Simon’s 
story is… if there’s no fire – there can be no pain. 
(Buchanan, 2005, p 202). 
 
The problem that arises here is that Simon, like myself and many 
thousands of others, experience a persistent pain sans fire. When 
there seems to be no temporal, spatial or material causality for the 
experience of pain, the experience of pain must be due to the 
nonphysical phenomena of the mind. (Besson, 1999, p 1610). This 
is then the flip side of this same wholly physical Cartesian syllogism 
of pain: if there is no lesion to be found in the body, any experience 
of pain must be the product of the mind. This theory of pain which 
we can call ‘classical’, differentiates two distinct and utterly 
separate types of pain. The first is bodily or physical pain and the 
other is all in the mind (Quintner and Cohen, 1999, p 1092).  
 
In the absence of a verifiable lesion afflicting someone then any 
pain must be the product of Mott’s psychoneurosis (1919) or as 
clinician’s such as Ferrari and Shorter (2003), Barsky (1992) and 
Lucire (2003) argue: somatisation. All of which, as one barrister for 
the Insurance Commission of Western Australia put it when arguing 
against the validity of a sufferer’s claim of pain, amounts to a 
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phantom pain falling into line with Descartes’ bell (Peace, 2002, p 
12).  
 
The risk inherent in the above body-mind explanations is when a 
bodily cause cannot be found, they may delegitimise the 
experience of pain as phantom pain because it is all in the mind. 
The signifier mind however, is at the very least, subject to that 
which Derrida termed ‘the metaphysics of presence’, since 
linguistically the signified of the mind assumes the presence of a 
locus, a centre or a natural site. Derrida points out that such a 
linguistic presence is metaphysical: 
Since these concepts are not elements or atoms, and since they are 
taken from a syntax and a system, every particular borrowing brings 
along with it the whole of metaphysics. (Derrida, 1978, p 355).  
 
Derrida argues here that the metaphysics of the mind, lacks any 
actuality of elements and atoms, and thus entails a presence of the 
mind’s locus or centre only within the construction of syntax. So, 
just what the mind actually is has always been historically enigmatic 
dating right back to Empedocles and continuing through modernist 
thinking, as D.B. Klein outlines: 
The perennial nature of the mind-body problem in history is revealed 
by recurrent references to it age after age from ancient Greek times 
to present. …The notion of a cleavage between mental life and the 
bodily organism was already manifest in Plato’s concept of a 
separate realm of universal ideas, in his doctrine of reminiscence, 
as well as in his mystical belief in reminiscence. Both he and 
Aristotle, had something to say about the bodily locus of mind, with 
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Plato selecting the head and Aristotle, following an earlier teaching 
of Empedocles, selecting the heart. (Klein,1970, p 228 - 29)   
 
 
It wasn’t until the 1600s however, that Rene Descartes refined the 
presence of the mind to something which constituted a thing, or, as 
he described it, the res cogitans (the thinking thing).  Descartes’ res 
cogitans has undeniable influence on philosophy from it’s 
inculcation into the reason of the enlightenment and its subsequent 
inculcation into medical and psychological discourse over the last 
three centuries (Melzack, 1977, p 134). If Aristotle and Plato gave 
conceptual weight to the mind’s metaphysical premise and mystery, 
then Descartes elevated the status of the mind to that of a thing, 
working in an utterly distinct way from the body. In A Bell in the 
Storm, Andrew discusses this presence with Sally (Simon’s 
psychologist) in relation to Simon’s experience of pain, in the 
prevailing medico-legal explanations of pain without verifiable 
lesion: 
Andrew But if he complains of pain – then (he taps his head) 
it must be a ‘phantom’ pain and he’s referred to 
someone like you who deals with the mind and he 
won’t get a brass razoo cos his pain’s not real! 
(Buchanan, 2005 p 202). 
 
Clearly the suffering of a pain state that resides in the mind not only 
poses the question of whether or not the pain is real or phantom 
but, entails a consequent skepticism, doubt and even 
disparagement towards the sufferer by others and institutions alike 
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who are influenced by the dominant discourse of the classical 
theory (Merskey and Teassel, 2000). In the clinical practice of 
treating pain in those without verifiable lesion, the presence of the 
mind as the cause of this pain is rarely challenged (Quintner and 
Cohen, 1999, p 1094). Little wonder that so many sufferers are 
diagnosed with somatisisation and excluded from compensation 
claims and the sense of having a legitimate pain state (Lucire, 
2003) [3]. The presence of the mind in medical and psychological 
discourse and practice has assumed the weight of common sense, 
but how this presence is defined is rarely scrutinized.  
 
The Macquarie Dictionary lists forty two different definitions for 
mind (Delbridge et al Ed., 1999, p1368). I would however, like to 
focus on just three of them: definition one, two, and twelve, since 
the others seem to merely outline the semantics of an uncontested 
and already assumed or received metaphysics of presence.  
 
Definition one defines the noun mind as: 
…that which thinks, feels and wills, exercises perception, judgment, 
reflection, etc., as in a human or other conscious being: the 
processes of the mind.” (Delbridge et al Ed., 1999, p1368 – their 
italics).  
 
“That which thinks, feels…” is undoubtedly informed by Descartes’ 
(1664) res cogitans (res – the thing, cogitans – thoughts or the 
infinitive to think) because the definition considers the mind to be 
something with the agency and power to be ‘that which thinks, 
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feels…’, that is Descartes’ thing that thinks. The epistemological 
problem here is the qualification necessary to establish the 
connection of the res or the thing to these thoughts is circular, 
because the premise asserts rather than proves its conclusion and 
vice versa. What we end up with in this argument is a circle: for 
mind, see mind. In the absence of Derrida’s elements and atoms, 
Descartes’ proclamation of res cogitans asserts a unique essence 
or centre in terms of the signified mind without ever proving its 
essence. This practice of “…giving it a centre or referring it to a 
point of presence, a fixed origin” hits a metaphysical brick wall but, 
possesses none-the-less, an important function necessary for its 
currency in any discourse. As Derrida argues: 
The function of this centre was not only to orient, balance and 
organise the structure … but above all to make sure that the 
organising principle of the structure would limit what we might call 
the play of the structure. (Derrida, 1978, p 352). 
 
In other words, the existence and structure of the body and the 
mind is limited to structures that are governed by organizing 
principles that as Belsey has argued, “…inhere timelessly and 
universally to each of us” (Belsey, 1982, p 7). Derrida argued that 
the centrality of the thing, which in this case is the res cogitans, was 
imposed or constructed by a desire to orient, balance and organize 
a structure that produces predictable and coherent phenotypes in 
order to project a (pseudo) security that we know. There is of 
course a contradiction in this position because without the presence 
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of elements and atoms, that is some corporeal reference, we can 
never have the security that we know. As Derrida again points out:   
Thus it was always thought that the centre, which is by definition 
unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which while 
governing the structure, escapes structurality. … The centre is not 
the centre. … And as always, coherence in contradiction expresses 
the force of a desire. (Derrida, 1978, p 352) 
 
The metaphysical problem of the mind is always faced with the 
unprovable structure. The mind’s thing-ness is simply not there to 
be centred; we face a circular contradiction and enforce coherence 
through a desire for an organizing principle of security and as 
Derrida suggested, “…even today the notion of a structure lacking a 
centre represents the unthinkable itself.” (Derrida, 1978, p 352). 
Indeed it seems almost unthinkable to consider that the vast 
discourse of the mind (philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, 
medicine, and nursing to name but a few members) would 
challenge its own lack of centrality, its own absence rather than 
presence. At stake here is the question does the mind as the thing 
(res cogitans) exist, outside the play of this desire and the language 
that engenders it?  
 
The MacQuarie’s second definition of mind italicizes its own 
definitive premise: “Psychology the psyche; the totality of conscious 
and unconscious activities of the organism.” (Delbridge et al Ed., 
1999, p 1368)  Here, the mind as a thing has gone on to be 
explored and colonised by the practice of psychology and indeed 
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psychology entrenches the mind as presence into not only its own 
discourse but a general one as well, as Harold Bloom remarked:  
Psychology has gone on to become the most powerful mythology of 
our age.” (Bloom, 2000, p 123).  
 
The problem with this mythology being passed off as a scientific 
knowledge base has been acknowledged even within psychology, 
and, it is explicitly conceded in terms of the psychophysical riddle. 
As Klein observed thirty-five years ago: 
All such theorizing was, of course, little better than vague 
speculation; but it does suggest an incipient recognition of what in 
later centuries developed into explicit recognition of the 
psychophysical riddle: how is the mind as known to psychologists 
related to the body as known to physiologists? (Klein, 1970, p 229). 
 
Why is not this psychophysical riddle foregrounded 
when considering diagnoses like somatisisation for the 
understanding and treatment of pain? Even if persistent 
unexplained pain (that is, pain without a verifiable lesion) is 
considered to be a product of the mind, then surely this begs a 
bigger question: how does this pain produced by the mind, relate to 
the pain that is said to be experienced in the body? How can 
practitioners and interpreters of the mind be so sure of their 
diagnoses when their Freudian epistemological base is itself 
unprovable? As Wittgenstein objected in a Berkely lecture, “Freud 
is essentially speculation, not even reaching the level of 
hypothesis!” (Cited in Bloom, 2000, p 113).  
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Wittgenstein’s objection seems to uphold Derrida’s concerns of a 
metaphysics of presence in the absence of anything other than the 
psychophysical discourse’s desire for the mind’s presence. 
Descartes’ mind has evolved into the practice of Psychology, and 
has through such an philosophical evolution (from Cartesian to 
Freudian thinking), presumed a presence complete with conscious 
and unconscious, with ids, egos and super-egos to comprise the 
hidden structures of the modernist subject (Derrida, 1978, p 246 - 
291).  
 
It is the question surrounding psychology’s structures though, that 
foregrounds its linguistic presence and the subsequent currency 
within its discourse, that continually encounter the intrinsic 
epistemic and linguistic problems of being ‘trapped in a circle’ 
(Derrida, 1978, p 355): for Psychology, see Psychology. This circle 
is essentially the same as the one for mind see mind as it can only 
assert rather than prove its presence. This circle gives us the sense 
that we are going forward and making a kind of teleological 
progress when we are only circling an aporia we can but speculate 
upon, as Derrida points out: “There is no sense of doing without the 
concept of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics.” (Derrida, 
1978, p 354). When it comes to the presence of the mind outside of 
language we must acknowledge an absence an elsewhere-ness. 
Far from the security of we know, we apprehend instead a profound 
epistemological vantage point that James K Smith describes as 
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‘kenotic humility’ (Smith, 2004, p 4). That is, in apprehending this 
riddle of the mind, we are both emptied and humbled rather than 
being full of a constructed certitude.  
 
Derrida’s use of Montaigne’s aphorism seems fitting here: “We 
need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things.” 
(Cited Derrida, 1978, p 351, his italics). This theoretical position 
though invites hostility, as Culler points out: “A good deal of hostility 
to theory comes from the fact that to admit the importance of theory 
is to make an open-ended commitment, to leave yourself in a 
position where there are always important things you don’t know.” 
(Culler, 1997, p 16)  We are caught within this history of 
metaphysics, which always already has the inherent paradox of its 
own heuristic endeavour – that is, is every theory just a story in a 
language system of differences? Culler poses this intrinsic 
theoretical dilemma through his engagement with theory and our 
desire to reflect the world vying with our need to tell stories about it 
in order to plug the gaps of our inabilities to know. Culler argues 
that: 
…the basic question for theory in the domain of narrative is this: is 
narrative a fundamental form of knowledge (giving knowledge of the 
world through its sense making) or is it a rhetorical structure that 
distorts as much as it reveals?  Is the knowledge it purports to 
present a knowledge that is the effect of desire? (Culler,1997, p 
94)  
 
The idea that the mind’s knowledge base is an oscillation between 
sense-making and desire for sense, poses enormous questions for 
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the discourse of the mind, which any attempt to answer will always 
conflict between reflecting or constating the world as it is and 
narrating the world we desire to have and see. Culler elaborates 
further: 
To answer these questions we would need both knowledge of the 
world that is independent of narratives and some basis for deeming 
this knowledge more authoritative than what narratives provide... 
But whether there is such authoritative knowledge separate from 
narrative is precisely what’s at stake in the question of whether 
narrative is a source of knowledge or of illusion. So it seems likely 
that we cannot answer this question, if indeed it has an answer. 
(Culler, 1997, p 95) 
 
Without due consideration and apprehension of Culler’s narrative 
and the aporia it encounters in the insuperable oscillation between 
sense-making and desire-for-sense, ‘Psychology’ may continue to 
appropriate the enforcement of a totality in order to empower its 
own desire for its very existence.  Even psychologists are 
recognizing and openly discussing this problem. For example, the 
noted psychologist Carl Vanderwoolfe explains: 
It has been repeatedly pointed out that psychology, in contrast to 
other scientific fields…has made very limited progress in the past 
century… despite strong institutional support and a phenomenal 
increase in the number of psychologists. It seems to me that a major 
cause of this state of affairs is the failure to abandon an outdated 
set of concepts which pose misleading or insoluble problems and 
encourage the continued use of ineffectual methods. 
(Vanderwoolfe,1998, p135) 
 
Vanderwoolfe’s argument highlights the same problem of the 
insoluble circularity for mind see mind. His use of “misleading or 
insoluble problems” explicitly refers to psychology’s inherent 
39 
 40
epistemological problem of asserting the mind as a thing complete 
with a centre that desires a natural site when any determination of 
this position is insoluble. Theoretically, psychology begins in this 
sense to encounter that which Derrida termed the noncentre and 
play in the discourse of literary theory in the 1960s:  
Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no 
centre, that the centre could not be thought in the form of a present-
being, that the centre had no natural site, that it was not a fixed 
locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number 
of sign-substitutions came into play. (Derrida, 1978, p 353) 
 
This play invited Montaigne’s need to interpret interpretations in any 
practice rather to desire the one true historically present presence, 
which adhered timelessly to a structured and fixed natural site. 
There exists here a tension between not just the history of the mind 
but, its presence as well. As Derrida suggested concerning a more 
universal epistemology: 
Besides the tension between play and history, there is also the 
tension between play and presence. Play is the disruption of 
presence. (Derrida, 1978, p 369) 
 
The notion of Psychology and the mind having a natural site 
confers upon both of them a presence, which we have seen, is not 
only circular in its desire to make sense of itself but, is disrupted by 
a centre that is not a centre and, as Derrida wrote: 
Being must be conceived as presence or absence on the basis of 
the probability of play and not the other way around. (Derrida, 1978, 
p 369). 
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Psychology’s Being confers upon itself the status of a natural site or 
a locus that “..seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or 
an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign and which 
leaves the necessity of interpretation as an exile.” (Derrida, 1978, p 
369) For Derrida, interpretation is so necessary because it is all we 
have in the absence of the centred origin.  If you exile the 
interpretation of play then you enforce a heuristic desire (that 
dreams of deciphering a truth which escapes play) for a centre and 
you become “…trapped in a kind of circle” (Derrida, 1978, p 353). 
Psychology exists through this circular linguistic practice that 
desires certitude but never achieves it. Vanderwoolfe makes this 
point as he argued: 
The fact that mentalistic terms are a useful part of everyday speech 
might be suggested as an argument that such terms must refer to 
some aspect of cerebral function. We all know perfectly well what is 
meant by such expressions as “pay attention” or “remember this” 
but we also know what is meant by such terms as “heartless”, 
“broken heart”, “soft heart”, “hard heart”, “taking heart” or “losing 
heart”. The latter terms are linguistic grave markers of long dead 
ideas; apparent vestiges of Aristotle’s theory that the heart is the 
seat of higher psychic functions. No one imagines now that they 
have the slightest relevance to cardiology. (Vanderwoolfe, 1998, p 
135). 
 
Something other than naming the pre-existent res or the thing is at 
work here in apprehending the mind, and on a linguistic level, this 
something is that which Derrida signed as the play of language. 
The mind as a concept, as a signified presence and employed on a 
daily basis in the discourse of pain, attempts to transcend this play. 
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This play is where language is not so much reflecting pre-existent 
entities like the diagnosis of somatisisation but, that language itself 
performs or engenders, that is to say plays with our universal 
experience. As Derrida claimed: 
This was the moment when language invaded the universal 
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a centre or origin, 
everything became discourse… that is to say, a system in which the 
central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never 
absolutely present outside a system of differences. The absence of 
the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely. (Derrida,1978, p 354)   
 
The transcendental signified for ‘the mind’ fails then, to be ‘the 
totality of the organism’ as required by definition two of the 
MacQuarie Dictionary.  The mind cannot be reduced to the 
conscious and unconscious activities within its own definition 
because they are disrupted by their own inability to transcend their 
absence, their lack of centre and origin. The Cartesian and 
Freudian dualism of the body-mind binary complete with its res or 
its structure cannot exist outside the play of its own language. As 
Derrida argues:  
The centre is at the centre of the totality, and yet, since the centre 
does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totatlity), the totality 
has its centre elsewhere. The centre is not the centre. (Derrida, 
1978, p 352) 
 
Here, the mind’s nonlocus, its elsewhere-ness to any natural site 
leaves us apprehending a concept or in actuality, Culler’s problem 
of narrative’s sense-making versus the desire for sense. Derrida 
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argued that this leads to a teleology which destroys the previous 
sense-making narrative in order to proclaim another (teleological) 
advance in the never-ending quest for certitude “…with as much 
lucidity and rigor as bad faith and misconstruction, as the last 
metaphysician, the last ‘Platonist’” (Derrida, 1978, p 353). Thus we 
can argue that the great hermeneutic or heuristic endeavour for 
certitude begets only another teleological extrapolation towards 
what amounts to a desire for its own totality. Thus what seems an 
advance in the discourse of the mind, stemming from a superior 
body of evidenced based knowledge, time and time again butts up 
against the metaphysical wall of Vanderwoolfe’s insoluble 
problems. The whole history of the western continuum concerning 
the mind has made and makes us desire mastery of its constructed 
psychoanalytic phenomena. From Descartes to the enlightenment, 
to Freud and post-Freudian thinking, the mind as res cogitans has 
attempted to organize and understand a set of phenomena (hitherto 
described as psychodynamic and/or mentalistic) in increasingly 
sophisticated ways, that nonetheless share the same pitfalls of any 
interpretation beyond its own desire, that is to say, beyond its own 
epistemological circular story of itself for itself. Any sophisticated 
apprehension of the mind leaves us wondering because there is 
always more to know, if only because the theory upon which the 
mind has been authored assumes and literally creates its own 
existence. It is reasonable to point out here that to diagnose 
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persistent unexplained pain as being all in the mind is a construct of 
‘belief and desire’ (Lucire, 2003, p 4). 
 
In this context it is time psychology and the discourse of pain theory 
contemplated the last fifty to one hundred years of literary and 
linguistic theory, which has seen literature apprehend a theoretical 
state that undoes rather than reveals certitude. As Culler describes, 
“You have not become the master, but neither are you where you 
were before.” (Culler, 1997, p 17) In this sense we apprehend a 
vantage point from which alterity emerges over certitude, 
differences over essences, humility over proclamation, subjectivity 
over objectivity, narrative over teleology or as Culler (Culler, 1997, 
p 94) puts it: “We stop dancing around and contemplate the secret.”  
 
The MacQuarie dictionary’s definition twelve defines the mind as a 
“psychic or spiritual being, as opposed to matter.” (Delbridge et al 
Ed., 1999, p 1368). This defines the mind through how it is 
essentially different to the matter of the body. Thus, the body-mind 
binary persists and the same heuristic problematic is conferred, but 
at least in this definition the problem of the centre and its essence 
is also, albeit implicitly, conceded because this definition shies 
away from defining the processes and highlights the differences 
between the body and the mind, in-so-far-as we don’t know what 
the mind is, we only know it is different to the body. As Saussure 
(1915) found, the arbitrary attribution of sense making through 
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language goes about its business by teasing out how signs are 
different to the other signs and arbitrarily different again between 
the different cultures of the world. Language is not the handmaiden 
to inherent and natural truths but arbitrarily and culturally 
constructed (Rice and Waugh, 1996, p 3). Vanderwoolfe again 
points this out in the discourse of psychology: 
Mentalistic terms such as attention, cognition, fear, belief or desire 
are not easily defined since they commonly refer vaguely to several 
quite distinct things including: (a) a presumed state of 
consciousness, (b) some sort of behaviour, and (c) an 
environmental context. Different languages have different verbal 
conventions. Thus, according to Wilkes (245 his reference), ancient 
Greek, Chinese, and Croatian do not have ready equivalents for the 
English words ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’. (Vanderwoolfe, 1998, p 
135) 
 
Definition twelve has thus shifted paradigms because this definition 
has hopped off the circular argument of for mind see mind, to, for 
mind, see how it is different to the matter of the body, with a 
passive nod to Derrida’s universal problematic that its centre is 
elsewhere. Here at least we begin to ‘contemplate the secret’ in 
Culler’s terms in-so-far-as how it differs to the atomic structure of 
matter. This secret is acknowledged yet remains unapologetically 
dualistic for over four decades. The pre-neuroplastic 
neuropathologists Penfield and Roberts espoused exactly this 
point: 
Theorists… may be able to give up dualistic terminology. But 
biologists are not theorists. And there is no place in scientific 
medicine for the unprovable hypothesis. We must be content to 
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study man and animal by the scientific method, using the language 
of “busy common sense”. This is the language of dualism. (Penfield 
and Roberts, 1959, p 10) 
 
If, as Penfield and Roberts asserted, there was no place in scientific 
medicine for the unprovable hypothesis, then why has the insoluble 
problem of the mind so been implacably centred in the above quote’s 
language of dualism? There is at the least, a tautology inherent in 
this position, if only because Penfield and Roberts attempted to 
practice in a provable way, the ways of the body-mind riddle. No 
practice is exempt from the theories that underpin its practice, 
especially when any scientific medicine must relate to the riddles of 
the brain-mind relationship. As Penfield and Roberts themselves 
articulated: 
We have at present no basis for a scientific explanation of the brain-
mind relationship. We can only continue to study the brain without 
philosophical prejudice. And if the day should ever dawn when 
scientific analysis of body and brain solves the “mystery,” all men 
who have sought the truth in all sincerity will rejoice alike: the 
professing materialist and the dualist, the scientist and the 
philosopher, the agnostic and the convinced worshipper. Surely no 
one need fear the truth. (Penfield and Roberts,1959, p 10)  
 
The difficulty with this position was that nothing is at work here as 
much as the unprovable hypothesis of the mind. The risk was and 
still is undeniable that the spectre of a Derridean play haunted, and 
if such thinking still persists, haunts, Penfield and Roberts’ scientific 
medicine and its extension to a busy common sense in the general 
discourse of medicine and psychiatry (Merskey and Teasell, 2000). 
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This is not, as Belsey and many other commentators have pointed 
out, the first time a common sense empiricism has theoretically let 
us down through the circles it prescribes. [4]  
 
If (non-dualist) theory was already challenging this body-mind 
dualism in 1959, then by 1993, the same scientific method through 
the work of one neurophysiologist, Janos Szentagothai, was 
coming up with scientific findings that would revolutionise our 
understanding of the brain “…as neither dualist nor monist”… would 
“pose problems for professional philosophers.” (Szentagothai, 
1993, p 113). Far from being solved, the “mystery” of how the body 
and mind interrelate was deeper and wider than ever, and the 
neuroplastic actuality was far less sanguine than either Penfield or 
Roberts had dreamed. The brain-mind duality was left both 
scientifically and philosophically insupportable and Wittgenstein’s 
concluding judgment upon (the father of) psychology as “not even 
amounting to speculation”, more potent than ever before. 
 
John Quintner’s challenge concerning my pain – “prove it” – was, 
however, never more open to Derrida’s signpost of an active 
interpretation (Derrida, 1978, p 370). If my x-rays, CT and MRI 
scans were all ‘clear’; if no fire, no tissue damage existed to ring 
Descartes’ bell in any instant, and if the problematic of the mind 
was simply unable to contain the mystery of my pain; then what 
interpretation might at least apprehend it? When I put this question 
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to John, there was only the barest of hints of something behind the 
twinkle in his eyes, as he looked up to a kind smiling portrait that 
hung from the wall of his rooms. 
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Chapter 3 
Beyond the Bell – from the Variable Link to Neuroplasticity, 
and Language in self-organising systems of difference   
 
   Introduction 
Theories of pain beyond the Cartesian-informed specificity theory 
are predicted upon first ideas, and then evidence that the brain and 
nervous system cannot be hardwired and reflexively predictable 
(Quintner and Cohen, 1999, p 1098). These ideas and evidence re-
interpret Descartes’ rope to be more complex than a mechanistic 
pulley relaying some phenomenal energy in a one-way upwards-
traveling signal to ring the bell of pain in the brain.  
 
   The Variable Link 
The first of these post-specificity theories was generated by 
Melzack and Wall in 1965 and is generally known as the Gate 
Control Theory (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 222). In the late 1970s, 
Liebeskind and Paul said, “Probably the most important theory in 
pain was the appearance in 1965 of the gate control theory of 
pain… This theory has like none before it, proved enormously 
heuristic.” (Liebeskind and Paul, 1977, p 41) Even the noted 
anaesthesiologist of the day, John J. Bonica, called it ‘undoubtedly 
one of the major revolutions in our concept of pain in the last 100 
years.’ (Cited Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 233). It was equally 
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inspired by the sufferings of those with an inexplicable pain that 
persisted despite there being no obvious injuries and those who 
had clearly suffered major injuries but for whom there was either 
little or no pain, or, a marked delay in the experience of pain 
inconsistent with the injuries sustained within the heuristic of the 
specificity theory. Melzack and Wall state that: 
The link between pain and injury seems so obvious that it is widely 
believed that pain is always the result of physical damage and that 
the intensity of pain we feel is proportional to the severity of the 
injury… However there are many instances in which this relationship 
fails to hold up. For example, about 65% of soldiers who are 
severely wounded in battle and 20% of civilians who undergo major 
surgery report feeling little or no pain for hours or days after the 
injury or incision (Beecher, 1959). In contrast, no apparent injury 
can be detected in about 70% of people who suffer from chronic low 
back pain (Loeser, 1980). Clearly, the link between injury and pain 
is highly variable: injury may occur without pain, and pain without 
injury (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 15).  
 
 
Melzack and Wall went on to describe this variability and the lack of 
obviousness about the predictability of pain as the “Variable Link”. 
This variable link disrupts, that is ‘plays’, with the obviousness of 
the universal foot on the fire ringing Descartes’ Bell. But as Mott 
had found in the three groups of shell shock victims in World War 1, 
such variability had long been known to exist. Indeed in civilian 
western cultures, this variability dated back to at least the condition 
known as Railway Spine in the 1850s (Cohen and Quintner, 1999). 
What appears less and less plausible, in purely theoretical terms at 
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least, is the adequacy of the body-mind heuristic to determine the 
experience of human pain – physical or otherwise.  
 
Much more seems to be at play within this variable experience. The 
traditional view had been of course to ascribe the experience of 
persistent unexplained pain to being ‘all in the mind’, but this 
depends on what the mind might ‘be’. The mind’s being however, is 
itself fraught with the unprovable hypothesis (which amounts to 
Wittgenstein’s claim that it is mere speculation) and the Derridean 
epistemological problematic that it is trapped in the language of 
dualism.  
 
While the gate control theory had its excited proponents it was, like 
Derrida’s theories concerning linguistic play, both irreconcilable and 
irreducible to the metaphysics and discourse of the structured mind 
because it ruptured its circular argument. In this sense the Gate 
Control Theory was like Copernicus’s theories that decentred the 
earth of the 1500s, forever changed the paradigm and discourse for 
pain. What was at stake here for the proponents of specificity 
theory is that the mind and its psychodynamic progeny was not the 
centre of things that they had believed it to be, because the brain 
could not be a hardwired reflex driven and predictable organ 
(Szentagothai, 1993, p101). If we inspect the gate control theory 
more closely then the following diagrams are very useful for 
medical laymen coming to terms with its science.  
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Diagram1 – Gate Control Theory 
The gate control theory of pain
S
S = small fibres
E
T
On
Brain
E = excitatory inter-neuron
 
(Melzack and Wall, 1983) 
 
Here this diagram illustrates the first instance of the complication of 
Descartes’ rope. The white line (apropos of ‘the rope’) traveling 
from left (the body) to right (up to the brain) is interrupted by the 
circle “T” before going upwards as arrowed to the brain. ‘T’ 
represents the spinal region referred to as the dorsal horn or where 
the “modulation of spinal signals evoked by injury-detecting 
afferents [nerves]” (Cervero et al., 1976, Handwerker et al., 1975). 
The modulation of the signals is the crux of the theory. Melzack and 
Wall postulated that the dorsal horn of the spine acted like a gate 
between the signals of two different systems – the peripheral 
nervous system or the fibres below the dorsal horn and the central 
nervous system above the dorsal horn, which included the brain. In 
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diagram 1 the small fibres of the peripheral system signal to the 
dorsal horn which then through the excitatory inter-neuron ‘E’ 
passes through ‘T’ (the dorsal horn) and through this gate up to the 
brain to elicit pain. 
Diagram 2 – Gate Control Theory. 
The gate control theory of pain
S
S = small fibres
E
E = excitatory inter-neuron
L
L = large fibres I = inhibitory inter-neuron
I
T
Off
On
Brain
  
(Melzack and Wall, 1983) 
 
In diagram 2 there is the second level of complication to the 
hardwired rope of the specificity theory. If small fibres conveyed 
and excited the excitatory inter-neurons of the dorsal horn 
(effectively opening the gate) then large fibres of the peripheral 
nervous system could invoke an inhibitory inter-neuron response at 
the dorsal horn and effectively shut the gate to delay or inhibit the 
(pain) signal, and thus invoke the phenomena described in the 
variable link.  
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Diagram 3 – Gate Control Theory 
The gate control theory of pain
S
S = small fibres
E
E = excitatory inter-neuron
L
L = large fibres I = inhibitory inter-neuron
I
T
Off
On
Brain
CENTRAL CONTROL
CENTRAL CONTROL
 
(Melzack and Wall, 1983) 
 
In diagram 3 there is a third level of complication to Descartes’ rope 
that was to “evoke controversy among scientists and clinicians in 
the field of pain.” (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 233). Melzack and 
Wall postulated that pain was engendered not just by upwards 
traveling signals that either passed or not through the gate of the 
dorsal horn but through that which Janos Szentagothai was to call 
‘downwards causation’, which involved the central nervous system 
sending signals of its own to either open or close the gate(s) 
(Szentagothai, 1984, p 1). This part of the theory invoked a brain 
that was anything but hardwired, in-so-far-as pain was not merely 
reflected by the brain as a reflex response when peripheral system 
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nociception or injury occurred. Instead the brain could of itself 
mediate and/or interfere with and even engender the experience of 
pain.  
 
Quite how the brain was able to do this was a complete mystery but 
the idea of a downwards central nervous system causation (that is 
an active brain beyond a passively fixed, reflexive and therefore 
predictable organ) had been born. This proffers a paradigm shift or 
at least the birth of a new paradigm both in understanding the way 
the brain mediates and begets our ontology and in the way our 
ontology organizes our brain’s neurophenomenology.  Indeed, this 
birth seems similar to the one Derrida wrote of when he concluded 
his Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences (coincidentally also dated in the mid 1960s) with: 
…a kind of question, let us still call it historical, whose conception, 
formation, gestation and labour we are only catching a glimpse of 
today… when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming 
itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in 
the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, 
mute, infant and terrifying form of monstrosity. (Derrida,1978, p 
370). 
 
The monstrosity of this birth of the gate control theory was - like 
Derrida’s ‘birth’ of the noncentre and its play in linguistic 
epistemology - its invasion of the universal problematic, that is to 
say, its decentring of Descartes’ bell being a natural site with a 
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locus – a centre. With the gate control theory, there was something 
else at play that spoke of an entirely new and complex dimension 
as Melzack and Wall themselves concluded: “We now suspect that 
there is a further dimension which could explain the plasticity of 
connections.” (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 239).  Given this 
monstrosity, the gate control theory had its strident critics and 
“provoked outrage in believers of specificity theory” (Melzack and 
Wall, 1983, p 233). It was attacked with vituperation and, for many 
years, as being incomplete and lacking veracity. These responses, 
however were “modified when careful experimenters observed 
modulation of spinal signals.” (Melzack and Wall, 1983, p 234).  
 
Melzack and Wall had the last word against those critics of the time 
(early 1980s) when they clarified: 
…The gate control theory, by eschewing a straight through pain 
pathway and a rigid relationship between injury and pain, is able to 
give serious consideration to prolonged neural activities related to 
pain. There is little doubt that such mechanisms are necessary to 
explain several fascinating clinical and experimental observations. 
  
We formulated a hypothesis that seemed to us to bring together all 
the facts available in 1965. Since that time much has changed.  
Some of the ‘facts’ were wrong. Much more is known now. (Melzack 
and Wall, 1983, p 256, 234). 
        
If that last statement that much more is known was true in 1983, 
then it is even more so in the 2000s, if only because the advances 
in neurobiological research have grown exponentially in those two 
decades (Le van Quyen, 2003; Faingold, 2004). If in the mid1960s, 
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Derrida introduced the historical question of the universal 
problematic of ‘play’, then it was also in the mid 1960s that Melzack 
and Wall introduced a neurophysiologcal universal problematic of 
‘play’ for body-mind dualism, and not only in terms of the human 
experience of pain.  
 
The first theoretical glimpses had been glimpsed of a brain that is 
other than hardwired and despite the latest neurophysiological 
advances and apprehensions, the brain remains “a miracle” 
(Chapman, 2004). In his presentation to the 2004 Annual Scientific 
Meeting of The Australian Pain Society, Professor of 
Neuropsychology at the University of Utah Richard Chapman, 
made the point that “pain is all in the brain” (Chapman, 2004, cited 
in presentation). Melzack and Wall’s gate control theory 
hypothesized that there was central nervous system involvement, 
that is, the brain was somehow involved in pain variability. Their 
locus of theoretical concentration however, remained the dorsal 
horn of spinal modulation as the gate for this nervous system 
involvement.  
 
In concentrating on the dorsal horn region of the spinal column, 
Melzack and Wall spotlighted that if the changes at the dorsal horn 
occurred to incur the variable link of pain, then the brain must be 
involved in downwards causations that defied our previous brain 
theories. The variable central nervous system involvement at the 
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dorsal horn came from the dark continent of the brain [5]. In other 
words, something miraculous was happening. There was always 
though, going to be the implied questions of the brain’s secrets: if 
the gate barred or facilitated access – then to what or from what 
was it opening or closing? If much more is now known about the 
brain, it was through the groundbreaking conceptual and scientific 
work of one extremely humble, shy and stunningly brilliant 
Hungarian professor of Neurophysiology, Janos Szentagothai and 
his colleagues Arbib and Erdi.  
 
    Neuroplasticity 
The concept of neuroplasticity sees the brain as a complex 
interpretative mechanism rather than simply as a device to receive 
and process information like a computer (Coderre et al, 1993, p 
259). Hitherto this hardwired concept of the brain has been 
understood in terms of the classical reflex principle (Szentagothai, 
1993, p 101). This classical reflex theory is to neurology what the 
specificity theory is to pain. Both are undoubtedly informed by 
Descartes’ rope ringing (that is to say a hardwired brain processing 
upwards travelling reflexed responses) in fixed centres within this 
hardwired brain that, for pain at least, rings a bell. Here, the brain is 
a device. In other words input to the system equals the output of the 
system. This paradigm shifting concept of neuroplasticity, however, 
views the brain as being a self-organising and interpreting 
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complexity that led Janos Szentagothai and his colleagues Arbib 
and Erdi to argue: 
…the philosophical tradition of hermeneutics which is a priori neither 
monist or dualist, can be applied to the brain. Playing with the idea 
that the “device approach” to the brain and the philosophical 
approach can be reconciled, we have concluded that the brain is a 
physical structure which is controlled and also controls, learns and 
teaches, processes and creates information, recognises and 
generates patterns, organises its environment and is organised by it. 
(Arbib et al, 1997, p 234) 
 
Implicit in these binary interactions is the notion that these opposites 
of learning and teaching, processing and creating, recognising and 
generating are not operating in opposition but rather, co-operate 
inseparably from the other. Szentagothai points out that the brain is 
both pupil and teacher, processor and creator, recogniser and 
generator, environmental organiser and yet it is something that is 
organised by the environment. It is not a device of either/or but 
inseparably engenders both our ontology and neurophenomenology. 
That is to say there is no way of separating the biophysics of our 
being from the being of our biophysics (Rudrauf et al, 2003). 
 
Susan Greenfield’s observation is pertinent here concerning the 
concept of human clones that would have theoretically, identical 
brains (Greenfield, 2002). She points out that these clones could not 
be identical ontologically because their brain would not be the same. 
This is because their second to second ontology would differ from 
each other and thus their brains would have different neuronal 
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organisations and therefore each supposedly identical subject would 
engender vastly different subjective experiences (Greenfield, 2002, p 
20). The brain then is always already involved in the recording and 
formation of this subjective experience. Our ontology and 
neurophenomenology is entailed in ways that entail each other, that 
is to say, our neurophenomenology engenders our ontology, and, our 
ontology engenders our neurophenomenology. As Szentagothai 
concludes, the brain: 
 …is an ‘object’ of interpretation, but also it is itself an interpreter. 
The brain not only perceives but also creates new reality: it is a 
hermeneutic device. Not only are our theories of the brain 
metaphors, the brain itself represents the world through schemas, 
which may themselves be viewed as metaphors. (Arbib et al, 1997, 
p 234). 
 
Szentagothai had ventured into the dark continent of the brain, not 
through speculation or the teleology of metaphysics but, through 
scientific experiments involving the cultivation of nervous tissues. 
What he found as a result of these experiments is still actively 
challenging thinking not only about the brain but ontology as well. 
He thought the discovery of self-organisiation necessitated the 
rethinking of all that had been thought self-evident through 
Cartesian discourse, not only about the brain but about how such a 
discourse thought it engaged in the phenomenal world. 
Szentagothai considered this was a problem that went well beyond 
the science of neurobiology (Szentagothai, 1993, p 100). This 
seems valid when a theoretical point from the above conclusion 
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(that the brain is a hermeneutic device that none-the-less 
represents the world through schemas that can be viewed 
themselves as metaphors), invites the idea that such metaphoricity 
sees the brain involved in what I termed ‘a creation-ness’ in A Bell 
in the Storm. This ‘creation-ness’ is beyond the heuristic of the 
hardwired reflexive organ, which Szentagothai described as ‘self-
organisation and/or autopoiesis’ (Szentagothai, 1993, p101). The 
self-organising or autopoietic brain is beyond mere speculation, that 
is, such ‘creation-ness’ can actually be observed. As Szentagothai 
stated:  
The classical reflex principle – as the basis of neural functions – has 
to yield to new ideas, like autopoiesis and/or self-organisiation, as 
the basic paradigm in the framework of which the essence of the 
neural activity can be better understood… Under suitable conditions, 
both in nervous tissue cultures and embryonic tissue recombination 
experiments, the conditions of such autopoietic activity can be 
studied. (Szentagothai, 1993, p 101). 
 
This evidence of self-organisation requires the brain’s involvement 
in engendering pain to be above scientific hypothesis and 
theoretical speculation. In his groundbreaking essay “Self-
organisation: the Basic Principle of Neural Functions”, Szentagothai 
used the term ‘autopoiesis’ to describe the ‘self-organising’ 
processes of the brain. He referred to “…the concept of self-
organisation as the principle in which I believe neural activity to 
have its origins.” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 112). The theory of the 
brain working as an interpretative hermeneutic device, which also 
uses metaphor and metonym to interpret the phenomenal world 
61 
 62
through a schemata of creation-ness, beyond the practical limits of 
a processing device like a computer. 
 
Under clinical experimentation, autopoiesis is there to be seen and 
not merely speculated. Szentagothai, then, was like Galileo on the 
back of Copernicus’s initial hypothesis actively witnessing the new 
space – the new universe of our miraculous brain. If Melzack and 
Wall were the nascent theoreticians in this autopoietic paradigm 
shift and like Copernicus who hypothesised the Earth was not the 
centre, then Szentagothai was the Galileo following Copernicus, 
who actually witnessed that the centre was indeed elsewhere. 
Szentagothai thus upgraded ideas of our brain as miraculous, from 
hypothesis to integrated theory. Szentagothai was, to borrow from 
Ezra Pound, making it new! (Pound, 1914 cited in Rothenburg and 
Joris, 1995, p 372). Unlike Pound however, Szentagothai was far 
more cautious about any proclamations or the deliverance of any 
manifesto of conclusive truth-claim, because, like the universe, the 
brain was simply too complex and big to proclaim over: 
Peter Erdi and myself had originally more ambitious goals in mind 
when starting our common work, i.e. even in playing with the thought 
that an explicit ‘brain theory’ might be the ultimate objective 
envisaged. Recently we have both become more modest in 
understanding that it would be more realistic to abide with certain 
elements that might contribute to a brain-theory in the more distant 
future. (Szentagothai, 1993, p 102) 
 
In other words, a reliable and predictable theory of the brain would 
take a more distant future to crack the codes of the self-organising 
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brain. In theoretical terms Erdi and Szentagothai have stopped 
dancing around and have begun to contemplate Culler’s secret of 
epistemological humility in the face of a staggering complexity. Erdi 
and Szentagothai then “warned” theoreticians themselves about:  
The remarkable new observations… on ‘memory fields’… that 
legitimate neurobiology may soon be in the position to make direct 
biological observations about functions of the brain that were 
hitherto considered as being in the exclusive domain of theory 
(Szentagothai, 1993, p 113).  
 
This statement declares that the self-organising brain thrusts us into 
the domain of a self-organising unpredictability and a metaphoricity 
that had previously been the exclusive domain of linguistic theory. 
My argument here then is that this is the same ontological, 
epistemological, and hitherto, purely theoretical reference, of the 
poststructuralist enquirers Derrida, Paul de Man, Roland Barthes, 
Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva and others. Could it be that both 
language and the brain engender rather than reflect our 
phenomenal world in theoretically similar self-organising ways?   
The idea of a theoretical cooperation between post-structuralist 
linguistics and the corporeal self-organisation of the brain began 
during a conversation I had with John Quintner in his rooms, about 
three months after my accident. John was lamenting the lack of a 
mapped medical theoretical territory beyond the dualistic approach 
to pain.  John concluded: “Pain comes out of complexities in the 
brain we are only beginning to understand.” (Personal 
correspondence, 2000). Immediately I thought of Derrida’s use of 
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Montaigne’s “We need to interpret interpretations more than to 
interpret things.”  Then my thoughts turned to those complexities in 
the brain and I made the association with Derrida’s ideas of ‘play’; 
particularly his declaration that “Play is the disruption of presence.” 
(Derrida, 1978, p 367). I discussed with John the idea that dualism 
was simply a form of interpreting pain that nonetheless had 
accumulated a dominant and dominating presence. The presence 
of dualism in this context was however, given to complexities that 
disrupted and played with this presence and, there was, over fifty 
years of mapped literary theoretical terrain that perhaps, could 
guide us. We quickly exchanged articles and books that began a 
collaboration that has been published internationally and expanded 
to include Foundation Professor AndrewTaylor (Edith Cowan 
University), Associate Professor Milton Cohen (University of New 
South Wales), Mr Owen Williamson (Spinal Surgeon, Monash 
University), and Associate Professor Jim Katz (Washington State 
University, USA). 
 
In attendance at the March, 2004 Annual Scientific Meeting of the 
Australian Pain Society in Canberra, I was particularly struck by 
Chapman’s finding that while we understand so much more now 
than Szentagothai pioneered (in particular nonlinear theory). 
Chapman pointed out that he could research the autopoietic and/or 
self-organising brain to certain vantage points before he had to 
concede “…then a miracle occurs and you get pain” (Chapman, 
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2004). I include his actual slide used in the lecture with his kind 
permission: 
CAS Theory Is Nonlinear
It is an alternative to mechanistic reductionism.
  
This knowledge of the brain’s self-organisation does not however, 
carry with it the great secrets of how exactly the brain goes about 
this self-organisation. A humility that urges caution against the 
proclamation of truth claims ought to be encouraged, not least 
because even the best researchers still don’t know what pain is - as 
step two’s irony in the above slide depicts. They know that pain 
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exists but not how it exists or what exactly it is either in time, space 
or matter (Chapman, 2004). The closest science has can come to 
this is to record what we think it might be in blood flow or perfusion 
studies of functional MRIs, McGill Pain Questionnaires and 
personal narratives (Williamson et al, 2005). Again a confluence 
between literary and pain theory occurs: for pain in medicine as for 
the text in literary theory, there is, as Culler says,  
…always more to know, but, more specifically and more painfully, 
because theory is itself the questioning of presumed results and the 
assumptions on which they are based. The nature of theory is to 
undo, through a contesting of premises and postulates, what you 
thought you knew, so the effects of theory are not predictable. ” 
(Culler, 1997, p 17) 
 
Nor is the brain’s self-organisation, predictable.  
 
 Language and self-organising systems of difference 
 
If the brain engenders rather than reflects our experience in much the 
same way language has been speculated to function since Saussure, 
then, is there a legitimate confluence between language, 
consciousness and the autopoietic brain. This confluence has been the 
theoretical and research terrain of the Argentinean neurobiologists 
Humberto Maturana and his colleague, Francisco Varela’s general 
‘Biology of Cognition’. (Maturana, 1995) Maturana discusses this 
biology of cognition on his web site:  
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The Biology of Cognition is an explanatory proposition that attempts to 
show how human cognitive processes arise from the operation of 
human beings as living systems. As much, The Biology of Cognition 
entails reflexions oriented to understand living systems, their 
evolutionary history, language as a biological phenomenon, the nature 
of explanations, and the origin of humaness. As a reflection on how 
we do what we do as observers it is a study in the epistemology of 
knowledge. But, and at the same time as a reflection on how we exist 
in language as languaging beings, it is a study on human relations. 
(Maturana, 1995) 
  
Both Maturana and Varela have explicitly argued for a self-
organising biological co-operation with language that engenders 
both our ontology and our neurophenomenology. Maturana 
explicitly argues that our ‘humanness’ as ‘languaging beings’ sees 
language and our beingness, and the brain and our beingness as 
cooperative process that cannot be teased apart let alone reduced 
to separate entities or phenomena. This position begs the question 
though that this bio-linguistic cooperation has always already 
existed. In Part ‘6’ of his essay titled ‘Philosophical Consequences’ 
Szentagothai ventured, “We have no other alternative than to go 
along with the challenge of an entirely new paradigm.” Szentagothai 
continued that the “…true autopoietic nature of neural functions… 
(presents) an entirely new challenge for ‘brain-mind philosophy” 
(Szentagothai, 1993, p 114). He concluded: “We would consider 
this as a challenge for thinkers with a professional background in 
philosophy.” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 114).  
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In the Medical Journal of Australia editor Martin B Van Der Weyden 
cited the United States physician and ethicist Howard Brody in 
linking the theories and endeavours behind both literature and 
medicine:  
Stories are essential as a means of perceiving how scientific 
knowledge in its generality can be applied to individuals in all their 
particularity. The exploration of literature is now a growth area in 
some medical schools. (Van der Weyden, 2002, p 405) 
 
Narrative and medicine are making appearances together in many 
of the influential medical journals (New England Journal of 
Medicine, British Medical Journal, The Lancet, Australian Medical 
Journal) but they ought to do so with a caution in first 
acknowledging the past one hundred years of literary theory 
discourse that leads us to Derrida, Hart and Culler’s vantage points 
of a chastened alterity and a requirement to contemplate the secret. 
It would seem that a self-organising biology is cooperative with self-
organising linguistic theories and, together, may facilitate scientific 
and medical knowledge by providing an epistemological space for 
medical science to grow outside the domains dualism and its 
subsequent reliance on a discourse of mechanistic and 
reductionistic determinism. For, as Derrida pointed out, this 
determinism is a quest for certitude that “…dreams of deciphering a 
truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign and 
which leaves the necessity of interpretation as an exile” (Derrida, 
1978, p 369).  Given the evidence of the autopoietic brain, there 
has perhaps never been more evidence to suggest that a wider 
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more open and active interpretative practice, beyond the language 
of dualism, should be included at all levels of interpreting pain in 
others. Pain Medicine ought to be a stochastic enterprise that in 
acknowledging the self-organising brain, also acknowledges that it 
is as dependent upon the art of interpretation as is literature.  
 
Szentagothai’s self-organising brain and Maturana’s findings and 
conclusions concerning the Biology of Cognition and language 
intersect with Saussure’s point about language: “…in language 
there are only differences.” (Saussure, 1915, p 121)  If we were to 
interchange language with the brain in the above apprehension, 
then the most influentially Copernicun comment on linguistics in the 
last one hundred years has potentially the same ramifications for 
how our second to second subjective experience is engendered 
rather than reflected by our miraculous brain (Greenfield, 2002, p 
91). For if one was to exchange the sign ‘philosophy’ with ‘literary 
theory’ (for both signifiers apprehend the relevant epistemology at 
stake here), then Szentagothai’s call for help from professional 
thinkers in theory may reveal the ground for an transdisciplinary 
theory that sees the subject in pain supported by the positions 
beyond the dualism of  Descartes’ bell.  
 
The ground for this transdisciplinary theory may well combine 
Derrida’s noncentred play cooperating with Szentagothai’s 
autopoietic and self-organising brain, and given the irrefutability of 
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the brain’s autopoiesis, are compelling, because of the way both 
language and the brain co-operate in the invasion of ‘the universal 
problematic’ (Derrida, 1978, p 354). For both the brain and 
language play with the phenomenal world and go about their 
sense-making business through very complex systems of self-
organising contiguity, as the noted contemporary neurologist VS 
Ramachandran  put it: “The brain makes sense of the world through 
a series of comparisons.” (Ramachandran, 1999, p 152). 
Ramachandran’s ‘comparisons’ closely resemble Saussure’s point, 
“…in language there are only differences” (Saussure, 1915, p 121). 
Our ‘humanness’ in Maturana’s terms goes about its sense-making 
through linguistic and neuronal self-organising networks relating to 
each other contiguously. As the editors of one literary theory 
anthology write in what is now a commonplace in their field, “In 
effect, language functions by identifying the differences between 
signs rather than revealing pre-existing truths or essences” (Rice 
and Waugh, 1998, p 4).   
  
There are however, two further qualities the brain cooperates with 
poststructural notions of language. The first quality is Derrida’s 
notion of the noncentre and Szentagothai’s observations on the 
noncentredness of neural activity. The second, is Szentagothai’s 
signpost of negentropy (negative entropy) that align with Derrida’s 
ideas concerning supplementarity and linguistic play (Quintner et al, 
2003). I will address these in turn now. 
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Noncentredness  
In discussing the potency of the brain’s noncentredness, 
Szentagothai remarked:  
One of the most miraculous features of neural systems is that the 
same piece of neural tissue can perform a large variety of 
processing functions, depending on the input… This variety is 
indeed so large that the beholder is naturally tempted to become 
sceptic about the idea of a modular architectonics principle of the 
cortex…” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 112) 
 
It seems the complexity of these neural systems defies the idea that 
any one locus of the brain is the centre for any one function or 
subjective experience. This noncentred contiguous complexity is 
similar to the quantum physicist Fotini Kalamara‘s notions of how 
atoms relate within a larger system of matter: “An atom is a piece of 
the network and its identity is given by its relation to the rest of the 
network.” (Kalamara, 2005, p, 48). This relation to the rest of the 
network is theoretically congruent with Saussure’s anti-essentialist 
system of differences and contiguity in language and Derrida’s 
presence of the noncentre - where the fixed origin or archè of signs 
in a contiguous linguistic system of differences is elsewhere 
(Derrida, 1978, p 354). Szentagothai’s scepticism concerning a 
modular [lineal] architectonics of the cortex is like Kalamara’s atoms 
in matter and Saussure’s signs in language, in as much as neurons 
have no fixed identity or central intrinsic function, rather, they relate 
to other neurons in highly noncentred and contiguous ways to the 
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rest of the network. Any intrinsic and centred identity and meaning 
is therefore not able to be reduced to the essence of individual parts 
but through the way these parts relate and contribute to an 
irreducible and miraculous whole in an infinitely complex system of 
differences (Rudrauf et al, 2003).  
 
In short, there can be no bell or centred function in the brain that 
becomes the fixed origin of a sole functionality in the processing of 
pain. This however begs the question of just what might the 
noncentre be? If the centre in Derridean terms is elsewhere – then 
what is the nature of this elsewhere-ness and the brain? At this 
vantage point I recall my first apprehension of Derrida’s noncentre 
as a concept when I was being taught Derridean theory by 
Professor Andrew Taylor in an honours class just before my 
accident in April 2000. He gave a few examples: the world wide 
web, it has no centre, no one single point of arche or origin and 
forms an interwoven type of construction more like a tissue is 
interwoven. Any water mass has no one point of molecular origin 
rather like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizoid patterns that again 
interconnect and interweave to form the overall lawn of the 
ryhsomic whole (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Within the lawn, 
there is no intrinsic origin where rhysomic patterns literally begin, as 
they extend and expand their complex web of heterogeneity within 
that which Derrida termed ‘…the presence of the noncentre’ 
(Derrida, 1978, p 356). 
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Another highly developed example of the noncentre concerns this 
MRI (below) depicting perfusion of blood flow in the brain over 
timed intervals related to the experience of chronic pain. 
Thalamic
blood flow
asymmetry
during
chronic
pain. 
  
 
In effect – we are observing a cartoon of the brain (as one frame is 
contiguously different to the other in space and time) depicting the 
intensity of blood perfusion to multiple and various parts of the brain 
in a patient in persistent pain. Here the doctors involved have 
concentrated on the thalamic areas ringed in red on the right, but of 
course there are multiple areas throughout the cortical regions that 
are ‘lighting up’ from blue, to green to yellow to red, which directly 
explicate Szentagothai’s variety of processing functions 
observations as “one of the most miraculous features of neural 
systems.” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 112) In this sense this functional 
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MRI of the perfusion of blood flow is a map as readable as the 
Bureau of Meteorology’s radar scan is for a lay storm-chaser to 
interpret, regarding areas of rain intensity indicating the likelihood of 
lightning in thunderstorms.  
 
These weather scans are available to the public on the internet and 
are in general, easily interpreted. For the MRI scan, the heaviest 
perfusion of blood flow is in red (just like the heaviest rain is in red 
on the radar), then descending to yellow, then green then blue. The 
similarities with a storm-chaser reading a radar continue in-so-far-
as the red through to blue areas do not of themselves discover a 
storm – rather they depict activity that is known to be associated 
with these phenomena. That is, intense rain may have an 
association with thunder and lighting, and intense perfusion of blood 
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flow with pain, but neither can tell us what either a storm or pain is. 
What is clear though, is that there is no Cartesian centre ’F’; no bell 
in the brain that rings in the human experience of pain; because the 
neural activity is going off all over the place (Buchanan, 2005, p 
235). Szentagothai again points out this noncentred presence when 
he states:  
…the processing at the …cortical level is only the very first step on 
an infinitely long journey… [that] makes one realise the immense 
complexity of the total connectivity of the brain... It would lead us far 
beyond… (any) line of speculation in order to develop a brain theory 
of our own.” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 111 -12)  
 
Szentagothai has found that not only is the brain autopoietic or self-
organising but is also in its processing functionality – noncentred. It 
is my argument however that, any Cartesian centre ‘F’ is elsewhere 
both in the linguistic and neurobiological sense. This apprehension 
however then determines the noncentre otherwise than as loss of 
centre (Derrida, 1978, p 370) in the same way Galileo’s 
confirmation of Copernicus’s loss of centre [of the earth] meant we 
didn’t so much lose the Earth’s importance as the centre of the 
universe as gain the affirmation that the universe is bigger and 
more complex than we had ever supposed. In this sense, a general 
and transdisciplinary interpretation cannot be exiled here, since the 
only conclusive medico-scientific finding to make concerning the 
presence of this noncentre is Montaigne’s point, “We need to 
interpret interpretations more than to interpret things.”(Cited, 
Derrida, 1978, p 350).  
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Negentropy 
The second quality of neuronal self-organisation: Szentagothai’s 
final signpost in terms of a philosophical apprehension of the brain: 
negentropy. Negentropy is the concept of a system which differs to 
Newton’s second Law of Nature: entropy. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines negentropy as negative entropy. If entropy is the 
loss of energy given off by any system for example light and heat 
from “…the framework of our classical views on the physical world 
as being closed (laws of thermodynamics etc) (Szentagothai, 1993, 
p 114), then negentropy is the lack of this entropy occurring in a 
predictable way. In a negentropic system, more than the 
thermodynamics of entropy is going on and the negentropy defies 
our abilities to interpret the system predictably. Szentagothai 
pointed out that all of his findings concerning the open systems of 
downwards causation, self-organisation and noncentredness were 
incompatible, or in Derridean terms irreducible, with the classical 
Cartesian reflex paradigm: 
As long as the original Cartesian reflex paradigm of nervous system 
was valid, there was simply no way to accept ‘downwards causation’ 
(etc)… within the framework of our classical views on the physical 
world being closed… However, if higher neural functions were 
visualised … this obstacle might be overcome in the framework of 
the relation between information and order (negentropy). 
(Szentagothai, 1993, p 114.)    
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The parenthesis of the word ‘negentropy’ above here is a very 
important signpost, for both literally and figuratively, any definition of 
negentropy is more, much more, than ‘the lineal relation between 
information and order and cause and effect’ (Szentagothai, 1993, p 
114). In Derridean terms, certitude is ‘elsewhere’. Szentagothai’s 
close colleague, Peter Erdi explored this unpredictable complexity 
in the brains systems of differences before and after Szentagothai’s 
death (Erdi, 1993). In his paper ‘Neurodynamic System Theory: 
Scope and Limits’, Erdi critiqued many different theories and 
approaches, from the difference between static and dynamic 
structuralism through to chaos theory in a bid to tease out a way of 
structurally coping with the complexity of the brain. Erdi found: 
Such kinds of concepts as circular and network causality, chaos, 
unpredictability, information, emergence, complexity, etc., lead to 
the limits of ‘dynamic structuralism’. The hegemony of the 
Newtonian paradigm, has… been weakened by physics and 
chemistry motivated neostructuralist theories such as the theory of 
dissipative structures, and of synergetics. In spite of their ambitious 
endeavours, and undeniable success, no theory of the brain can be 
given within a pure structuralist framework. (Erdi, 1993, p 147) 
 
No matter how intricate and complex the structuralist theory, it 
simply is unable to cope with the self-organising, noncentred, 
negentropic and therefore unpredictable complexities of the brain. 
Whether the signifiers self-organising, noncentred and negentropy 
denote and/or connote the necessary signifieds to cope with the 
complexities of the neurodynamic system remains to be seen. Erdi, 
as long ago as 1993, referred to the brain’s complexity as self-
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referential. The brain’s structurality, like language’s structurality in 
Derrida’s terms, escapes its own structurality. Erdi’s argument is 
science’s chaos, unpredictability, traffic information, and/or 
emergence are signifiers limited in their ability to reflect the 
conceptual neurodynamic complexity going on. Such self-
referentiality defies any structuralist theory to interpret the brain and 
Erdi concluded, “Brain theory… ought to be ‘poststructuralist’. (Erdi, 
1993, p 147).  
 
Erdi was utterly clear: no structure or structuralist approach, no 
matter how dynamic can cope with the three factors that are at 
constant complex play in making sense of the self-referential brain 
because: 1., it has the ability to self-organise; 2., it goes about this 
self-organisation in infinitely complex heterogenic noncentred ways; 
and 3., it is a system that within this autopoietic noncentredness 
may induce activities that gain rather than lose energy, or, as 
Faingold succinctly defines it, “[where] the output of a system can 
exceed the input.” (Faingold, 2004, p 57)   
 
Richard Chapman’s miracle at step two has reappeared: input 
occurs, then a miracle happens and the output exceeds the input. 
Such a system sees lived experiences like persistent pain emerge 
in unpredictable ways, which defy our scientific heuristic 
endeavours but particularly our common sense and especially, the 
language of dualism.  
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To illustrate however, how the language of dualism still pervades 
the scientific hermeneutics of the brain, Owen Williamson, a spinal 
surgeon of the Medical School at Monash University, asked 
Richard Chapman after his presentation at the 2004 Pain 
conference what he thought about the occurrence of the miracle of 
the brain and pain, and this was Richard Chapman’s reply: 
My view of the miracle is that it is emergence. Emergent properties 
are always a surprise, given the elements from which the thing 
emerges. However, I don’t mean to imply “merely” emergence, as 
phenomenal reality is a huge leap from the biological brain. It would 
seem that brains are machines designed to produce the emergent 
phenomenon of consciousness. This, I guess, is adaptation to the 
environment. Clearly, pain is an aspect of consciousness, and I 
must reason, then that it is an emergent property. Sometimes, it 
does not emerge when nociception is present. We need to 
understand why this happens. (Chapman, personal email 
correspondence to Wiiliamson, 2004)            
 
In any interpretation of Richard Chapman’s reply it is necessary to 
scrutinize what is meant by ‘emergence’ within the discourse of 
neurobiological science.  Mikulecky (1996) defines emergence as 
‘the sudden and unpredictable appearance of new forms of 
organization.’ (Mikulecky, 1996, p 181)  If we return to Melzack and 
Wall’s variable link, sometimes pain does emerge when nociception 
in the instant is either not present or cannot be detected. In fact it is 
pain without lesion (ergo nociception) that is the bearer of the 
heaviest investment in a reductionist and circular dualism - certainly 
in medico-legal discourse as well as the medico-epistemological 
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problems posed by diagnoses such a Railway Spine, Shell Shock, 
Repetitive Strain Injury, Fybromyalgia and Trauma Disability 
(Quinter and Cohen, 1996). There is a far greater concern however, 
with the position with Richard Chapman’s ‘and I must reason’ of the 
brain as machine that is essentially res extensa, that is the brain as 
machine concerns a view of the brain that is of a purely separate 
body from the consciousness that is presumably of the separate res 
cogitans of the mind. Richard Chapman’s argument is thus trapped 
in the familiar circle of dualism because if the brain is not separable 
from consciousness then the oppositions of res extensa and res 
cogitans can only exist in a circular story of themselves.  
 
The signifier emergence here may become a transcendental 
signified for the miracle while still accommodating the language of 
dualism that reflects a machine that is res extensa complete with its 
opposite, consciousness: res cogitans. Owen Williamson’s 
conjecture (below) to Richard Chapman’s explanation is worth 
including here not only because of its succinct validity, but because 
it demands the inclusion of an active interpretation outside the 
language of dualism: 
I’m not sure what he [Richard Chapman] means by emergence, 
other than consciousness arises from the brain, because we have 
brains and are conscious. It seems he is relabelling the miracle, 
without increasing understanding. (Personal email correspondence 
to author, Williamson, 2004)   
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This was Erdi and Szentagothai’s point over eleven years ago, that 
in turn echoed Derrida’s invasion of the universal problematic 
nearly thirty years before that: 
What can a brain theoretican do after realizing the crisis of the 
notion of universal rationality? He or she can attempt to accept that 
modern (reductionist) science lacks self-reflexivity and perhaps turn 
to hermeneutics and emphasise the cyclic nature of perception and 
learning (Erdi, 1993, p 148). 
 
The ‘crisis of the notion of universal rationality’ I take to be the 
equivalent of Derrida’s invasion of the universal problematic, as 
both realize the miracle is too playful or self-reflexive to rationalise 
or reduce to its component parts. Little wonder Szentagothai left it 
“as a challenge for thinkers with a professional background in 
philosophy” (Szentagothai, 1993, p 114). Whether a hermeneutics 
and/or a poetics would offer more supportable and suitable 
vantages from which to engage such active interpretation was a 
valid concern to Szentagothai’s challenge. Intrinsically what is still 
at stake here is nothing less than the (poststructural) self-referential 
brain’s engenderment of human sentience and the ensuing 
philosophy, theory, science and cultural studies of pain, and this 
endgenderment moves between (as literary/linguistic theory has for 
the last one hundred years) the important differences between a 
Hermeneutics and a Poetics.  
 
Jonathon Culler defines a Poetics as ‘…modeled on linguistics’ 
which ‘takes meanings as what must be accounted for and tries to 
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work out how they are possible.’ (Culler, 1997, p 61). The 
endeavour of the A Poetics then is Montaigne and Derrida’s 
concerns with the necessity of interpretations: that is, we need to 
interpret interpretations more than to interpret things. This is 
especially the case when the thing is both self-referential and 
aporetic, which is the case for the emergence of pain from the self-
referential brain. Culler accounts for the contrast of a Hermeneutics 
as a heuristic endeavour that ‘starts with things and seeks to 
interpret them, to tell us what they really mean.’ (Culler, 1997, p 
61). The hermeneutic approach bids to uncover the secret rather 
than contemplate it, that is, it attempts to tell us what is really going 
on, and, in so doing falls into the trap of proclaiming certitude when 
the aporetic encounter always spawns more questions than  
answers. Erdi’s point concerning notions of universal rationality 
lacking self-reflexivity is crucial because any science of the brain 
and pain is compelled to enter the interpretative realm of a Poetics 
because the heuristic endeavour of a hermeneutics is limited by the 
nature of pain’s aporia. These limitations are compounded when 
the discourse of medical science can no longer validate its own 
metaphysics, especially within the language of dualism, under the 
weight of the self-referential yet very biophysical, miraculous and 
therefore unpredictable brain. 
 
 
 
82 
 83
Chapter 4 
Language, the Brain and Pain: the problem of reference in the 
intersubjective befalling of the Uncanny 
 
In the theory of self-referential linguistics and deconstruction, a 
theoretical and historical disquiet has emerged, regarding weighty 
misgivings of deconstruction eschewing a reference that makes 
sense of the world (Caruth, 1996, p 73). This disquiet alleges that 
self-referentiality prevents a knowledgeable access to history, 
language and even cognition. That is, a problem of reference 
ensues from its very self-referentiality. This disquiet has led to an 
allegation that self-referential notions spawn a denial of historical 
access to the world and especially the world of science. Cathy 
Caruth sums up these concerns: 
The constant focus by poststructuralists on the linguistic devices by 
which meaning is produced, and by “deconstruction” on the 
difficulties these devices create for our understanding of a text, 
seems to amount to a claim that language cannot refer adequately 
to the world and indeed may not truly refer to anything at all, leaving 
literature and language, and even consciousness in general, cut off 
from historical reality. (Caruth,1996, p 73 – 4)    
Implicit in Caruth’s concerns is a nexus between language and 
consciousness. Maturana’s point about us being languaging beings 
is highly relevant here because of consciousness’s inseparability 
from a self-organising biology that itself defies a universal and 
predictable structure:  
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As much, The Biology of Cognition entails reflexions oriented to 
understand living systems, …language as a biological phenomenon, 
the nature of explanations, and the origin of humaness. As a 
reflection on how we do what we do as observers it is a study in the 
epistemology of knowledge. But, and at the same time as a 
reflection on how we exist in language as languaging beings, it is a 
study on human relations. (Maturana, 1995) 
 
The Cartesian dualism of I think therefore I am, is problematised 
through a linguistic and neurobiological play, which is mediated 
through systems of differences of both the brain and language that 
are not necessarily in opposition. Szentagothai and Erdi’s 
poststructure and Maturana’s biology of cognition invites us to 
consider a continuum of complexity. Descartes’ I think therefore I am 
therefore looks at the very least more like I am this miraculous self-
organising thing which is inseparable from my second to second 
ontological engagement with the environment and I operate within a 
self-organising language system therefore I think; and I think 
because I am this miraculous self-organising thing which is 
inseparable from my second to second ontological engagement with 
the environment… At this point I suspect Richard Chapman’s step 
two miracle makes its reappearance because we are denied access 
to the secrets of this miracle while knowing full well it is a miracle. 
  
Despite the inaccessibility of the miracle, the problem of reference 
remains and I would like to discuss briefly the signified(s) of 
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‘deconstruction’ in order to tease out the theoretical disquiet. Like any 
signifier, the signifieds of ‘deconstruction’ are subject to a play that 
can leave us in an epistemological metaphysics of presence. The risk 
is that ‘deconstruction’ takes on a currency of meaning unintended by 
the play it intended to apprehend. Derrida himself was well aware of 
this danger when he sought to clarify what deconstruction is by 
determining what it was not: 
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from 
the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take 
accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them 
in a certain way, because one always inhabits. and all the more 
when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the 
inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of 
subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that 
is to say without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the 
enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its 
own work. (Derrida, 1978, p 24). 
 
Deconstruction, Derrida tells us, is not a pulling apart of the text to 
reveal hidden and underlying universal truths or meanings that go on 
to necessarily affirm the principles of New Criticism and the natural 
principles of a humanist idealism: complexity, paradox, life affirming, 
irony, humour, seriousness, for example. [6] Rather, deconstruction 
is as Barbara Johnson phrased, “a teasing out of warring forces of 
signification within a text” (Johnson, 1985, p 5). Derrida in the film 
Derrida, describes it off-the-cuff as a process whereby any centre, 
has within it something that is always already present, that undoes its 
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own project, its own centrality, its own teleology. In language it is 
undoubtedly the always already present qualities of play, self-
organisation, noncentredness and the propensity of language to keep 
supplementing itself (Derrida, 1978, p 369). Supplementarity for 
Derrida, is the ability of language to keep gaining in not only its 
sense-making but in the literal number of signifiers and the differánce 
of the eventual signifieds, in the sense that the Complete Oxford 
English Dictionary is never complete but is in a constant 
diachronically dynamic state of ‘gain’, which shares an uncanny 
likeness to Szentagothai’s signpost of negentropy for the brain, in 
that the output of the language system exceeds its input.  
These linguistic features of a self-organising play, noncentredness 
and supplementarity have a striking resemblance in their 
poststructure to Szentagothai and Erdi’s self-referential brain with its 
own qualities of self-organisiation, noncentredness and negentropy. 
There is a crucial point to be made: both the brain and language in 
their self-referentiality pose great difficulties for any practice that, as 
Caruth suggests, seeks to model ‘…the principles of reference on 
those of natural law, or, we might say, of making reference like 
perception.’ (Caruth, 1996, p 74).  Caruth’s point is that when our 
perception and references become blurred then we can and do 
mistake our stories of natural law, for natural law. Nowhere is this 
clearer than in the ideas that were held as dogma, for many 
centuries, that the earth was the centre of the universe. All our 
perceptions dictated the centrist reference, as after all the sun rises 
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in the east and sets in the west, and the sun seems to circle us and 
not the other way around. 
That our perceptions may erroneously reference natural law has led 
us to establishing empirically based principles, such as the classical 
reflex principle in neurology, and/or the res cogitans of Cartesian 
dualism explicit in the specificity theory of pain, that are more stories 
of our perceptions than natural law. What is crucial to this insight is 
that it is not so much what we are perceiving that matters but, who is 
doing the perceiving.  
In my radio play To Fall Without Landing, the character Cathy suffers 
from Vestibular Syndrome where the phenomenal world swirls 
around her. Her persistent vertigo is caused by the earth literally 
falling through space when some abnormality in her abilities to 
stabilise and balance occurs. This syndrome is quite rare and is 
usually caused by an abnormality of the tiny vestibular bones in the 
inner ear or, as in Cathy’s case, when no abnormality is detected, the 
cause is often thought to be for psychological reasons. Cathy is 
referred to a psychiatrist called Searle. Her condition is at its worst 
when she opens her eyes and attempts to walk to someone. She 
often walks in tight circles with her head swirling around and around 
to try and keep the other ‘stable’ enough to focus. Searle asks her 
how this feels and she replies: 
 
Cathy I think we all know how I feel… because the 
bigger reality is we’re all just… like… me. 
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Searle How so? 
Cathy Falling through space on the third rock from a 
tiny sun…  
Searle You make it sound so nihilistic? 
   (Buchanan, 2005, p 263) 
 
Behind Searle’s objection is the American philosopher John R. 
Searle’s position that the existence of an external world is comprised 
of ‘brute facts’, like snow on Mount Everest (Searle, 1992, p 17).  His 
argument against deconstruction is that to deny our access to the 
brutally factual existence of the snow on Mount Everest is 
preposterous (Searle, 1992). Cathy’s swirling to the psychiatrist 
Searle, is also preposterous because we seem so empirically fixed 
by the ‘brute facts’ of our seeming fixity of place. This is akin to the 
joke: Did you hear about the literary theorist who got hit by a truck? 
He thought it was a cultural construct. But this is to miss the point 
about what Horst Ruthrof terms a ‘corporeal turn’ where the 
existence of the snow on Mount Everest is never denied, but how we 
interpret it and what it may mean to us is mediated in quasi-
perceptual ways (Ruthrof, 2000, p 9). Phenomenally, the snow is 
perceived through neurobiological structures that of themselves 
escape structurality. That is, these neurobiological structures do not 
reflect the pre-existent snow on the mountain as a simple reflex to an 
unmediated presence – rather these poststructures are deeply 
constitutive of the perception through their active self-referentiality. 
Such an active interpretation is further mediated when this perception 
88 
 89
is communicated to others through the self-referentiality of language. 
Ruthrof cites Helen Keller to apprehend this perceptual complexity: 
When I think of hills, I think of the upward strength I tread upon. 
When water is the object of my thought, I feel the cool shock of the 
plunge and the quick yielding of the waves that crisp and curl and 
ripple about my body. (Keller cited in Ruthrof, 2000, p 1).  
No-one is denying the external reality of these hills or waves. The 
idea of a brute fixity that amounts to a fixed mark of external 
empirical reference, which adheres timelessly as a universal law in 
terms of the ways we perceive this phenomena, seems more and 
more problematic. This problem of reference is further compounded 
when the phenomenal world is always mediated by the self-
referentiality of both the brain and language.  
 
  Subjective, intersubjective, objective 
Donald Davidson’s work problematises the traditional philosophical 
distinction between subjective and objective by examining the 
interconnectedness and inseparability of the intersubjective from 
the traditional subjective-objective binary (Davidson, 2001, p 7). 
Davidson argues that knowledge of our own perception (subjective) 
and the shared world (objective – that is Searle’s snow on Mt 
Everest) is always deeply influenced by the perceptions of others. 
This realm of the other’s perceptions he considers to be the 
intersubjective. He argues that the intersubjective is always at the 
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fore of our sense-making but that none of the three forms of 
knowledge could exist without the other: 
If I did not know what others think, I would have no thoughts of my 
own and so would not know what to think. If I did not know what I 
think, I would lack the ability to gauge the thoughts of others. 
Gauging the thoughts of others requires that I live in the same world 
with them, sharing many reactions to its major features, including its 
values. (Davidson, 2001, p 17).  
Here as Derrida would put it, there is always already a language 
system ‘inhabiting in a certain way’ (Derrida’s italics) the structures 
within those intersubjective values, which is engaged in the 
arbitrary process of culturally conceived sense-making systems to 
engender and communicate our gauging thoughts. Paul de Man, in 
his essay “The Resistance to Theory” attempted to distinguish 
reference from natural law (de Man, 1982). Necessarily de Man’s 
argument was tied to his understanding of the relationship between 
constative and performative language weaving that which we think 
we are reflecting, when in actuality, we are making up 
intersubjective stories as we go along (Caruth, 1996, p 73).  
 
De Man’s concentration upon the differences between constative 
and performative language is crucial because “the constative is 
language claiming to represent things that are already there, 
(whereas) the performative is the rhetorical operations, the acts of 
language, that undermine this claim by imposing linguistic 
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categories, bringing things into being, organizing the world rather 
than simply representing what is.” (Culller, 1997, p 102). The 
danger of constative language is that it reflects the world as we see 
it rather than the world as it actually might be. Clearly medical 
science invests its heuristic endeavour far more in a constative 
language and the representation of things as they seem, which is 
supported by the external reference of empirical evidence. The 
Gold Standard Evidence of the scientific method in Random 
Controlled Trials [7] typifies this constative objective from the 
description of diseases, for example, but it is also implicit in most 
nosological endeavour, including the more contentious pain 
syndromes such as Firbomyalgia [8] (Quintner et al, 2003). At this 
point the constative language of diagnosis becomes a verdict, 
which can, far from reflecting what is actually going on in people 
with pain, eschews interpretations outside the confines of its 
pronouncement and judgment that would necessarily entail 
emergent phenomena from the self-referential brain.  
 
In contrast, performative language engenders rather than reflects 
the world and, as it title suggests, its language brings a world into 
being and not the other way around. The language of literature 
sings the world into existence, and, creatively does. This is 
exemplified in J.L. Austin’s claim that performative language takes 
part in a world without either right or wrong in the same way 
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someone getting married says “I do”. (Austin, 1975, p 153). 
Constative language in this context seems hamstrung by its own 
endeavour as its nearest equivalent “I am getting married now.” is 
incapable of performing the action necessary to constate it, as in “I 
do”. When one cannot describe something, one must do in the 
instant, as one is doing or living the experience (Austin, 1975, p 5).  
 
Like all binary positions explored in this thesis, however, the 
inseparability of constative and performative language is what is at 
stake. Can they even be separated? Are these ‘opposites’ 
necessarily in opposition? Here we reach an aporia, that space to 
which we are denied access around which an oscillation develops. 
As Culler points out: 
The only way to claim that language functions performatively to 
shape the world is through a constative utterance, such as 
‘Language shapes the world’; but contrariwise, there is no way the 
constative transparency of language can be performed except by a 
speech act. The propositions which perform the act of stating 
necessarily claim to do nothing but merely display things as they 
are; yet if you want to show the contrary – that claims to represent 
things as they are in fact impose their categories on the world – you 
have no way to do this except through claims about what is or is not 
the case. The argument that the act of stating or describing is in fact 
performative must take the form of constative statements. (Culler, 
1997, p 102) 
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In other words, this oscillation between the two determines both as 
inseparable from, and embedded in, the other. We are back at 
Caruth’s problem of reference and why de Man is so interested in 
the stakes between those discourses that invest in one and shun 
the other, or in short, engage in the resistance to (self-referential) 
theory. While both arenas of language undoubtedly exist, it is the 
performative aspects to any constative utterance, statement 
(written or spoken) or diagnosis which requires our attention and, in 
any claim to be purely constative, our suspicion. For here the 
stakes are high as to what constitutes a sense of history and the 
invasion of the universal problematic: does a constative view of 
history deny us access to the history of pain? In other words is the 
allegation made against self-referentiality by the classical tradition 
equally applicable against classical theory?  
 
The answer to that has its traces within the performative language 
of dualism and the degree to which the classical specificity theory 
owed its seeming constative qualities to a ‘story’ that passed itself 
off as purely constative natural law. The same can of course be 
said for the equally Cartesian classical reflex principle of neurology. 
Here, constative language that portends to describe natural law in a 
kind of objective scientific reflection is in fact, deeply performative in 
its desire for a universal rationality with a referenced certitude. Is 
classical theory even more prone to the abstraction of history than 
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self-referential theory because as Caruth argues, “far from denying 
access to history, (self-referential theory) is a way… of precisely 
keeping history from being swallowed up by the power of 
abstraction.” (Caruth, 1996, p 74).  For ‘abstraction’ in this context, 
read the abstraction of desire for certitude that, as de Man was to 
argue in his essay The Resistance to Theory, takes on the graceful 
movements of the puppets of the Marionette theatre in the ways 
classical theory can seem so real but is in fact highly manipulated 
(Caruth, 1996, p 79). 
 
De Man considers Kleist’s story On the Marionette Theatre in the 
light of Kant’s “philosophical attempt to distinguish language from 
empirical law by making theory into a self-reflexive system” (Caruth, 
1996, p 77). This distinction between language and empirical law 
anticipated theory’s concern that language engenders rather than 
reflects and therefore mediates experience and our perception of 
experience. De Man’s interest lies in the text that is woven between 
the structures of both the puppets and the puppeteer “…that 
lifelessly transforms the laws of force and motion into superhuman 
grace” (Caruth, 1996, p 80). Caruth’s interest in De Man’s argument 
is in the moments the puppets of the Marionette seem to take on 
their “perfect curving motions of a dance, without the clumsiness of 
the human dancer, because in the puppets, the limbs are what they 
should be: dead, mere pendula, governed only by the law of 
94 
 95
gravity” that this text begins to weave between the structures of the 
puppets and the puppeteers involved and the puppets begin to 
perform something that does more than it knows (Caruth, 1996, p 
80).   
Classical theory depends upon third party removed objectivity: we 
observe, we learn, we know, and then, we practice from such 
reference. At stake here though, is what if the reference can not 
referenced objectively because the perception of a manipulated 
dance is mistaken for objective reference? 
  
Of intrinsic importance to the question of reference is the literal and 
figurative use of Newton’s first natural law of motion: gravity. 
Gravity as both a literal and figurative event confounds the 
references of our world of apparent empirical fixity and transforms 
the problem of reference into a problem of falling. As Caruth points 
out:  
Newton, in the story of his discovery of gravitation, sees an apple 
fall, and understands in a flash that the objects of the universe are 
all falling toward each other by the same force that pulls this apple, 
invisibly, toward the ground. (Caruth, 1996, p 81). 
 
That is, if every object is falling, which despite the empirical evidence 
of fixity to the contrary, means we are all doing more than we know. 
That is, we are always already falling towards some aspect of the 
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other and otherness in general. It follows from this general state of 
falling that the other may also fall towards us as we fall, in what 
Derrida calls ‘the coming of the other’ within the context of l’avenir 
(Derrida, 2002). In the French there are two kinds of future: futur and 
l’avenir.  Futur concerns the predictable future we would wish to 
secure and entails securing a job, having superannuation and 
insurance policies. L’avenir in contrast, concerns the unforeseen 
events of the other coming into our lives in completely unpredictable 
ways and having unpredictable effects that really effect and change 
our lives. A Bell in the Storm apprehends l’avenir through Andrew’s 
character when he and Sally are meeting in Café L’avenir and she 
asks whether the café’s name means café of the future: 
 
Andrew Sort of… It’s more the unpredictable future… In French 
there are two kinds of futures – the one we secure against 
– you plan for – it’s why we have jobs, bank accounts, 
superannuation, insurance policies etc and then there’s 
l’avenir… (Pause) Those totally unpredictable things that 
truly shape our lives… (Buchanan, 2005, p 200).  
 
 
In the discourse of persistent pain, Descartes’ bell represents the 
kind of future we would wish to secure. That is, pain will only persist 
if there is tissue damage or lesion in the instant and it cannot persist 
unless this lesion is ongoing. Pain here becomes a confined 
prediction and so too, is its ability to continue into the future. The 
l’avenir of persistent pain is its uncanny unpredictability of severity 
and chronicity especially in the absence of obvious lesion in the 
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instant. Quoting from Schelling, Freud says of the uncanny in his 
essay ‘Das Unheimliche’: ‘The uncanny is what should have 
remained a secret and hidden but has come to light.’ (Freud, cited 
Payne and Schad, 2004, p 33). Under the Cartesian based 
specificity theory, the secret of persistent pain without lesion should 
have remained confined to that of phenomena of the mind 
(phantom, psychoneurosis, somatisisation) and in this sense, it 
should have remained hidden within the structures of Descartes’ res 
cogitans and Freud’s structure of the unconscious. 
 
The meaning of ‘uncanny’ stems from the German das Unheimliche 
meaning ‘two opposite things’ (Payne and Schad, 2004, p 34).  In 
the self-referential brain and the emergence of pain, the two 
opposite things of body and mind in the classical theory, have not 
been able to contain or hide the secret of pain’s uncanniness, 
because, the necessity of the body and the mind to be separate 
was unable to keep them in opposition. That is, as for constative 
and performative language, both the body and the mind are 
inseparable from, and embedded in, each other. In this sense the 
process of decentring in science: from Copernicus to Newton, from 
Newton to Szentagothai, Erdi and Maturana, has always involved 
the revelation of the uncanny. What these individuals found was a 
succession of complexities that decentred the stories upon which 
our perceptions mistook for reference.  
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Thus, Copernicus found the earth is not the centre of the universe; 
Newton found the whole universe is falling; and, Szentagothai, Erdi 
and Maturana found the brain is self-referential. What we thought 
were opposites in natural law: earth and universe, fixed and falling, 
and reflexive and unpredictable, were never actually in the 
opposition we imposed upon them and, their inseparability and 
embeddedness is revealed through the emergent phenomena of 
the uncanny.  Uncanniness then, is the revelation of that which 
should have stayed a secret but is revealed when the binary 
opposition of our heuristic theories collapse under their own 
metaphysical weight. 
 
So too though has been the uncanny history of philosophy from 
Kant to Nietzsche, Nietzsche to Husserl and Heidegger, and 
Husserl and Heidegger to Derrida. As Caruth suggests: 
…the history of philosophy after Newton could be thought of as a 
series of confrontations with the question of how to talk about falling. 
And similarly, the problem of reference… is: how to refer to falling. 
(Caruth, 1996, p 76).  
 
Caruth’s ‘how to refer to falling’ is the problem of reference. The 
world is not as we have thought it to be, that is the centre of a 
stable universe. In To Fall Without Landing, Cathy refers to this 
problem: 
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Cathy How is it that I’m the one seeing a 
psychiatrist when it’s the whole universe 
that’s crazy…?  
(Buchanan, 2005, p 263) 
Now with the confirmation of the self-referential neurophenomenal 
world, we are not as we have thought ourselves to be, that is 
predictable organs of reflexivity to a stable and pre-existent 
phenomenal world with a separate and enigmatic mind. The text of 
western epistemology, what Derrida termed the episteme, has 
always been a Marionette text between the puppet dancing its 
knowledge in exhilarating and graceful ways that appear most 
human, and, most as it were, empirically referenced by natural law. 
But it is when this dance seems most natural, that it is actually at its 
most mechanical, and, most manipulated, by the text between the 
puppet, which for example may be the bell of pain and the 
puppeteer of Descartes’ L’Homme.   
 
Neither de Man nor Caruth argue that there is not an external 
reference, but rather that this external reference is the universal fall 
against which the resistance to theory has sought to rise. In de 
Man’s reading of the Marionette theatre, theory itself recognises 
that the fall is both a literal and figurative falling. The oppositions of 
‘literal’ versus ‘figurative’ have collapsed as the uncanny again 
emerges in this universal falling.  De Man points out this 
uncanniness when he refers to the fall as being, “…in all senses of 
the term, including the theological Fall” (de Man, 1982, p 285). This 
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does not mean the “empirical” reference is irrelevant. Replicate 
Descartes’ L’Homme and put your toe too close to a fire and a bell 
of pain does indeed seem to ring in the instant, just as we do seem 
to be ever fixed in our chairs as we read these words, rather than 
the global reality of hurtling through space on the third rock from a 
small sun. The problem is if this perception is mistaken for a fixed 
universal reference, against which all phenomenology is measured 
and fixed into a classical doctrine, and, this same mistaken 
perception becomes inculcated into the discourse of common 
sense, and, in the case of pain, the discourse of medical practice. 
Derrida repeatedly pointed out that within the perceptions of 
classical doctrine some secret, some spectre or ghost haunts its 
ideas of fixity and certitude. The spectre deconstructing the 
classical doctrine is the uncanny, revealing secrets that could no 
longer be confined, hidden, or remains a secret. In this sense for 
Derrida, ‘…everything refers to this uncanniness.’ (Derrida cited in 
Payne and Schad, 2004, p 34).  
 
What we have thought to be fixity is befallen, but, had always 
already been. The overall problem of reference is how to come to 
terms with this falling, pulling as it does any seeming fixity and/or 
reflex with it, whether this falling be signified by Kant’s defiance of 
empirical perception as reference, or Derridean play in the 
“Nietzschean affirmation”, or Erdi’s poststructural brain, or by 
Chapman’s step two miracle.  
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The other point here, which is by no means minor, is that this 
vantage necessarily views the aporia that exists between constative 
and performative language, especially in terms of the textual 
knowledge that is spun between any attempt we make to determine 
reference within the overall falling. If everything is falling then surely 
the only reference we have is the fall itself? Caruth argues: 
In de Man’s text, as in Kant’s, the impact of reference is felt in 
falling: in the resistance of the example of falling to a phenomenal or 
perceptual analogy that would turn it into the mere figure of an 
abstract principle. In naming a befalling, de Man’s text no longer 
simply knows what it says, but indeed does more than it knows, and 
it is in this that we can read the referential significance of his own 
theory… What theory does, de Man tells us repeatedly, is fall; and in 
falling, it refers. (Caruth, 1996, p 89 – 90). 
  
In other words, the constative desire for objective observation has 
had to give way to the instance of a deeper and literal involvement 
in the vantage of Merleau-Ponty’s lived experience that always 
does more than we know and defies dualisms’ requirement for 
oppositions (Merleu-Ponty, 1964, p 87). Merleau-Ponty insisted it is 
fundamental to our identity as beings that we are physical objects 
and “not a psyche joined to an organism, but the movement to and 
fro of existence, which at one time allows itself to take corporeal 
form and at others moves towards personal acts” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p 88). This is the same sense of J. L. Austin’s iterable 
process of being married because the ceremony can not be 
completed by the constative utterance “I am getting married” or the 
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verdictive “I am married” but demands an “I do” to actually get 
married. (Austin, 1975, p 5) 
Here lies a space for a co-operation between this performative 
knowledge that does more than it knows and Szentagothai’s 
downwards causation, autopoiesis, negentropy; that is to say the 
miraculous falling of the complexity preserving, self referential brain 
(Erdi, 1993, p 146). In pain the historically recent neurophenomenal 
understandings have exposed us to a phenomenal world that is 
bigger and more complex then we thought. This revelation has 
necessarily spawned new signifiers to cope with the play of the self-
referential brain’s significance. Of particular interest here are the 
terms wind-up, long-term-potentiation, and recruitment and the new 
diagnoses these terms have created from pain medicine taxonomy 
committees: allodynia, hyperalgesia (primary and secondary) and 
hyperpathia. These diagnoses in turn, seek to deal with the 
autopoiesis, the miracle of what is growingly referred to as 
neurosensitisation (Miller, 1996). We ought to pay close attention to 
the new language that is used to cope with this expansion of our 
neurophenomenal world, but also, the lack of language that is 
currently available to cope with this new phenomenal context. The 
French neurobiologist, Le Van Quyen highlights this concern: 
Despite a growing body of evidence… our understanding of these 
large scale brain processes remains hampered by the lack of 
theoretical language for expressing these complex behaviours in 
dynamical terms. (Le Van Quyen, 2004, p 67) 
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Just because the miracle cannot remain hidden, doesn’t mean we 
understand the nature of its space, since like any aporia, we are 
denied access to its mechanisms even if we did have the language 
outside of dualism to contemplate them. As Faingold points out: 
The complexity of the brain has placed a seemingly insurmountable 
constraint on our ability to understand with any degree of precision 
how the functional mechanisms of the brain are organized to 
perform even the simplest tasks. (Faingold, 2004, p 57) 
 
Wind-up refers to when a non-noxious stimulus (a gentle tapping on 
the neck for example) is constantly repeated on a subject for a 
period time until the instances of the stimuli – although of 
themselves non-noxious – eventually elicit pain and if continued for 
a prolonged period, unbearable pain:  
 
Andrew Do you remember when I first examined you, how I 
tapped you on the shoulder? Well, if I were to tap 
someone who doesn’t have your pain state, initially 
it wouldn’t bother them. But after ten minutes it 
would start to feel dull and heavy. After thirty 
minutes it would begin to ache. After an hour they 
would hurt. And after two hours they would be 
begging me to stop. (Slight Pause) It’s called 
“wind-up” and it’s the brain’s response to a stimulus 
that builds up over time… 
Simon So why did the tapping hurt me straight away? 
Andrew Because your brain’s already built up the pain… like 
a …memory 
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Simon Let me get this straight… You’re saying I received 
the equivalent of…like a fortnight’s tapping in the 
moment the truck hit me? (Buchanan, 2005, p 218) 
 
There remains the moot point that this term, wind up, is an attempt 
by medicine to deal with pain phenomena that emerge uncannily 
from the unpredictable self-referentiality of the brain. This attempt 
therefore, takes place from a vantage beyond the predictable 
common sense of the hardwired brain and its specificity theory 
driven medico-legal discourse. In so doing though, this same 
attempt invites more questions than it answers: principally 
concerning the nature of the miracle.  
Implicit in any interpretative practice here is the oscillation of the 
aporia, this space to which we are denied access, and, a space that 
is always open to an active interpretation, if only because, its nature 
is, and always has been, self-organising, noncentred and given to 
negentropy: that is to say, a self-referential play within de Man’s 
fall. Pain is inseparable from self-referentiality and is irreducible to 
any objective assessment predicated on a predictable reflex from a 
recognizable and detectable stimulus. Pain is therefore necessarily 
always subjective, and, is always communicated and observed 
intersubjectively, because it is given to, and emerges from, this 
aporia. 
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The International Association for the Study of Pain recognized this 
subjectivity as early as 1994 with the following definition of pain: 
Pain is an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated 
with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such 
damage. (IASP, 1994). 
 
This definition has generally been interpreted as meaning that pain 
is always subjective (Chapman, 2004). The importance of this 
subjectivity is that pain can no longer be objectively extricated from 
the epistemological and ontological bio-medical complexity of what 
is really going on in its experience. It is in the intersubjective realm 
however, that pain and its subjectivity takes on three peculiarly 
unique characteristics, which Elaine Scarry found in her 
groundbreaking book The Body in Pain – The Making and 
Unmaking of the World (Scarry, 1985, p 3). Scarry divides physical 
pain into three different subjects:  
first, the difficulty of expressing physical pain; second, the 
political and perceptual complications that arise as a result of 
that difficulty; and third, the nature of both material and 
verbal expressibility or, more simply, the nature of human 
creation. When at last pain does find a voice it begins to tell 
a story… (Scarry, 1985, p 3). 
 
My reading of Scarry’s contention is that there is no “pure” 
constative language for the experience of pain. It is therefore 
always performative, inherently engaged in metaphor, metonym 
and musicality (pre-linguistic grunts and groans) and in de Man’s 
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performance of doing more than we know (Kristeva, 1986, p 82). In 
short, pain tells a story because language is unable to cope with 
the experience, just as language is (currently) unable to cope with 
the self-referential brain. Whether this is causally linked to the self-
referentiality of both the brain and language is a moot point, one 
that I relayed to both Dr John Quintner and Associate Professor 
Milton Cohen in an email of August, 2003, sent during the 
completion of a paper we had all co-written that had just been 
accepted in the Journal for Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 
(Qunintner et al, 2003),  
Dear John/Milton, 
We have stumbled upon something – both language and the brain are 
plastic/playful and, our common reference for the lived experience of 
this plasticity, is pain. 
 
Milton emailed me back almost immediately highlighting the above 
and added, “Nice point. Perhaps this could be expanded?” 
(Personal correspondence, 2003). With the completion of this 
sentence, perhaps a ground has been prepared where at the very 
least, it could and should be expanded within the exciting 
confluence of the literal and figurative miracle,  for as the French 
poet Rene Char noted,  
In the explosion of the universe we are witnessing, a miracle 
happens: the fragments falling down are alive! (Char, cited 
Rothenburg and Joris, 1995, p 706) 
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Chapter 5 
Imaginary creations - language, neurophenomenology and the 
unstable self… 
 
Scarry’s implications for language and the inexpressibility of pain 
are that when physical pain at last finds a voice, it begins to tell a 
story. The story that pain tells is about the inseparability of first, the 
difficulty of expressing physical pain; second, the political and 
perceptual complications that arise as a result of that difficulty; and 
third, the nature of both material and verbal expressibility or, more 
simply, the nature of human creation, and their embeddedness in 
one another (Scarry, 1985, p 3). While undoubtedly Scarry’s 
insights into the suffering and ontology of pain, were, and are to an 
extent, still groundbreaking, Scarry seems not to apprehend an 
inherent tautology or pleonasm in the nomenclature of “physical 
pain”.  
 
At first glance Scarry’s use of the signifier physical passes as a 
simple adjective: physical pain. For on one level it is adjectival, as it 
seems empirically, that physical pain is a type of pain. If we ponder 
physical pain as a tautology though, then we expose its adjectival 
quality as being a captive to the somatic-psychogenic or body-mind 
binary. That is, the postulated existence of physical pain implies 
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that there is also a wholly non-physical pain and that the two are 
quite distinct things, apropos of the binary of Descartes’ res extens-
res cogitans.  
 
In French the nearest equivalent signifier for pain is ‘douleur’, and 
its signifieds cut up the phenomenal world of not only that which 
English terms physical pain but sorrow as well, and ‘douleur’ does 
so without distinction between physical pain and sorrow. While on 
one level this signified merely reiterates the differences and 
arbitrary nature of the signified on the conceptual level across 
different cultures, it may also co-operate with the ontology and 
inherent subjectivity of the self-referential brain and its pain (Carr, 
2001, p 47). That is, what is the extent to the experience of pain? 
Does it entail merely physical symptoms, and inherit with that 
questions the self-referential problems of the body-mind 
oppositions, or, does it always entail inseparable emotions as 
‘douleur’ would suggest? If one were to consider the results of the 
McGill Pain Questionnaire in a French Clinic, what would be at 
stake is not so much what the results of the questionnaire would be 
in France but, just what the McGill Pain Questionnaire is in French, 
since the extent of what pain is thought to be differs under each 
language? 
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Pain is like de Man’s falling, and does more than we know. Scarry 
points out that precious little language exists to phenomenally cope 
with pain, but in English at least, the language that does exist, is 
almost entirely negative in connotation. Professor Rory Sussex’s 
University of Queensland’s (linguistic) study of pain found that 99% 
of the English language available to cope with pain had negative 
connotations (Sussex, 2001). He concluded, “The English language 
view of pain is almost wholly negative and the sufferer finds 
themselves trapped within the available negative language system.” 
(Sussex, 2001, p 55) Scarry had already concluded, “Pain actively 
destroys language” and effectively reduces the sufferer to a pre-
linguistic state of grunts and groans (Scarry, 1984, p 14). Clearly, 
the ontology and neurophenomenology of pain predisposes people 
in pain, but particularly persistent pain (because it so defies simple 
explanation), into a peculiarly vulnerable lived experience between 
public and private life. The philosopher Hannah Arendt discusses 
this lack of language for pain and its sequelae: 
Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of 
blotting out all other experiences, namely, the experience of great 
pain, is at the same time the most private and least communicable 
of all. Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we are 
unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance, it actually 
deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that we can 
forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. There seems to 
be no bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I am no 
longer “recognizable” to the outer world of life. Pain, in other words, 
truly a borderline experience between life as “being among men” 
(inter homines esse) and death, is so subjective and removed from 
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the world of things and men that it cannot assume an appearance at 
all. (Arendt, 1998, p 50 – 51). 
 
The American Rheumatologist James Katz sums up Arendt’s position 
in the Journal of Medical Ethics,  
This is a lack that is attached to pain. Specifically, it is a lack of 
language… A deeper analysis of this concept is accessible through the 
writings of Jacques Lacan… (wherein) not only is the unconscious 
structured like language but in truth the unconscious resides in language. 
(Katz, 2004, p 60, p 62).  
 
Katz’s signpost to the ‘writings of Jacques Lacan’, relates to the 
ongoing importance of Lacan’s the other in an understanding of 
radical subjectivity and language’s role in this otherness (Payne and 
Schad, 2003, p12 - 23). The concept of the other emerged from 
Lacan’s mirror phase when the infant, aged between six to eighteen 
months, experiences manqué (a lack of or loss) at apprehending its 
own image in the mirror (Lacan, 1977). The infant sees and 
recognises the self in the mirror but also recognises in a flash, like 
Newton with his apple, that the image it sees is not only the self, 
because the self is doing the seeing, but, it is also the other. The 
ideal concept of the self has been split (Lacan, 1977).  
 
Lacan thought the Ideal I had, upto this mirror phase, experienced 
itself as indissociable from its mother (le Désire de la Mère) (Lacan, 
1977). At this mirror phase, the images and fantasies what Lacan 
called the Imaginary order, are irrevocably split and the child 
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experiences the two main features of Symbolic Order: manqué (lack 
of or loss) and besoin (need) (Lacan, 1977). The emergence of the 
Symbolic Order from this otherness led to the formation of the 
unconscious, together with le Nom-du-Pére, which was similar to 
Freud’s Oedipal complex (Lacan, 1977). The emergence of the 
Symbolic Order fed an unending cycle of loss and desire (desir) to 
bridge the gap between this desire to reclaim the imaginary order’s 
ideal and the Symbolic order’s main tool with which to reclaim it: 
language (Lacan, 1977).  
 
For Lacan, language only served to further compound this lack 
(manqué), because language’s inherent self-referentiality and lack of 
fixity, problematises the very nature of this besoin (need) and its 
ensuing desire. In short, language is unable to bridge this gap of that 
which causes the cycle of desire and loss. The subject’s desire for 
reclamation of the Ideal I, is constantly re-negotiated through a 
language system of differences it cannot master, secure, or fix 
(Culler, 1997, p 158).  
 
Lacan anticipated both de Man and Caruth’s concerns with the 
problem of reference, because the linguistic system amounts to the 
problem of reference in the universal fall, of self referentiality. It is 
little wonder Lacan’s importance in this intrinsic sense of otherness 
has endured and grown. The French douleur then has added 
importance in this context, as it pertains to pain as the 
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indistinguishable symptom that cuts up the phenomenal world in 
terms of being unable to distinguish between bodily pain and sorrow. 
This is because language’s role in engendering pain is more a 
symptom of Lacan’s manqué, as any language to cope with pain will 
cycle between pain’s lack or loss and the desire to reclaim the pain-
free state we have lost. This engenderment of the symptom through 
language was pointed out by Lacan in Ecrit: 
the symptom resolves itself entirely in the analysis of language, 
because the symptom is itself structured like language. (Lacan, 
1977, p 59).  
 
At this point, Jim Katz, like so many in the medical discourse, 
voices a familiar concern about what amounts to classical theory’s 
problem with self-referentiality: 
This becomes philosophically problematic because if the 
deconstructionist premise is true that language is unstable, then the 
unconscious, let alone the self, may be fundamentally unstable as 
well. (Katz, 2004, p 62). 
  
Lacan’s radical interrogation of subject formation concerns 
language’s metaphoricity, metonymy, and musicality, because if 
language could indeed bridge the gap of our manqué and reclaim 
our Ideal I, then there would be little need for metaphors, metonyms 
or the musicality in language, to translate what amounts to an 
inability to claim fixed meanings and essential truths. Language is 
unable to claim fixed meanings and essential truths because it 
inherently unstable as we have seen in J.L. Austin’s performative 
language, and Derrida’s universal problematic. The instability or 
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self-referentiality of language is fundamental to the creation and 
engenderment of the self.  
 
The other of Lacan’s discourse is not only the literal other of 
Arendt’s inter homines esse, but, the other of and intrinsic to the 
self-referential self: intra homines esse. Here, Katz’s clause ‘the 
self may be fundamentally unstable’, is worthy of iteration because 
whatever the adjective, the fundament of the self is other than 
stable, because the self-referential language that engenders our 
ontology is also engendered by it in autopoietic ways. Could it be 
that Lacan’s argument that ‘the symptom is itself structured like 
language’ can be now augmented to be, ‘the symptom is itself 
structured not only like language, but also like the brain’? (Lacan, 
1977, p 59). That is to say, like Szentaogothai’s ‘schemas that 
themselves act like metaphors’ (Szentagothai, 1993, p 101). The 
confluence between the self-referentiality of language and 
neurophenomenology, and, the other of a radical subjectivity, is 
now compelling. This instability (in Katz’s language) is not so much 
existentialist but ontological, linguistic and also intrinsically 
neurophenomenal. 
 
This co-operative interplay between language, neurobiology and the 
self, could also cooperate with Scarry’s creative frame and Julia 
Kristeva’s ‘imaginary creations’ to augment Lacan’s unstable subject, 
because both Scarry’s ‘creative frame’ and Kristeva’s ‘imaginary 
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creations’ may offer a powerful affirmation, not despite but because 
of, the lack ascribed to pain and otherness in general. In short, the 
creativity that is spawned by the loss of pain may constitute a gain.  
 
Kristeva’s re-interpretation of Lacan’s Imaginary order is of most 
pressing interest here in terms of this creative gain. She is heavily 
influenced by Lacan’s theories. Just as Lacan re-read Freud, so has 
Kristeva re-read Lacan. For Kristeva, language is again vital in the 
development of the subject but it’s a language that not only attempts 
to interpret the world through the symbolic, but a language that 
examines states at the limits of language itself:  
…where language breaks up in psychosis…or the moments where 
language doesn’t yet exist.” (Kristeva, 1986, p 19).  
 
This breakdown of language is redolent of Scarry’s pre-linguistic 
grunts for the subject in pain (Scarry, 1985, p 12). Kristeva 
investigates language’s role in subject formation more as a process, 
which she termed the ‘subject-in-process’:  
Process in the sense of process but also in the sense of a legal 
proceeding where the subject is committed to trial, because our 
identities in life are constantly called into question, brought to trial, 
over-ruled. (Kristeva, 1986, p 19) 
 
For Kristeva, Lacan’s mirror phase is vital to this process, because its 
metaphorical chaotic interpretation of the unstable self is formed in 
terms of difference and otherness (Abraham, 1996, p 123). She re-
reads the mirror phase’s role through her investigation of the process 
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of subject formation: from the non-differentiated infant to speaking 
subject, by postulating a distinction between the semiotic and the 
symbolic. What she terms ‘the semiotic’:  
…takes us back to the pre-linguistic states of childhood where the 
child babbles the sounds s/he hears, or where s/he articulates 
rhythms, alliterations, or stresses, trying to imitate her/his 
surroundings. In this state the child doesn’t yet possess the 
necessary linguistic signs and thus there is no meaning in the strict 
sense of the term. (Kristeva, 1986, p 20). 
 
Kristeva points out that the semiotic does not represent the unity of 
presence of the imaginary. Rather, the semiotic is a modality 
“constantly called into question…a state of disintegration in which 
patterns appear but which do not have any stable identity.” (Kristeva, 
1986, p 20).   
 
More closely aligned with Lacan’s ‘Idea I’ in the imaginary order is 
what Kristeva terms the ‘Chora’. She states: 
The word ‘chora’ means receptacle in Greek, which refers us to 
Winnicott’s idea of ‘holding’: mother and child are in permanent 
stricture in which one holds the other, there’s a double entrance, the 
child is held but so is the mother. (Kristeva, 1986, p 21) 
 
 
The Chora then, is a more archaic semiotic modality again, wherein 
the infant gains the most archaic memories of the maternal body. 
Such memories may even go back as far as the infant in uterine. The 
Chora embodies those moments when archaic libidinal pleasures are 
indistinguishable from the mother, and, before the maternal body 
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becomes understood as the (m)other. During the mirror phase, when 
identification and the development of language casts the child into 
the symbolic realm and into the Oedipal complex, the experiences of 
the chora, are repressed. For Kristeva, the repression of such 
beautiful and libidinous memories may have dramatic consequences 
for creativity. She argues: 
At that point we witness the possibility of creation, of sublimation. I 
think every type of creation… is due to this possibility of opening the 
norms, towards pleasure, which refers to an archaic experience with 
a maternal pre-object. … What is obvious is that this experience of 
the semiotic chora in language produces poetry. (Kristeva, 1986, p 
20).  
 
 
Paradoxically, Kristeva focuses her interest on depression or 
melancholia and the loss it represents for the subject’s experience. 
She argues that when this loss is acknowledged, it creates a 
powerful interplay with creativity and the experience of the semiotic 
chora. In depression and melancholia we experience the loss of, yet 
paradoxically, the desire for, the experience for the semiotic chora. 
Kristeva argues that imaginary creations are sublimations of this loss 
by the self for the other, wherein, momentarily, the subject-in-process 
can both hold and be held within the imaginary creation.  For Kristeva 
this experience ‘produces poetry’ which amounts, to a creation-ness, 
which amounts to a gain. From this gain, Kristeva argued that: 
‘Imaginary creations are a powerful antidepressant. Provided we are 
able to create them…’ (Kristeva, 1986, p 21).   
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It is however, Kristeva’s anticipation in the mid 1980s of the 
neurophenomenal operation that seems uncanny, almost as if she 
had already read Szentagothai’s writings on the self-referential brain 
of 1993 and the impact this self-referentiality may have on our 
understanding of subject formation and psychoanalysis. In1986 she 
spoke of such anticipation: 
…it’s a problem situated at the cross-over point between biological 
and psychological research. A few years ago psychoanalysis was 
confronted by the science of language, now there is a new challenge: 
neuro-biology. (Kristeva, 1986, p 22) 
 
What seems even more uncanny is that there is now so much more 
known about a neurophenomenal association between pain and 
depression. Kristeva’s focus on depression could have ramifications 
and relevance for pain as well, because there appears to be a 
neurophenomenal association between depression and pain 
(Greenfield, 2002, p 92). Could it be that if pain and depression are 
closely associated, then Kristeva’s imaginary creations may not only 
alleviate depression but soothe pain as well? This association 
between depression and pain concerns Susan Greenfield’s research 
into the plasticity of the brain forming assemblies of neurones that 
actually reflect subjective experience:  
It is interesting, that in depression, pain is perceived more acutely 
(Affleck et al, 1987) whereas in schizophrenia (a small assembly 
mode) the thresholds are higher (Guieu eta al , 1994). It may be the 
case, therefore, that the erstwhile mysterious subjective element to 
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pain perception… may be attributable to fluctuating size in a transient 
neuronal assembly. (Greenfield, 2002, p 92).  
 
Miller also observes this close neurophenomenal association 
between pain and depression:  
A common diagnostic association occurs between depression and 
chronic pain (Benjamin et al, 1998; Fishbain et al, 1986; Kramlinger 
et al, 1983; Krishnan et al, 1985; Miller, 1993a). Coderre, Katz, 
Vaccarino, and Melzack (1993) have proposed a central 
neuroplasticity model of chronic pain that appears to meet the 
present criteria for a neurosensitisation syndrome. (Miller, 1996, p 
13) 
 
Miller defined neurosensitisation as the ‘development of 
progressively enhanced sensitivity or reactivity of central nervous 
system (CNS) mechanisms at the neurophysiological, biochemical 
and intracellular levels.’ (Miller, 1996, p 12). He further observed that 
pain and depression ‘often appears excessive in duration and 
severity with respect to the identified initiating injury or event.’ (Miller, 
1996, p 12) Of relevance here is the way antidepressant medication 
is proposed to affect these same neuronal assemblies that 
Greenfield refers to, as she restates the actions of antidepressants 
on these neuronal assemblies:  
in particular the actions of ‘certain very well known transmitters… 
serotonin, histamine, dopamine and noradrenaline’ (Greenfield, 2002, 
p 92)  
 
While this is the accepted logic of antidepressant medication 
intervention, the secrets of just how they may alter these neuronal 
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assemblies and go about their antidepressant ways is still unknown. 
As Greenfield states:  
Just how the water is turned into wine – how the bump and grind of 
the neurons and the shrinking and expanding of assemblies actually 
translate into subjective experience – is, of course, another story 
completely. (Greenfield, 2002, p 92). 
 
Enter here, yet again, Chapman’s step two, then a miracle occurs.  
Although Kristeva’s postulation that ‘Imaginary creations are a 
powerful antidepressant…’, was based on her work as a 
psychoanalyst, and, perhaps, her deeply refined theoretical intuition, 
it is highly poignant to look at the functional MRI scans of Catherine 
Bushnell’s (2000 and 2002) study of the nexus between pain and 
creativity: 
 
(Bushnell, 2000) 
 Scan 3A (left) is a functional MRI of a patient in severe pain. The 
area on the right forebrain circled, represents blood perfusion relating 
to pain on a varying scale of intensity. Red is the most intense, then 
yellow, then green, then blue in lessening intensity. Scan 3B (right) 
shows the same patient with the same pain but they have been given 
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music of their choice to listen to. The perfusion in the forebrain 
circled has diminished or been modulated to a blue, as indeed an 
area of blue in the auditory cortex (right temporal) also activates the 
same intensity of blood flow, presumably associated with listening to 
music. The character of Andrew in the play, describes it to the court 
that presides over the authenticity of Simon’s case, thus: 
 
Andrew The first scan on the left is of a subject in severe pain… The 
red to yellow and green areas circled are areas of perfusion 
that signal pain… See how the second one, taken after the 
person has heard soothing music of their choice has come up 
as blue in the auditory cortex here… but has modulated – 
yeah ok - turned down the pain on the forebrain - circled 
here... As a traumatic experience may precipitate pain – a 
creative one may soothe it. (Buchanan, 2005, p 230). 
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The subjective experience of Bushnell’s patient reported a reduction 
in pain, congruent with the perfusion in the scans. Greenfield’s 
caution persists however, because just how the water is turned into 
wine is still not clear. It is possible to suggest though, that perfusion 
relates to the brain activity, that, in turn, relates to Greenfield’s 
neuronal assemblies, which shrink and expand into subjective 
experience of pain. Kristeva’s assertion that imaginary creations are 
a powerful antidepressant may well translate to a powerful analgesic 
as well, only we know there now exists firmer neurological evidence 
to back it up.  
 
If imaginary creations can be powerfully anti-depressant and it would 
seem analgesic too, then Kristeva pointed out that a paradox ensues 
for this efficacy to be engendered. That is, the subject needs to 
acknowledge such “loss – of ties, of meaning – in order to write 
[create].” (Kristeva, 1986, p 21). Depression and pain represents the 
acknowledgement of loss and facilitates access to the chora, and 
such access may facilitate the experience of the chora from which 
ensues the stuff of art. If Lacan reinterpreted Freud to incorporate the 
self-referentiality of language, then Julia Kristeva has reinterpreted 
Lacan, and it is her reflection upon the role of creativity in this 
reinterpretation, that is potentially of profound importance for the 
subject in persistent pain. The self-referentiality of the brain, 
language and the self is crucial in the light of imaginary creations 
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which are always engaged in a process that is doing more than it 
knows. This role of imaginary creations as an efficacious gain for the 
subject in pain may go some way to understanding the role of the 
photographic creations, in the life of Nick Djordjevic. A life without 
whom, the play A Bell in the Storm, could never have been written. 
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Chapter 6 
I am alive!! 
The other and the storm in the photography of Nick Djordjevic 
 
 
 
In the noted neuro-pharmacologist Carl Faingold’s paper ‘Emergent 
properties of CNS neuronal networks as targets for pharmacology: 
application to anticonvulsant drug action’, Faingold contemplates 
the secrets of ‘complexity theory, when the multitude of elements in 
a complex system interact, [then] new and unexpected properties 
can emerge due, in part, to self-organisation.‘ (Faingold, 2004, p 
57). Of great interest for Faingold here was this complexity theory’s 
origin in meteorology. He states: 
The complexity approach was originally applied in meteorology to 
explain how small sporadic changes in wind currents in one part of 
the global weather system via a cascading series of interactions 
could trigger the development of a highly organised and powerful 
storm thousands of miles away…Ideas that originated in the study 
of weather systems may be of use in understanding how drugs act 
on the brain. (Faingold, 2004, p 57). 
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This complexity theory seems redolent of the notion in chaos theory 
that an insect’s wing, beating on one side of the world, can cause a 
catastrophe, on the other side of the world through self-organising 
complexities that are in no way predictable or measurable.  
 
So the story goes, in March 1988, Nick Djordjevic stood on Trigg 
Beach to photograph a sunset. Since 1983, his life had changed 
irrevocably due to a persistent pain state, secondary to a non-
specific viral infection that was thought to be an insect bite. 
Whatever the initial cause, Nick’s pain became persistent and three 
and a half years later, he was diagnosed with psoriatic arthritis. In 
deference to chaos theory, rather than an insect’s wing beating on 
one side of the world causing catastrophe on the other side, in 
Nick’s case it seemed that a miniscule insect’s bite may have set 
off a complex self-organising state that precipitated his world into 
catastrophe.  
 
Nick’s pain was not only persistent but grew in severity. It also 
defied all predictions made about its course and duration, and, after 
a few years, Nick had to resign from his professional career as a 
public servant. He remained home, within a state of alienation all 
too familiar to severe persistent pain sufferers across the world 
(Merskey and Teassel, 2000). His condition deteriorated and he 
became depressed. In 1987, he took an unsuccessful overdose to 
end a life that he felt had become unliveable. He survived. He was, 
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though, referred to see a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist would only 
see Nick if it was conjointly with his wife, Anne. Nick was disturbed 
by the ‘treatment’ he received from the psychiatrist. Nick told me: 
This guy believed I was behaving like an infant and my wife like the 
parent. All he wanted to do was draw Parent/Adult/Child diagrams 
and suggested that my wife and I date in and date out. He didn’t 
acknowledge my pain. It was so humiliating. My pain was ignored. 
For him, it didn’t exist.  (Personal Correspondence, Djordjevic, 
2005) 
 
Not surprisingly Nick declined to see this psychiatrist again. After 
the despair of suffering both the pain and the disparagement of his 
pain, Nick began participating in workshops offered by the Arthritis 
Foundation in pain management and distraction techniques. Anne 
saw an advertisement for Arthritis Self Help Workshops: Learn how 
to manage your arthritis. The course lasted for six weeks.  Nick told 
me: 
I never gave it a chance to work cos I’m a cynical prick by nature but 
the seed of guided imagery and creative distraction techniques had 
been sown, because I saw some of the others in that course 
relieved and uplifted, and, I wondered what that was about. 
(Personal correspondence, Djordjevic, 2005) 
 
Through a chance meeting with another pain suffer, Glen, Nick 
began an inquiry into photography. Glen was a member of the 
Wanneroo Photographic Society and he suggested that he join the 
club as he knew that I was interested in photography. Nick was 
immediately taken and excited by the prospect of what a 
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photograph could do in capturing a creative moment. This quickly 
led to his own creative attempts, as he told me: 
What I saw there blew me away. I couldn’t believe photographs that 
good could be taken. I wanted to do this – to take shots that good. 
My friend Glen was interested in photographing all manner of 
landscapes especially lightning but all my efforts were rank amateur 
crap. Then the club hosted the 1998 Western Australian 
Photographic Federation Annual Convention at the Hillarys Boat 
Harbour over the labour day long weekend in March. One of the 
tasks was to photograph a sunset. On the Saturday evening I went 
off by myself to Shag Rock at Trigg. I rigged up my tripod and 
camera and there it was - this storm… on the horizon. (Personal 
correspondence, Djordjevic, 2005) 
 
The ‘pics’ Nick ‘took’ that dusk became his first serious storm 
photographs. When the photographs were developed, he named 
them Genesis. Something, very deeply felt, had indeed begun for 
Nick. The photographs created a sense of well being and wonder in 
the creation of them that has driven not only the passion and love 
for his professional career, but, the creativity he credits with saving 
his life. He told one journalist during the season of the play A Bell in 
the Storm:  
If I didn’t have my photography, I wouldn’t be alive today. 
(Djordjevic, cited McNeill, 2005, p 53).  
 
Nick attests to a deeply intuitive connection between the storm’s 
dynamic being, and his own being. He has confided to me, that this 
connection with the storms he photographs can not be described in 
too much detail, because it feels like a secret between him and the 
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storm. He told me: “I let the photographs speak for me.” (Personal 
correspondence, Djordjevic, 2005.). Each time he developed a new 
storm photograph, it was like glimpsing the pain he had been told 
was not there by the psychiatrist. In this sense, Roland Barthes in 
Camera Lucida, describes the photograph as a wound. Barthes 
states:  
I wanted to explore [the photograph] not as a question (a theme) but 
as a wound: I see, I feel, hence I notice, I observe, and I think. 
(Barthes, cited in Padfield, 2003, p 20) 
 
Deborah Padfield cites Barthes in just this context, in her 
groundbreaking book perceptions of pain (Padfield, 2003). The 
book explores the creative utility of the photograph for a number of 
people living with persistent unexplained pain. She picks up on 
Barthes’ notion that: 
…attributes similar qualities to photography as to medicine. At times 
(…as with fibre optics and X-rays etc) both practices attempt to 
make visible what has hitherto been invisible – to peel back the skin 
revealing what is usually concealed, and often painful. (Padfield, 
2003, p 20). 
 
In other words Nick’s photography was involved, like Padfield’s 
photography, in not only contemplating the secret of his wound, but, 
in revealing the wound that was hidden and a secret, as for Freud 
and Derrida’s interest in das unheimliche or the uncanny. What was 
uncanny for Nick at the time and remains so to this day, is that 
every time he photographs storms, his pain is relieved. With the 
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benefit of the self-referential perspective, the uncanniness of his 
pain relief in storms is apparent when considered in the light of 
Bushnell’s MRI scans and Kristeva’s imaginary creations combine 
in the creative moment becoming a powerful (neurophenomenal) 
antidepressant and/or analgesic. The idea of Nick experiencing 
pain relief in the storm is even more uncanny, when it is intersected 
with Faingold’s meteorological parable to account for how both 
literally and figuratively the storm and the brain maybe self-
organising.  
 
Of these complex neurophenomenal and ontological intersections 
however, Nick was entirely unaware. What he knew, having seen 
many different doctors for his pain, was that to openly discuss his 
pain relief in the storm was very difficult. In part, this difficulty was 
due to the paucity of language available to cope with his pain, but 
also,  because doctors’ doubts about the physicality of his pain left 
him feeling peculiarly vulnerable. This doubt and vulnerability is 
explored between Simon and Andrew in the play, A Bell in the 
Storm:  
 
 Andrew  You felt your pain go into the storm? 
Simon I hope yr not mocking me? (Pause) Let’s just say 
that what was outside of me was inside me and 
what was inside me was outside of me (Slight 
pause) but they always had been and it all just… 
Andrew Went away… The pain? 
(Buchanan, 2005, p 219). 
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After his initial photographs of Genesis, nearly every storm that 
developed off the coast between Trigg Beach and Ocean reef Nick 
went to photograph. By 1990 he had photographed many of his 
most widely known and best selling photographs, including Ten 
Billion Volts: 
 
 
It was however, the creative uncanniness of the process in 
photographing the storms, that Nick became more and more 
interested in.  His experiences of this process seemed to 
reinvigorate his life and reduce his pain, or at least, increase his 
ability to live with it. His best photographs were taken after dark, on 
long exposures, without any clue what was really out there to be 
photographed. He found the contents of his photographs came to 
him and not the other way around, as the play explores: 
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Simon …your CT Scans and MRIs and X-rays and whatnot. 
They just go ‘click’ and in a fraction of a second, 
expect to capture what’s going on. (Pause) But to 
photograph a storm you gotta be open to the world… 
patient… and only when yr in the dark the most, 
leave yr shutter open with the lens set to infinity… 
Then, what’s really out there comes to you – not the 
other way around. (Buchanan, 2005, p 218) 
  
Sometimes for Nick, what ‘comes to you’, was much more than he 
ever dreamt would be out there. His award winning photograph 
Atlantis attests to this uncanniness: 
 
 
On first seeing this photograph, I assumed as most do, that Nick 
had used photoshop to digitally enhance the colours and dynamics 
of this shot. I was however, quite wrong, as the play points out in 
the following direct address: 
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Simon (Direct address) This one was taken an hour after 
dark. You’re thinking I used photoshop, right? To get 
all these greens and sunset colours – especially as it 
was so dark I couldn’t see a thing. But you’d be 
wrong. It was a forty-five minute exposure, that’s all.  
 (Buchanan, 2005, p 192) 
 
 
Nick had also grown to understand the way the subjects and 
objects of the photograph played within the photograph, contingent 
as they were, upon the length of exposure over which the 
photograph was taken. The longer the exposure, the greater the 
play on the lens, and the more likely that uncanny things hidden to 
the normal eye, may emerge through it. It was also the feelings he 
developed that seemed more and more vital to this creative 
process, as Simon’s character explains to Sally in the play: 
Simon As it grew dark the storm seemed to come for me… 
So I just stood back and something said leave the 
shutter open and see what it sees out there. Just 
leave it open… it’s a feeling… a creation-ness - 
that’s all… It’s not something you can see – it’s 
something you feel… (Buchanan, 2005, p 213 -14) 
 
Indeed Atlantis was taken an hour after dark on an evening when 
no storms were forecast, but when Nick sensed there just might be 
one about. It seemed to the naked eye that there were no colours 
of the sunset left to shoot, the rocks were dark, and, there was but 
one tiny flash of lightning during the whole shoot. Indeed the night’s 
exploration had seemed a photographic failure to Nick, even if the 
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process of being and doing all this had again modulated his pain. 
He packed up his gear, like a fisherman goes home having enjoyed 
the outing, but caught nothing.  
 
Instead, when he developed the photograph, he found all those 
colours playing in the hidden, but very present, afterglow of the 
sunset, mixing with the mercury vapour’s green (that is produced 
from the local street lights) splashing all over the rocks, and, in the 
most interesting part of the frame, a single lightning strike 
elucidating the whole of the picture’s complexity through its very 
playfulness. The lost city of his pain, and his joy, was there, in the 
dark all along. What had seemed initially to me a banal title to 
accompany an obviously photoshopped photograph, suddenly 
struck me with its sheer ingeniousness. I was, and remain deeply 
moved, every time I see this shot.  Andrew in the play tries to 
explain to Sally his feelings about these photographs more 
generally: 
 
Andrew Merde. Jesus these people just don’t realise this is 
something that can help tell the brain’s story. DNA 
has the double helix – the solar system has the 
atom… but pain – it only has Descartes’ bell… 
Sally It’s late Andrew…  
Andrew This guy stuck away in Perth so burdened with his 
own pain has found the metaphor: Complex systems 
theory, self-organisation, neuroplasticity and lightning 
- it all fits! Eureka!!! And all two minutes from his 
house on his local beach. And what really gets me is 
he had to lose nearly everything to find it. And he 
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finds it in his only reason left to live… (Buchanan, 
2005, p 223) 
 
Nick became, as many storm-chasers do, highly engaged with the 
tracking and prediction of these storms, and found the following 
maxim to be useful: many are forecast but few come, but it is the 
ones not forecast that come best and most fiercely. Perth is not 
known for its high frequency of electrical storms, and during 
summer, there is a protracted period of meteorological quiescence. 
In winter, the thunderstorms are often too difficult to photograph as 
they are associated with fast moving low level cold fronts. Nick’s 
most preferred storms remain the slow-moving, mid-level 
disturbances that occur sporadically and unpredictably, in the Perth 
spring, summer and autumn. 
 
The mystery associated with the storm’s forecast however, is even 
more apparent, when it comes to understanding just what lightning 
actually is, in order to forecast it. Like pain, we know lightning 
exists, but we have little idea what it is or how it is produced 
(Gosline, 2005, p 30). This was first discussed in the prestigious 
scientific journal Nature in November 2003, which was the same 
month we began to workshop the play that would become A Bell in 
the Storm. Then in May 2005, which was the same month A Bell in 
the Storm was produced, the journal New Scientist’s cover article 
ran with ‘Thunderbolts from Space – What triggers lightning.’ by 
Anna Gosline (Gosline, 2005.)  
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The article discussed the latest research on the impasse 
concerning what lightning is: 
Nobody understands what’s going on here. You have a lot of people 
guessing but we are really clueless. After a couple of hundred 
years, it’s actually embarrassing. (Dwyer, cited in Gosline, 2005, p 
30). 
 
Gosline first discusses the classical theory concerning lightning, 
involves ice crystals rubbing together in the storm’s up drafts, 
creating a negative ionisation and electrical charge that leaves a 
positive charge building in the earth that in turn, eventually leads to 
the discharge of this polarity as lightning (Gosline, 2005, p 31 - 34). 
Gosline then points out though that this theory is theoretically 
insupportable as she states: 
But there is a flaw in this explanation. Air only ionises spontaneously 
in electrical fields of around 2500 kilovolts per metre. Centuries of 
often dangerous measurement with kites, balloons and aircraft have 
produced many measurements of fields in thunderstorms. But no-
one has ever found an electrical field in a storm cloud that is any 
where near strong enough to ionise air molecules. The fields found 
are typically between 100 and 400 kilovolts per metre, less than a 
tenth of what is needed [to produce lightning]. (Gosline, 2005, p 30 
– 31).  
 
The long held and widely accepted theory for the causation of 
lightning, was suddenly, inadequate. The elements available within 
the earth’s atmosphere simply could not generate enough volts for 
lightning to occur. If this is the case, then what might be going on? 
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The new evidence concerns an involvement of other elements in 
the creation of lightning, namely ‘cosmic rays in a process termed 
runaway breakdown’, as Gosline suggests: 
These are highly energetic particles that zip through space at close 
to the speed of light. When a cosmic ray strikes Earth’s atmosphere, 
it could hit an air molecule, ionising it and producing an extremely 
energetic electron. In the electrical field near a storm cloud, such an 
electron could be accelerated to near the speed of light, then hit and 
ionise other air molecules, producing more and more electrons in a 
chain reaction. The ensuing avalanche of electrons would ionise the 
air, allowing charge to flow.  (Gosline, 2005, p 32). 
 
Lightning, that was once held to be phenomena produced through a 
simple cause and effect closed system of earth-only atmospheric 
givens, has been found to lack reference to scientific actuality. The 
growing evidence confirms a greater mystery and complexity, in 
contrast to the Ockham’s razor approach of the most obvious and 
simple answer is usually true. At stake here is that Ockham’s razor 
may too often mistake our perception for reference that often 
serves only to reinforce Zeno’s paradox in a quest for knowledge of 
such mysteries. That is Ockham’s razor, like Descartes’ bell may 
halve the distance without ever bridging the gap. The greater 
mystery and complexity of lightning has a correlative with pain and 
the medical model as the James Katz points out: 
This medical model is not unlike the Western belief in hermeneutics 
as a path to certainty… Unfortunately (or fortunately), the flaw with 
this belief is that successive iterations of a medical model may just 
as likely adhere to Zeno’ paradox. (Katz, 2004, p 61). 
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This is at the heart of the director Angela Chaplin’s favourite line in 
the play (Chaplin, 2005, p 5) when Sally asks Andrew: 
  
Sally (A silence – lightning and thunder) Tell me… By 
pointing out where they’re wrong – does it make 
you right?  
   (Buchanan, 2005, p 240) 
 
There seems an irrefutable theoretical parallel at play between the 
neurobiological mystery of pain and the meteorological mystery of 
storms and lightning. There is even a commonality between the 
metaphors used to cope with this complexity: the cascade of pain in 
the brain’s downwards causation of neuronal assemblies and the 
avalanche of lightning in the storm’s runaway breakdown of 
electrons. The very metaphoricity of this language parallels both the 
sciences of neurobiology and meteorology’s inability to bridge 
Zeno’s paradox. The mystery endures as entities we thought to be 
predictable and stable defy both states not only through their very 
complexity but through the phenomena that emerge uncannily from 
their falling.  
 
This mystery is highlighted by the study of recent meteorological 
evidence concerning phenomena called sprites. Sprites are “…faint 
flashes of light [that] dance above the clouds at an altitude of 
between 40 – 90 kilometres (storm clouds are 10 – 16 kilometres 
above the ground)” (Gosline, 2005, p 34).  
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It is now thought that gamma rays from space are involved 
somehow in their dance, perhaps in similar ways to the emergence 
of lightning but it is simply not known how or why or in what way 
Gamma rays may contribute to either the avalanche of the lightning 
strike and/or the dance of a sprite. The mystery of their origin still 
endures as Joe Dwyer points out, “We know that runaway 
breakdown is occurring, and we know that lightning is occurring.” 
(Dwyer, cited Gosline, 2005, p 34). The mysteries of lightning and 
sprites in storms parallels neurobiology’s discoveries that the self-
referential brain is involved in the creative act and that these 
imaginary creations may modulate pain, but just how they do this 
remains unknown.  
 
Simon points out the aporia of this mystery to Andrew in the play: 
 
Andrew When you’re photographing your lightning does 
your pain diminish? (Pause) I think I know why! 
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Simon The Saviour! They don’t even know what lightning 
is! They used to think it was an electrical discharge 
caused by ice crystals being rubbed together in 
updrafts… But now they only know it can’t be that! 
And that’s just the lightning – you ever heard of 
sprites? 
Andrew Sprites? 
Simon There are things in storms we can’t even imagine – 
as for what causes them - they don’t have a clue?  
    (Buchanan, 2005, p 137) 
  
Simon’s point here perhaps, is that there are also things in our 
brains that defy if not our imagination then certainly our common 
sense that are at the heart of Chapman’s step two miracle and 
manifest in the uncanny emergence of both pain and the creative 
act as we catch up with the self-referentiality of our onto-
neurophenomenal fall.  
 
The parallels between meteorology and neurobiology here are 
indeed uncanny. What has been considered to be opposite and 
separate in terms of the self and the world, the world and the 
cosmos (separated by their compartmentalized arenas of study) 
now seem so highly related and interconnected as to be 
inseparable. What seems compelling is that one lone and discreet 
pain sufferer has stumbled upon this connection within a 
photographic practice that traverses such a territory beyond the 
aleatory artistic epiphany. Just as Newton in seeing the apple fall 
on his head knew the universe was falling, so too does Nick 
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Djordjevic’s photography, in the act of its own creation, know that 
what is happening onto-neurophenomenally within him is related to 
the world he glimpses through his lens in ways that always do more 
than they know. Atlantis is but one striking example of this process. 
Both literally and figuratively, as Nick’s pain and creations fall, he 
refers. 
 
What is also compelling here is Nick’s gradual refocus from 
photographing lightning to things of joy and play. Taken by the 
process of his photography from planning, to shooting, to 
developing his creations, Nick wondered if subjects other than the 
storm would be as efficacious. He remembered Little Island three 
kilometers off the Hillarys Boat Harbour in the Marmion Marine Park    
that offers reefs for surfing but also a gathering place for Australian 
Sea Lions. Nick wondered if an area he surfed before his pain 
became persistent would have anything to offer this creative and 
efficacious process. 
 
He purchased some underwater camera housing and off he set in a 
dinghy and a wet suit. He found that both he and the seals could 
dance with in a neutral buoyancy environment of the sea. His pain 
was again modulated but he also felt a sense of well-being with and 
for the seals as sprites of the ocean. If the storms offered an 
affirmation of his pain-of-the-cosmos as a kind of weltsmertz, then 
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photographing the seals offered a buoyant affirmation of joy and 
dance as Nick explains: 
It’s like flying! It’s an affirmation of reinventing the self beyond pain 
and moving onwards. I was still bedeviled by pain but I could cry out 
I am alive! The seals play with you, blow bubbles when you blow 
bubbles, dance when you dance – they play like kids in the surf! 
(Personal correspondence, Djordjevic, 2005) 
 
 
The photographs, he noticed, were gentler in composition and effect. 
He was delighted and again surprised. There was a photographic 
world beyond the storm like there was a life beyond his pain. This 
was not to excise joy from the pain or the pain from the joy but to 
know both as inseparable and deeply involved in the other or as he 
explained, “You get lightning and you get sprites. You don’t get one 
without the other. Joy and pain: it’s impossible to tease them apart.”  
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If in Barthes’ sense of the photograph was like a wound then Nick’s 
seals were Kristeva’s jouissence: powerful, healing, and restorative 
as for Paul Celan’s,  
it knows you 
come the Sabbath. 
  (Celan, 2001, p 377) 
 
As for Celan, this is the anticipation of rest, refreshment, redemption. 
(Felstiner, cited in Celan, 2001, p xxxvi).  
  
 
Nick’s core photographic passion remains with the storms but he has 
broadened his palate from the off-shore Little Island break to include 
one of his favourite and perennial of locations near the small town of 
Cervantes on the central west coast of Western Australia: The 
Pinnacles. Twice a year in April and August, he takes other 
professionals and/or enthusiasts up to photograph the full moon 
rising in the dusk and setting into the sea at dawn at ‘this most 
spiritual and mystical place’.  
141 
 142
  
Photographer Dale Neil photographing Nick Djordjevic in the dawn at the 
The Pinnacles , Late August Full (Blue) Moon, 2004. Photo by the Author. 
 
 
He finds these limestone formations set in their own confined desert 
overlooking the Indian Ocean, to be somehow deeply connected with 
a spirit of play and cosmological dance. I have accompanied him 
three times on these trips and each time found to my surprise and joy 
his delight in something which is undoubtedly mystical. “All you get 
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up here are questions – and once I got the mother of all storms. It 
was just fantastic!!” So was the photograph: 
 
 
I recall a phone call from John Quintner suggesting he take me up to 
meet this photographer who uses photography to deal with his pain. 
It was July, 2001. My pain was awful, persistent and very debilitating. 
By then I had joined the academic pain-medicine collaboration John 
had with Associate Professor Milton Cohen at the University of New 
South Wales. We had already completed the first few drafts of the 
paper that would be later published in the Journal of Theoretical 
Medicine.  
 
On the journey up to Nick’s place that day in 2001, John spoke to me 
about a paper he had just read by the eminent psychiatrist Milton 
Freeman. The self-referential brain lacked a metaphor to help tell its 
story: DNA has the double helix, the solar system has the atom but 
what did the brain have, especially given its uncanny and 
unpredictable self-organisation in the subjective experience of pain?  
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It seemed quite unlikely anything would ever be found, but, I offered, 
there’s always hope of an apple dropping on someone’s head. We 
got out of the car at an average house in an average suburb about 
half a kilometre from the coast. After greeting this six foot five 
mountain of a man, Nick took us to a studio he called his bunker, to 
show us his lightning photography. In a flash, I saw the self-
referential apple falling onto Nick’s head.  
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Chapter 7 
Monochords, feeler words and Celan’s ‘Never’  
 
That Saturday afternoon in July 2001, I sat quietly as John drove 
back from Nick’s bunker. Two ideas echoed again and again in my 
thoughts. The first idea concerned the photograph as a glimpse of 
something far greater than it can ever capture and the second idea, 
was a possible solution for Freeman’s requirement for something that 
could be the-hoped-for translator of the brain’s story. Could there be 
something already out there that speaks for our onto-
neurophenomenal fallings in their self-referential, unpredictable, and 
uncanny ways?  
 
The first idea concerned the metonymic nature of photography, 
where photography’s object d’art is a part indicating a far more 
complex and interesting whole. The metonym of photography works 
like the Maori word iwi, which literally means bone, but iwi is also the 
term used to indicate the complexity of a whole people, a whole tribe, 
a whole Maori nation (Reed, 1965, p 25). The second idea concerns 
the metaphoric project, which is already problematised within its own 
quest for complete translation within a system of linguistic differences 
over any fixity of meaning or sense-making, as in my monochord: 
        
-the metaphor in the poem – I never quite make up the difference— 
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     (Buchanan, 2005, p 289) 
It seems metaphors exist because language cannot essentially 
express the phenomenal and metaphysical world and so seeks to 
translate through figurative substitutions. That is, in the case of the 
complexity of our brain and pain, can lightning and its mystery ever 
really help to translate such self-referential complexity?  
 
After seeing for the first time the uncanny moments of self-referential 
possibility in Nick’s photography, there came fast on its heels this 
anticlimax of the bathetic impasse. That oscillation that ensues 
between the general revelation of a secret but not the intrinsic nature 
of its secrets. Nick’s photos are highly contingent in their 
apprehension on the above two ideas and, as such, the bathos of the 
aporia and its impasse seems inevitable. In this context of this 
bathetic impasse I recalled J.D. Caputo’s point that,  
...like Derrida, who is so much taken with aporias and impasses, 
who thinks you are really getting somewhere only  when you are 
paralysed and it is impossible to advance… the apophatic, the 
unnameable, unknowable secret is a subject Derrida does not know 
how to avoid. (Caputo, 1997, p xxvii) 
 
Pain’s very aporia means no train of knowledge goes to the territory 
of its secrets, at least, not yet. Given the onto-neurophenomenal self-
referenntial complexity of its being, it is more likely that a totality for 
the explanation of pain will remain impossible and this alone 
accounts for the bathos after the uncanny revelation. This bathos 
seems redolent of Lacan’s desir and manqué and Kristeva’s 
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jouissence: after the glimpse of union with the chora and or the 
imaginary order’s Ideal I, comes the loss of that very glimpse and the 
perpetual impasse to access it more permanently. I then recalled 
Derrida’s own epithet “Only write what is impossible, that ought to be 
the impossible rule.” (Derrida, 1993, p 27). One impossible poem of 
Paul Celan’s from Lightduress apprehends this impossible context of 
revelation and bathos  
 I CAN STILL HEAR YOU: an echo, 
 palpable with feeler- 
 words, at farewell- 
 ridge. 
 
 Your face shies quietly, 
 when suddenly 
 light brightens lamplike 
 inside me, at that place 
 where most painfully one says Never. (Celan, 2005, p 99, Tr. Jorris). 
 
 
I have often recited the last two lines to myself as if they were only 
one line. Sitting in that car on that day, my pain was still there, as was 
by then, the crisis in my marriage, but the pain was something other 
than I had felt it to be. Pain no longer blocked out my sun. I went 
home and wrote my first one line poem: 
                  --white lines of the highway, her face in the sky – 
(Buchanan, 2005, p 289). 
 
I have, ever since I began to read poetry as a boy, been especially 
taken by the last line of any poem. Perhaps that is why in my youth, I 
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preferred the confessional lyric poets like Robert Lowell whose very 
powerful last lines seemed to have more power in them than the rest 
of the poem combined. Or rather, the preceding confessional lyric of 
his poetry had been there mostly as a runway from which the last 
lines took off and made the poetry soar. Poems like Lowell’s For 
Sale, Man and Wife, and For the Union Dead, are particular 
favourites but the final lines of Soft Wood convey for mine, both the 
inability of language to cope with, and the affirmation of the onto-
neurophenomenal reference [9] of, pain: 
each drug that numbs alerts another nerve to pain. 
    (Lowell, 1981, p 62) 
 
The above last line, as well as completing the lyrical quotient of the 
poem’s narrative, about his friend Harriet Winslow who was dying of 
cancer in far off Washington, also stands and works alone. Not only 
that but it takes on the form of the photographic metonym and begins 
to, like any part indicating a much bigger whole, possess the 
yearning of a gestalt. Any photograph yearns for the diachronic 
movement, that is the movie it cannot be, but, it always invites the 
viewer, like the reader of literature, to interpret this movement, to 
imagine the movie it is not. In short, the photograph never has what it 
is but always yearns for what it is not, and that is their attraction and 
their power. As for the Maori ‘iwi’, the bone becomes a whole nation 
of people, and a flash of lightning becomes a testament to a universal 
mysterium tremendum.  I the viewer, I the interpreter, I make up the 
difference.  
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The object of the photograph’s frame is always searching for its 
subjecthood that only we as the interpreter, the viewer, can give it. In 
this sense it is very much like Roland Barthes’ reader taking pleasure 
in the text (Barthes, 1977, p 3) and, like Prospero in his epilogue, the 
photographer asks for our indulgence to set the captured object free. 
(Shakespeare, 1979, p 1345)  
 
Given the combination of pain’s neurophenomenal aporia and the 
linguistic paucity which amounts to an ontological impasse (that 
generates Scarry’s notion that when pain finally does find a voice is it 
through the creative frame), then the case for the monochord poem 
to be both a powerful antidepressant/analgesic and a legitimate 
imaginary creation seems as compelling as it is for Nick’s 
photography to both reveal and modulate the wound. (Padfield, 
2004). I began to both research the monochord’s poetics and 
practice their form.  
 
I was then unaware of the Greek poet Yannis Ritsos’s Monochords 
(Ritsos, 2005). My own term for the monochord poem was twofold in 
its meaning for my writing practice. Firstly, like the photograph, it 
gave me a single chordal phrase, as for the post bop jazz I also play 
and which seems redolent of Joni Mitchell’s simile like a warm chord 
(Mitchell, 1981). Secondly it was also literally metonymic as the 
lowest twelve notes on a piano are produced through single bound 
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strings that are actually called monochords. Thereafter the strings 
become bichordal until in the highest range they become polychordal.  
 
These literal and figurative elements mimicked my experience of pain 
in-so-far-as there was very limited language (as for Scarry’s 
prelinguistic grunts not unlike the tones of the lowest twelve notes on 
the piano) and, so, when I did find something to say about my pain, 
especially to doctors, it was by definition, both through this creative 
frame and laconic. A good example of this laconic creative frame was 
when a doctor asked me ‘How was my pain today?” I replied, “I have 
five bags of wheat hanging from my neck.”  
 
The McGill Pain Questionnaires I answered for several of my doctors 
and one psychologist, were another example of this linguistic 
impasse, as I had to tick the category that best described my pain – 
stabbing, burning, pulsating, etc. Each of these participles were not 
only masquerading as adjectives but were hopelessly inadequate in 
conveying the state of my pain. Yet all these words were used to 
measure the type and the extent of my pain, as if such a thing could 
be done through language. Since such an exercise was doomed, the 
ceding of this endeavour (at least in myself) opened up the same 
possibility of Nick’s photography: one line, one glimpse. The hope in 
this monochordal exercise is that maybe, just maybe, the pain which 
is hidden and a secret can be revealed, in uncanny creative ways.  
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As more monochords were written I also noticed the way they lay on 
the page. Each monochord stood alone yet each touched the other, 
not in any lyrical narrative sense but through a linguistic contiguity 
deeply involved in Derrida’s linguistic ‘system of differences’ (Derrida, 
1978, p 352). The way the monochords touched were redolent of 
Celan’s feeler words in that each monochord touched and thereby 
felt the other, just as every chord in music feels the next chord and 
indeed needs the next chord, to make an overall musical presence 
felt. On the page, the monochords’ presence expanded to be 
elsewhere to standing and being a lone singular entity. 
 
In this sense I asked Nick Djordjevic if I might write some 
monochords to accompany his photographs. This request was not 
made out of any wish to caption any essence to his photographs but 
that the two different works may simply touch within the aporia of 
pain and depression, but also within the joy of the imaginary creation. 
He generously agreed and I proceeded cautiously so as to avoid the 
destruction of both in the forced marriage of the other.  
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--the earth is lichen, the sky a skeleton dancing with black hair— 
 
 
 
 
--what knowledge our locks keep out, enters without knocking— 
 
When we saw the first few I asked him how he would feel if I wrote a 
play about all this. I reassured him that I would take care not to use 
his photography in a way that biographed him. His eyes squinted in 
caution but he agreed so long as it was made plain that the play was 
not about him and then he added, “But we will never capture the 
secret.” There was something about the way he said never that was 
again redolent of Celan’s lightduress: 
 Your face shies quietly, 
 when suddenly 
 light brightens lamplike 
 inside me, at that place 
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 where most painfully one says Never. 
      (Celan, 2005, p 99)  
 
 
-the ogre will come in any case – more god-like than they thought 
— 
 
Recently, I read how Yannis Ritsos wrote many of his monochords in 
secret, often while imprisoned on a remote island by one of the right 
wing dictatorships that suppressed his work in Greece (Ritsos, 2005). 
He would scrawl his monochords on torn off pieces of paper, roll 
them up, slide them into a bottle and bury them. What was too radical 
to be said could stay buried, like a hidden secret, until the play and 
complexity of things political and ontological; the affirmation of 
wonderment over disparagement; and, in the fullness of time, the 
inability of dualistic constructs to stay in the opposition they enforce; 
was revealed through the das unheimliche. Ritsos’ art, so long 
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thought to be the ogre, emerged from its hidden secret in the earth, 
more god-like than they thought.  
 
In Derrida’s sense of the impossible, Ritsos had written the 
impossible, Nick had photographed it and, I now had a vantage point 
from which to begin a poetic course chartered by Derrida’s 
impossible rule:  
Only write the impossible. That ought to be the impossible rule.  
    (Derrida, 1993, p 27).  
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Endnotes 
 
1. A letter entitled, Pain beyond monism and dualism by the 
collaboration of Williamson, Buchanan (myself), Quintner and 
Cohen was published in Pain 5754 05, 04, 2005 19:22. The 
letter’s tenet was essentially that as pain was an aporia that also 
had a lack of language available to express it, then: ‘absence of 
evidence for pain was no longer evidence for absence of pain.’ 
The letter pointed out that: ‘That the recognition that pain is an 
aporia and is beyond language should not engender a sense of 
clinical nihilism, but remind us that the use of language to denote 
and analyse the pain experience is imprecise and uncertain.’ 
2. Curatolo et al 2001, point out that despite the neurobiological 
evidence to the contrary, the syllogism of the specificity theory 
that fires cause pain and without fire there can be no physical 
pain, remains the dominant theoretical and practical apprehension 
of medical practice in the treatment of pain. 
3. Lucire argues persistent unexplained pain states are explainable 
through the belief and desire of the both the patient to have them 
and the doctors, who believe these patients, to treat them. This is 
despite the growing neurobiological evidence for this persistent 
pain and a continuing lack of such evidence for the actuality of 
somatisisation. In other words, Lucire’s accusation of belief and 
desire for pain in the patient and, for the clinician to believe in the 
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patient’s pain, seems a tautological projection of her own belief 
and desire. 
4. Belsey (1982, p 7) argued:  
common sense urges that ‘man’ is the origin and source 
of meaning, of action and of history (humanism). Our 
concepts and our knowledge are held to be the product of 
experience (empiricism), and this experience is preceded 
and interrupted by the mind, reason or thought, the 
property of a transcendent human nature whose essence 
is the attribute of each individual (idealism). 
5. I have taken the term dark continent from Freud in this instance, 
which he originally employed to describe the psyche of women. 
The irony of this is unintended other than to connote that the 
acceptance of a mystery can invite the undoing of entrenched 
positions – in this case – that the brain was merely a reflex driven 
hardwired mechanism. The undoing of this long held classical 
theory continues to cause fear and uncertainty in the holders of 
such theories to be valid. The disparagement of sufferers of 
persistent unexplainable pain is, in this context, not dissimilar to 
the disparagement of women by the patriarchy. 
6. The essentialist difficulty New Critical discourse had was to assert 
that one true and correct reading of a text was achievable, when 
the means by which this position could be proved could only ever 
be subjectively asserted through an imposed pseudo-objectivism. 
7. Gold Standard Evidence is the term used by science to both 
denote and connote the very highest level of evidence has been 
achieved through the use of double blind random control trials 
(RCTs). This methodology attempts to obviate any possible bias 
by the conductors of the experiments. The metaphor of Gold 
Standard insists on a pure translation or reflection of the world as 
the way it is. This endeavour seems redolent of the attributes and 
pitfalls of the New Critical heuristic endeavours. 
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8. The diagnoses of Fibromyalgia was critiqued in the paper 
Signification and Pain: A Semiotic Reading of Fibromyalgia by 
Qunintner et al, as a nosological and linguistic construct that 
lacked medical utility and any reference to the neurodynamics of 
pain syndromes it claimed to present.   
9. Recent evidence has shown that opiates when used over a long 
period time may actually be interpreted by the brain to enhance 
pain rather than to reduce it. In this sense Lowell’s line is quite 
uncanny in its wisdom.    
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Introduction 
A Bell in the Storm  
and 
To Fall without Landing… 
 
At the time of A Bell in the Storm’s production in May 2005, there had 
been fifteen drafts of the play completed since the commencement of 
these studies in 2002. The play was initially titled “Like Snow on Mt 
Everest” after John R Searle’s reference to brute facts and 
speculative philosophy.  
 
The first few drafts involved three different motifs in place and time. 
The first motif was set in Perth in the contemporary and involved 
three characters: Simon, a persistent pain sufferer as a result of a 
serious car accident, who was in his 40s fighting a compensation 
claim; Sally, his psychologist who was in her late thirties; and 
Andrew, a pain medicine physician who was also in his late thirties. 
Andrew had recently returned from living in France where he had 
lived with his wife Jacqui for the last sixteen years but, from whom, 
he had recently separated. The second motif was set in Arcachon, 
France, during World War One and involved Andrew’s grandfather 
Bob, as a twenty-one year old, who was there to fight with the AIF. 
Sheell shocked but coping Bob meets Gabrielle on his R & R in 
Arcachon. Gabrielle is a local widower in her late twenties who 
became Bob’s lover during his leave in Arcachon. The third motif was 
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set again in Arcachon but in the early 1980s and involved Andrew as 
a twenty-one year old retracing the steps of his recently deceased 
grandfather (Bob), who, as a result of his action in the Great War had 
sustained a shell-shock injury that caused a life-long pain that had 
been diagnosed as psychoneurotic. Andrew, in this motif would faint 
outside a café only to be cared for by Jacqui, a local divorcee, and 
they would, despite the language difficulties, fall in love. 
 
Andrew Ross, the then Artistic Director of Black Swan Theatre 
Company expressed interest in the piece and an initial reading was 
conducted in September 2002. He suggested major rewrites to 
streamline the three different motifs into a single cotemporary motif 
with either flashbacks and/or the narratives of the French motifs 
spliced into that action. The action would therefore be confined to 
Simon, Sally and Andrew – with Old Bob, Gabrielle and Jacqui (who 
was renamed Cecile in later drafts) confined to memories and 
telephone conversations within the single motif.  
 
Within the next month however, it was clear that Andrew would be 
leaving Black Swan Theatre and more than likely would be going to 
Brisbane to continue his career. With Andrew’s departure by 
Christmas of 2002, the local theatre scene became quite turbulent 
and after seeking advice from theatre colleagues I decided to 
proceed with the play in the independent sector. Ingle Knight 
professed interest to direct and help dramaturge the play to a 
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workshop level and Bill McCluskey agreed to play the part of Simon. 
A fourth draft was read in November, 2002. While Ingle was happy to 
proceed with the piece and help apply for funding from the 
Department of Culture and the Arts, there was much criticism of the 
overly-complex nature of the piece and I was left in a very 
despondent frame. Between Christmas and the late February (in part 
in order to meet the next funding application deadline), I re-wrote the 
play twice more under the title “The Lightning and the Bell” and 
added the character of Counsel for the Commission. I then applied 
successfully for funding to workshop the play independently.  
 
A total of $7,700 was granted to me by the Arts Development Panel 
of the Department of Culture and the Arts to workshop the piece in 
November, 2003. Between June and October, 2003, another three 
drafts were completed and by November, 2003 I had the interest of 
two theatre companies. The piece was workshopped at the Western 
Australian Academy of Performing Arts from December 1 until 
December 14, 2003 and a moved reading performed at Victoria Hall 
(the base of deckchair theatre) on Saturday December 14 between 
2.00pm and 4.30pm before an invited audience. It was directed by 
Ingle Knight and the actors involved were: 
 Bill McCluskey played Simon 
 Jacqueline Low played Sally 
 Peter Web played Andrew 
 Michael Loney played Counsel for the Commission  
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 After the moved reading, both the Artistic Director and General 
Manager of deckchair theatre expressed their formal wish to 
produce the piece professionally in their 2004 season, to which I 
agreed. 
 
I submitted another completed workshop draft still under the title of 
“The Lightning and The Bell” to deckchair theatre in January, 2004. 
This draft deleted the Counsel for the Commission as the accent of 
the play concentrated more on the creative affirmation of the creative 
brain and less on the court-room drama. Due to unforeseen 
circumstances and the vicissitudes of professional theatre practice 
the play was delayed until deckchair’s 2005 season and even then it 
proceeded only with the unprecedented financial backing of Alcoa 
Australia. Four more drafts were completed in the interim period up 
until the production commenced formal rehearsals in April 2005 
under the revised title of A Bell in the Storm. 
 
Scitech had also graciously allowed the production be staged in its 
planetarium dome in the City West Complex in West Perth. Although 
Scitech had already agreed to the staging of the production in the 
dome the real coup de theatre (Banks, The West Australian, May 16, 
2005) of the dome had come about after I met with the Professor of 
Neurobiology Stuart Bunt in November 2004. We had initially met to 
discuss the neurobiology behind the play and its nexus with creativity, 
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language and the narrative. We then discussed how the brain’s three 
newly discovered qualities of self-organisation, noncentredness and 
negentropy were irreducible to Descartes’ Bell. It was though the 
storm/lightning photography of Nick Djordjevic that proved to be the 
most fruitful topic of the meeting. Professor Bunt listened quietly as I 
put the case that Nick’s photography wasn’t just an amazing personal 
narrative of someone coping with their pain but that the storms 
themselves shared uncannily complex characteristics of how both 
lightning and pain emerge unpredictably from self-referential systems. 
We discussed how the creative act can modulate pain through 
inhibitory neuronal activity and how the main character of the play felt 
his pain go into the storm whenever he photographed lightning. 
Professor Bunt pondered what I had said and then told me he knew of 
some members of SIGGRAPH (a computer specialists organisation 
and forum) who could three-dimensionally render a storm sequence for 
the dome to engender this context for the play. I went home and rang 
Nick excitedly. After only a few emails and meetings between us with 
Martin Sawtell, Simon Rudland and Brendan Ragan and the director of 
deckchair theatre, Angela Chaplin, the idea of having a three 
dimensional storm was born and included into the play. No-one – not 
even the three young programmers knew what was going to be 
achieved, but, achieved it was and with stunning effect for the 
penultimate scene of the play, which Angela Chaplin christened the 
Jesus moment: 
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Meanwhile another play had been gestating in my thoughts. It 
broadly concerned Caruth’s self-referential fall. I was asked to attend 
an Australian Playwrights’ Conference in December 2004, conducted 
at Yanchep, north of Perth. Many playwrights and theatre 
practitioners across the country, including Tim Daly, attended and led 
workshops. I was asked to contribute a new six page play and a 
synopsis. It was read at the conference under the working title of To 
Fall without Landing and Gillian Berry of the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission’s Radio National Drama Unit approached me to expand 
it into a full length radio play. The initial full length draft was offered to 
Gillian Berry in March, 2005 and accepted for production in April, 
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2005 with further drafts submitted in May, 2005 and July 2005. 
Production and recording occurred from 22nd to the 24th August and 
the radio play To Fall Without Landing went to air on Radio National, 
on the Sunday 2nd and Friday 7th October, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 
 182
 
 
 
A Bell in the Storm 
 
a multi-media play by 
David Buchanan 
with photography 
by Nick Djordjevic 
 
Produced by deckchair theatre 
May 14 – 30, 2005 
In the Planetarium, Scitech  
Perth, Western Australia 
All Rights Reserved 
©2005 
David Buchanan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 
 183
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the explosion of the universe we are witnessing, a miracle happens: 
the fragments falling down are  a l i v  e ! 
     Rene Char 
 
 
 
I CAN STILL HEAR YOU: an echo, 
palpable with feeler- 
words, at farewell- 
ridge. 
 
Your face shies quietly, 
when suddenly 
light brightens lamplike 
inside me, at that place 
where most painfully one says Never. 
 
   Paul Celan ‘Lightduress’ 
 
 
 
Like ghosts amid your palaces 
Thoughts of poor men force their way 
 
   Ernest Jones, ‘We are Silent’, 1851. 
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Setting Contemporary Perth, Western 
Australia. The stage should be 
open yet able to represent an 
office, the Café L’avenir, a 
bedroom, and the District Court – 
as well as the beach or land’s 
edge.    
 
Characters 
   
Simon Sharrin  40 something… He is a car 
accident victim suffering from 
persistent and severe pain.  
Dr Andrew McLeod Mid to late 30s. He is a Pain 
Medicine specialist, recently 
separated from his French wife 
and children of sixteen years and 
only just returned to Perth. 
Sally Mid 30s. She is a clinical 
psychologist. Andrew and Sally 
were first loves before he left for 
France 17 years ago. Sally is also 
doubles as Stephanie, Sprite and 
the voice of Cecile. 
Musician(s)…  
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Scene 1 
 
Dark stage – then a red light comes up.  
 
Music “The Beauty in the Breakage” up… Enter Simon. 
 
Simon (Direct Address) Hi… I’m Simon Sharrin… or 
at least I have been. We get so used to a name 
that we think we’re beyond the game. Like I 
was this guy, Simon Sharrin: happily married to 
Stephanie Dodds (she didn’t take my name) – 
two gorgeous kids Jemima and Ann, a house in 
Solomon Street on the hill with sea views, two 
cars - Saab and MemSaab - dependable job 
teaching English… yearly holidays O.S. 
…everything rang like a bell… you get the 
picture of Simon Sharrin… But you know 
what’s coming next, right? What’s in a name, 
right? That’s why I reckon we all have mobile 
phones – not just cos we can - but because we 
know deep down - that without warning, 
everything in our name could change in a big 
bang and (Simon straps himself in his car) 
instead of strapping on a seatbelt to protect us 
from an explosive universe, we might get to say 
our name one last time to the person we loved 
the most… like that guy on Mt Everest rang his 
wife and kids to say goodbye… or those poor 
fucks on the 9/11 planes… their last words 
hurtled invisible  and thin as gas through space 
to reach that ear to echo in… 
 
He looks up at the red light and dialling his mobile 
phone… 
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Simon (To himself) Come the Sabbath??? (Long 
Pause… then into the mobile) Steph? It’s 
me… (Pause) Yes I’m driving, but it’s Ok… I’m 
stationary at a red light… (Pause) Yes… 
(Pause) About a minute and half away… Tell 
her I’m sorry I’m late…I’ll watch the movie with 
her just as soon as I get home… (Pause) How 
was the reading? (Truck headlights are 
incoming like munitions. Music up to effect 
this) The poetry was Ok but she’s got this big 
name now and… 
 
The lights explode into Simon…  Stage effects to effect 
The thinning… (Horizontal lighting, and 
mist/smoke effects, with a turbulence to 
effect a storm building. Subdued and 
putative lightning effects begin. Simon is 
picked up (via his ‘seat belt’) and thinned…  
 
Screen; The Big Bang (birth of the universe), The Earth 
from Space, thunderstorm from space, then  
brain MRIs, before World War 1 scenes from 
Passchendaele…  
 
Screen randomly the words in no particular order: ‘the 
sky’… ‘skeleton’… ‘dancing’… ‘black hair’…  
‘behind their eyes’… ‘lichen’ … ‘the earth’…  
 
 
‘C’est le Guerre’… ‘Am Sabbath’… ‘is a’… ‘Carry the 
stone’… ‘open ones’ 
 
Enter Andrew reading papers.  
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Enter Sally who moves between Simon and Andrew.  
 
Screen deliberately bad portraits of ‘wife and kids’ in the 
backdrop of ‘the family home’. Then the same ‘family 
home’ – empty… Screen Genesis series of photographs 
– Simon stands in pain - mid-stage and picks up a 
postcard which he studies. He sits in great pain, mid-
stage staring up at the photo.  He reads the postcard to 
himself again, then slowly, painfully gets up and walks 
towards the screen… as he nears the screen the 
photograph whites out. 
 
Sally Simon Sharrin? 
Simon I used to be… 
Sally Tell me about your pain 
Simon  It was a four wheel drive… 
Sally  He was drunk. 
Simon  I got so… thinned… like I was becoming a gas  
Sally   Tell me about your pain. 
Simon It’s the price I pay 
Sally  For not dying?  What is it – your pain? 
 Simon There aren’t the words 
Sally Never?  
Simon There are no words 
Sally There’s always hope… 
  
 
Sally moves through to Scene 2 as Simon addresses the 
audience before moving among them… 
 
Simon Look I hope you don’t mind this but… Hands up 
those, who are right now, right here, in pain? 
(Silence) Any kind of pain from a twinge to 
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arrgh! It’s Ok I’m not going to bite… I’m in 
agony myself. Thank you… Most likely, 
everyone else here wants to help you…. Right? 
Reach for the Panadol, soothe the brow…To 
relieve pain is divine, right? (Pause) Keep your 
hands up if this pain has lasted longer than 3 
months…? (Pause) Six months…? 
(Pause)Years…??? Thank you… you can pop 
yr hands down now… Do we still wanna reach 
for the Panadol and soothe the brow though…? 
No point, right? Its Ok…relax… relax… you’re 
here to have a good time, right? Oh… just one 
more thing – hands up please those among us 
here who are in love? Keep your hands up if 
this love has lasted longer than 3 months? Six 
months? Years…? (Pause) Tell me, if you had 
to – could you prove this love? Oh and just one 
more thing… (Yeah I know… but this time it’s 
the last time, I swear) Hands up all of you here 
who are alive!? (Silence) Well then – it’s like 
Sal said – there’s always hope…   
 
 Segue into Scene 2… 
 
 
Scene 2 
 
Music fades… 
Lights up – Andrew’s office. He reads referral 
documents at his office desk. There is a large framed 
photo of his Grandfather as a World War 1 soldier 
hanging on the wall next to his Bachelor of Medicine and 
Surgery, and Faculty of Pain Medicine awards. A Large 
print of Narcissus and Echo also adorns the wall. 
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Andrew stares at the letter he holds before he looks up 
and throws it on to the desktop. He gets up and walks to 
the doorway just as Sally enters…  
 
Sally Andrew… are you the Dr McLeod? 
Andrew (Pulls back) Sally?! (Peels off back behind 
his desk) Hi… 
Sally (Pause) I have… a meeting with…  
Andrew Yes… I’m the pain specialist… for my sins… 
(Pause) It’s been a while… 
Sally Yes… How long have you been back? 
Andrew Ah… a few months… maybe six. I’ve been 
busy getting this practice up and running… 
Sally You were recommended, by the University.  
Andrew Please, take a seat. (She sits)  
Sally I’d like to talk with you about a patient of 
mine… 
Andrew A patient?  
Sally Simon Sharrin…  
Andrew Are you a doctor? 
Sally Yes… a PhD in clinical psychology… 
Andrew Oh… A Clinical Psychologist… You gave up 
law? 
Sally I did…just after you left… for France… as fast 
as your feet would carry you…  
Andrew Right… How can I help you, Sal? 
Sally (Pause) It’s to do with Neuropathic pain.  
Andrew I’m amazed you’re even interested.  
Sally Sorry… 
Andrew Well, as a clin psych you would consider the 
pain was all in his mind, surely? That’s your 
province isn’t it? The mind! 
Sally My province… is helping people cope with their 
pain… (Pause) Would you see him for me? 
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Review him – and the reports that have been 
done by the Commission. 
Andrew The Commission? Car accident? (Sally nods) 
Is it going to court? 
Sally  I hope not… I don’t think he could cope and 
they know it. He was smashed up. 
Andrew How long ago? 
Sally Three years – a bit more. Trouble is, there 
aren’t any broken bones or anything on his 
scans to evidence injury…  
Andrew Ah yes… Evidence… 
Sally He’s fallen apart. Lost his job, his wife walked 
out on him with the kids. It’s a mess. I’ve been 
seeing him for nearly two years…  
Andrew Have you found any evidence – in his mind? 
Sally (Ignores him) Now, it’s time to settle with the 
Commission. 
Andrew Or he could just get on with his life… All the 
evidence says people do better outside 
compensation claims. 
Sally That’s easy for you to say on a doctor’s 
income. What makes you think he has a 
choice? They’ve filmed him for hours…you 
know what the Commission’s like? They lean 
on you – have him followed and spied on –  
Andrew In France we don’t… I’ve been away for such a 
long… time. 
Sally I noticed… (Tense pause) Will you ummm, 
please just see him for me? 
Andrew Sure…  
Sally  Oh about those films taken by the Commission, 
some of them are of him taking photographs… 
Andrew So? 
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Sally In the middle of lightning storms… In the 
middle of the night… for hours on end… carting 
tripods and stuff… 
 Andrew Oh… 
Sally It’s his only passion… it’s what he does…  
Andrew Lightning? 
 
A silence… 
 
Sally When could you see him? 
Andrew Actually, I have a cancellation…Tomorrow… 
morning… ten? I could see him then? 
Sally Thanks…  He’ll be here… 
 
Sally stands… and is taken by the photo of the soldier… 
 
Sally  Ol’ Bob eh? (Turns as if to consider the 
resemblance) He had pain, didn’t he?  
Andrew (Steels himself) Yes… 
Sally I remember he used to sleep in his chair at the 
kitchen table with his head in his hands… 
Andrew  From the first night he got back to the day he 
died.It wouldn’t let him lie down… Had to keep 
on the move… like in the trenches… some 
things  just won’t let go… 
Sally Simon can’t sleep any other way either. Thanks 
for seeing him. 
 
Sally moves to exit…but stops… She pulls out a photo… 
Screen photo of a teenaged boy smiling…   
 
Segue into Scene 3… 
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Scene 3 
 
Screen Blood Red Sky…  Enter Simon into ‘The bunker’. 
His pain has increased and he is pacing in despair… 
Then slowly he looks up at the screen. 
 
Simon (Direct address)This one was taken an hour 
after dark. You’re thinking I used photoshop 
right? To get all these greens and sunset 
colours- especially as it was so dark I couldn’t 
see a thing. But you’d be wrong. It was a forty 
five minute exposure, that’s all. You’d be 
amazed at what’s out there if you just let things 
come to you…Anyhow… Welcome to my 
bunker… Where I close the door on the world’s 
commissions and develop my storms that find 
me on Trigg beach… Trigg beach… where I 
surfed everyday as a kid… Its my church and 
its waves my faith. You know, those childhood 
places that fill your head as you drift into sleep, 
like that old pepper tree in the backyard – 
familiar and recognisable as a school bell or a 
ring on a finger. Specific as a key but they open 
the universe. In here and out there… My 
bunker and Trigg… that’s where you’ll find 
me… To me, they’re the same place really… 
But occasionally I have to go to doctor’s rooms 
– and Sal’s of course… Sally, my clin psych… I 
try to tell her –She wants to understand - the 
sun drowns every night in the sea… its blood 
spills across the sky… the planets laugh out 
loud bright as stars… But, its like I say – there 
really aren’t the words… Try saying this? 
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He looks back at the photo… Blood Red Sky time-lapse 
dissolves (10 frames). 
 
The briefest glimpse (like lightning itself) of Ten Billion 
Volts is seen, followed by the three second footage of a 
sprite phenomenon from a thunderstorm…  
 
Change lighting… Simon stands and literally walks into 
Scene 4… 
 
 
Scene 4 
 
Lights up – Andrew sits in his office looking at scans 
and x-rays. Enter Simon.  
 
Andrew Please, take a seat. (Simon turns around 
awkwardly – in pain)  
 
Simon sits with great care. Andrew walks to his desk 
and sits.  
 
Andrew I understand from Sally… 
 
Simon stands from his pain and moves (as if it were his 
excuse to stand) up to the awards on the wall. 
 
Simon Faculty of Pain Medicine. 
Andrew Yes… Simon, your claim… 
Simon Can’t be good… playing a game where ya can’t 
kick any goals? (Simon turns, hands Andrew 
his reports and sits awkwardly back in his 
chair)  
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Andrew I’m sorry…? 
Simon Pain… there’s no goal posts… 
Andrew Quite. It’s tough (He opens the reports and 
begins reading) I’ll just see what your scans 
tell me. 
Simon Nuthen… Nothing will come of nuthin! 
Andrew (Slight pause) Sometimes something does 
come of nothing… Or what we think is 
nothing… On TV once, I saw this racing car 
pull out too early from its refuelling stop… The 
pit crew were suddenly covered in methanol 
fuel… One spark and they were all rolling 
around in agony. But no one around them 
helped… because methanol’s flame can’t be 
seen by the naked eye. No one helped – 
because no one believed they were in pain 
because they couldn’t see any flames.  
 
A silence… 
 
Simon Invisible flames? 
 
Andrew Lets have a look at you. Sit up on the bed, 
please. (Andrew ushers Simon gently on to 
the examination bed)  
Simon Yeah, right… (Pain) Arrh shit. 
Andrew (Moves quickly to Simon’s neck and back) 
Tell me about your pain? 
Simon (Gestures from his neck down his arms, 
then to his back, lower back and legs and 
finally all around his head) All over… 
Andrew And the pins and needles you get – down both 
arms? 
Simon  And legs… 
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Andrew Any pain over the top of your legs? 
Simon This one. 
Andrew (Presses a spot on Simon’s lower back) 
Does it get worse if I… 
Simon (Winces in pain) Fuck y…! 
Andrew Sorry… Sorry… (Starts tapping on Simon’s 
shoulder) What if I do this? 
 
Simon, after five seconds, closes his eyes and arches 
his shoulders back. Screen Ten Billion Volts…)  
 
Simon (Opens his eyes – fade Ten Billion Volts) 
Piss off! 
Andrew  (Pulls his hand away) Sorry, sorry. (Simon is 
wriggling his fingers and staring at them) Is 
the tingling worse in your fingers after my 
tapping? (Simon nods) Mmmm. Are you 
getting any sleep? (Simon shakes his head) 
Headaches? (Simon nods) Any trouble with 
your vision? (Simon nods) How much? 
Simon Enough... 
Andrew I’m sorry I have to ask these… 
Fade Stephanie and the children from a family photo 
leaving him alone. 
 
Simon I don’t know why I’m like this! 
 
He turns back to find himself pacing Andrew’s office 
with Andrew looking on, concerned… 
 
Andrew I know what this must be like for you… 
Simon You have no idea what it must be like for me – 
pain medicine man!! 
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Tense pause. 
 
Andrew What about your photography? 
Simon What about it! 
Andrew Some Commission detectives have filmed you 
while you were out all night in storms. (Tense 
pause) With nothing showing up on your 
scans, the Commission’s doctors have written 
reports to the effect that you’re malingering.  
Simon Those scans… But when I’m photographing 
lightning… I…  
 
Lighting change/storm FX up – music up… Simon 
stands drawn to the stage edge. As he walks his pain 
diminishes beautifully… Cease FX/music… 
 
Simon Never mind.  
Andrew (Intrigued) Are your hands still tingling? 
(Simon nods) How soon after the accident did 
the pain start up? 
Simon I woke up with it and it hasn’t left me…  
Andrew You were knocked out? (Simon nods) Was the 
car a write-off? 
Simon  Again with the ‘write-off’ thing! Every doctor I 
see wants to know how bad the car was? 
(Pause) Yes! It was a write-off… and so am I! 
Fucken whiplash! 
Andrew Simon, I don’t think you suffer from whiplash… 
Simon  Gee! Thanks Sal for referring me to this one! 
Andrew No you don’t understand! What I mean is 
Whiplash is just a name like shell-shock in 
World War 1. I don’t think whiplash does justice 
to what you have… 
Simon Justice, eh? 
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Andrew I think what you have is because of the way 
your brain and nervous system, has responded 
to the accident. 
Simon Waddya mean? 
Andrew It’s hard to (Pause) I think (Pause) your 
accident provoked a response by your brain 
that has created your pain… similar to the way 
the big-bang created the universe.  
Simon Yeah, right! 
Andrew (Pause) The big bang took only a few seconds 
but it’s still unfolding. We now know that you 
can also have pain long after an accident like 
yours.  
 
Simon stares at him silently thinking this through. 
 
Simon A big bang pain(?Slight pause) From the 
madness of the stars we are born. 
Simon (Pause) What’s it called? 
Andrew What do you mean? 
Simon (Picks up a pen and paper from the desk) 
Well there must be some fancy word you 
doctors all use to name this universal brain of 
ours? 
Andrew Not a lot of doctors are aware of it yet…  
(Smiles) Neuroplasticity… Why? 
Simon As in plastic bag? 
Andrew Yes – but as in plastic: to change, be 
creative… 
Simon Yeah yeah… Brain creativity… 
Andrew Why? 
Simon Internet… (Pause, reads from his writing) 
Neuroplasticity… Pain’s your game medicine 
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man, but it’s a game played out on the field of 
my body. 
Andrew (Pause) I’d like you to try some medication to 
calm yours down a bit. 
Simon My neuroplasticity? (Andrew nods) What 
medication? 
Andrew Opiates… 
Simon Like heroin? Oh yeah right! 
Andrew They will ease your pain… There’s some new 
and very sophisticated anticonvulsant ones that 
can also stop the pain building up.  
Simon (Writing) Anti-convulsants, eh… 
Andrew And some antidepressants we could try… 
amitriptyline.  
Simon (Writing) Ami-trip-tyl-ine… And these 
opiates… 
Andrew There’s quite a few… 
 
Simon stands and walks up to and studies the Narcissus 
and Echo print, as if to distract the situation. 
 
Andrew It’s Narcissus and Echo… (Simon examines 
him) I don’t think Narcissus was the selfish 
monster he’s been made out to be. He was a 
dreamer… that’s all… who didn’t realise… 
Simon Realise what? 
Andrew That what we think is real can be no more than 
a phantom of our own making… When what is 
real, has been right before us all along…  
Simon Like Echo here? 
 Andrew I’d like to see you often until your case goes to 
court … or the Commission will have a field day 
with you. 
Simon So long as I got my bunker – I don’t care… 
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Andrew Simon – they will allege that your injuries are 
nothing more than phantom… Sal would have 
told you that you’re up against the most 
efficient insurance company in Australia. It’s a 
war, Simon!  
Simon And what’s in it for you?  
Andrew The good fight! (Looks at the portrait of his 
Grandfather)  
Simon (Moves over to the portrait) A war, eh? Your 
grandfather? (Andrew nods)  
Andrew He won the Military Medal and the Military 
Medal with Bar and survived the whole stunt… 
(Andrew hands Simon a script) Take two of 
these at night. Please no alcohol…  
Simon I don’t drink… 
Andrew Don’t drive either.  
Simon You reckon this’s all in my mind? 
Andrew Just because something’s invisible doesn’t 
mean it’s not real. 
Simon Like God!  
Andrew  I’m not sure I’d go that far? 
Simon Runs in the blood then… the good fight? 
(Reluctantly takes the script) Can I go? 
Andrew I’d like to see you the day after tomorrow? 
Simon We’ll see… 
Andrew Do you listen to music? 
Simon So? 
Andrew See if it soothes your pain? 
 
 
Exit Simon. Haunting music up… Segue into Scene 5… 
 
 
Scene 5 
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Café L’avenir – a café by the beach… Sunset photograph 
is screened… Sally sits at a table drinking from a nearly 
finished bottle of wine. Enter Andrew… 
 
Andrew (Seats herself) Hi… Sorry I’m so late…I ran 
over a patient…I mean I ran over with a 
patient...  
Sally Have you been drinking? 
Simon  No, Ah, I’d forgotten how beautiful these 
sunsets are. I used to come here every Friday 
night when I was kid… It was called The Steak 
Cave then…  
Sally Café L’avenir now… 
Andrew L’avenir?   
Sally  Café of the future! Isn’t that right? 
Andrew Sort of… It’s more the unpredictable future… In 
French there are two kinds of futures – the one 
we secure against – you plan for – it’s why we 
have jobs, bank accounts, superannuation, 
insurance policies etc and then there’s 
l’avenir… (Pause) Those totally unpredictable 
things that truly shape our lives…     
Sally Simon’s accident? 
Andrew Sure… but I was thinking more along the lines 
of falling in love… (Pause) How have you 
been? 
Sally (She stiffens) Would you come here with your 
grandparents? When you were a kid? 
Andrew Na. With mum… Tell me about you?   
Sally Really…Your Mum? 
Andrew I’d see her every Friday night…  
Sally What was that like for you? 
Andrew Do you still feel anything for me? 
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Sally How much have you had to drink?  
Andrew (Sighs) Do you think Simon has any chance – 
if it goes to court? 
Sally It won’t go to court… Why – how did it go? 
Andrew Prick-ly…  
Sally He wasn’t always like this. I’ve spoken to 
Stephanie - his ex-wife. She said he was… 
gentle, smart… lovely… A respected English 
teacher… Had his moments of course, like the 
rest of us…  
 
Enter Simon grinning… he runs up to an imaginary child 
and wraps her in his arms, picks her up and swings her 
around and plays with her – jumping over her as she 
‘runs’ under his jumps.  Then as suddenly he grimaces 
and opens his arms up to the air to reveal nothing–
ness… loss/pain.  
 
Andrew How long were they together? 
Sally Sixteen years.  
Andrew That’s a long time… to just disappear… 
Sally (Conceals her hurt) How long were you 
married? 
Andrew (French accent) To Cecile? 
Sally Why, have you been married more than once? 
Andrew Six-teen years…  
Sally How did it happen? 
Andrew (Distant – as if talking about a patient. 
Lights up on Simon and they speak 
together…) She… told me last October, in bed 
one morning… she started to cry… said that 
she thought she didn’t love me enough to 
stay… 
Sally No, no… How did you meet her? 
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Andrew  Oh – I fainted… 
Sally You fainted? 
Andrew I had been riding a motorbike for too long. I 
forgot to eat enough… I guess…  
Sally Jesus Drew…  
Andrew I rode all the way from the Somme to Arcachon 
in a day… through a Biscay storm… I got off 
my bike at a café… and fainted. (A moment 
between them Angela…) I woke wet with her 
hair raining on my face. Ummm… she took me 
home… Or to what I thought was… my home… 
Arcachon.  
Sally  (Pause) Were you ever going to contact me? 
Andrew I… I arrh… thought… about it. Why does he 
take photos of lightning? 
Sally What? I don’t think he’d be alive without 
them… (Pause) He once told me when he’s 
photographing lightning – he’s photographing 
his own pain. 
Andrew Really! (To himself) Lightning and Pain…? 
Sally Did you finish your training in France? 
Andrew Ah, no… In London. Cecile came with me. 
Then we moved back to France… where the 
children were born and I began to specialise in 
pain. 
Sally Children…The Commission has expedited 
Simon’s mediated conference… 
Andrew Are you worried? 
Sally Oh maybe it’s nothing… every now and then 
the Commission makes an example of 
someone… A test case.  
Andrew That doesn’t sound good. 
Sally I’m worried about what he might do. 
Andrew (Slight pause) Really?  
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Sally And the Commission justifies everything on the 
grounds that society can’t afford these claims… 
But it’s the Simon’s of this world that get caught 
in that no-mans-land…  
Andrew Le terrain vagues… They do it because it’s the 
only way they understand pain - Descartes’ bell 
tolling loudly through the body. 
Sally You’ve lost me… 
Andrew Come on! Descartes’ bell… 
Sally (Sings) What Rene Descartes was a drunken 
fart  I drink therefore I am. 
Andrew Oh very droll. Rene Descartes! The 
philosopher who said the mind was a thing? 
He’s the great granddaddy of psychology – not 
Freud! (Pause) 
Sally What? 
Andrew I still can’t believe they don’t teach this! 
(Pause) In 1644, he drew a little bloke with his 
toe getting burnt by fire… which pulled on a 
bloody rope that was attached to a bell in the 
brain!  Fire, pulls the rope, rings the bell – pain!  
(He goes through the routine) Descartes’ 
bell. And the moral of Simon’s story is… if 
there’s no fire – there can be no pain. But if he 
complains of pain – then (he taps his head) it 
must be a ‘phantom’ pain and he’s referred to 
someone like you who deals with the mind and 
he won’t get a brass razoo cos his pain’s not 
real! 
Sally  Someone like me… (Pause) So what does 
someone like you say?  
Andrew That pain is all in the brain… and the brain is 
as complex as… the whole universe. It’s 
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amazing … each one of us carries inside us, 
our own universe! I’m doing it aren’t I? 
Sally Oh yeah! 
Simon  What if he doesn’t come to his next 
appointment…? 
Sally He will… 
Andrew When can I see his photos? I thought you 
might have some at your place, after dinner 
over a coffee?  
Sally Wanker… (She takes her mobile phone out 
of her bag) I’ll ring him – we’re working on 
something together so he lets me come up to 
his bunker… (Dials) Studio…  
 
They get up to leave… 
 
Andrew Just how involved are you with your patient, 
Doctor…  
Sally Of philosophy… 
Andrew Touchè… 
 
They exit. Fade lighting and segue into Scene 6… 
 
 
 
Scene 6 
 
Simon’s studio in semi darkness… Music (subtle) up. 
Simon is already present… sitting at his computer on a 
chat line. His computer chimes on an incoming 
message… 
 
Simon Mary from California! Yes… 
Screen  Hi Simon… I have some news… 
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Simon (Types) Man, have I got some news for you 
too! Maybe they’ve found why we’re in so much 
pain! It’s our brains, Mary!!! They’re playful… 
Enter Sally and Andrew. Sally goes to knock on the front 
door but hesitates.  
 
Sally So, not two weeks after you’d left me behind in 
Australia, without so much as a goodbye Sal, 
it’s been good to know ya… Oh and lets not 
mention that drunken proposal of marriage at 
your grandfather’s wake! You fainted in France 
and woke to find (Mock French accent) Cecile 
reigning over you? 
Andrew (Authentic French accent) Pardon… 
Sally (Mocks his accent) Pardon (Pause) So… 
you’re back in Perth seventeen years later – 
licking the same wounds I had. And don’t you 
dare say oui… 
Andrew (pause) Yes. 
Sally Mphh… I hope for Simon’s sake you’re not 
going to run away again! 
Andrew Where have I to go? 
Sally Come on… 
They enter… Screen the photograph Cataclysm. 
Immediately Andrew is captivated by and drawn to it.  
He walks into it…  
 
 
Screen Billy has gone to his seals… 
Simon Oh fuck… (Types) When? 
Screen  Yesterday… He’d organised everything… 
pre-paid the funeral, paid his rent in 
advance, even Christmas presents for his 
kids… Organised for the police to come to 
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his apartment – enclosed a key… He left a 
long letter… You’re in it… He wants me to 
send you a copy… 
Simon (types) I… 
 
 
Sally Do you still want that coffee? 
Andrew Where…Your place? 
Sally No yours 
Andrew Oui… 
Sally Are… you… crying? 
Andrew No… 
 
Sally moves to Andrew. He tilts his head and they touch 
very gently… Lights up and Simon gets up. Sally moves 
away from Andrew and walks towards Simon. 
 
Sally Simon!  
Andrew Your photography…   
Simon  (To Andrew) So, how do you know Sal? 
Andrew Sal? We ah, went out for quite a while when we 
were younger…   
Sally First real love… 
Andrew Yes, I’m afraid… (pause)  
Sally Your afraid! 
Andrew Sal was telling me that when you photograph 
lightning… That, it’s like you’re photographing 
your pain …  
Simon Did she just!!   
Andrew Simon… I’m on your side. 
Simon And what side is that? 
Andrew I think there may be something to your 
photography!  
Simon  That’s nice… 
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Andrew No… I think you may have stumbled on to 
something really important! (Simon mock 
snores) I have found some evidence - 
neurobiological evidence – about pain…  
Simon I’ll let you discuss it with Sal shall I – and on the 
way out! - she can tell you how she already 
thinks that!!! 
Andrew What? 
Sally A programme Simon and I are working on 
together… 
Andrew Hang on… 
Sally Not now  
Andrew When you’re photographing your lightning does 
your pain diminish? (Pause) I think I know why! 
Simon The Saviour! They don’t even know what 
lightning is! They used to think it was an 
electrical discharge caused by ice crystals 
being rubbed together in updrafts… But now 
they only know it can’t be that! And that’s just 
the lightning – you ever heard of sprites? 
Andrew Sprites? 
Simon There are things in storms we can’t even 
imagine – as for what causes them - they don’t 
have a clue?  
Andrew Yes – but we’re finding out so much more!  
Simon Just tell me when it’s all going to end for me? 
For me!! Me!!! 
Sally Si – what is it? 
Simon  (Holds his head in his hands then looks at 
her…) Good night... 
 
Simon exits.  
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Sally (Calls to Si as he exits) I’ll see you in the 
morning, yeah? I’ll pick you up about nine. 
Andrew  Pick him up?  
Sally His pre-trial conference… tomorrow morning… 
Andrew About this programme?  
Sally Not now, look, maybe it’s a bit late for that 
coffee, after all… 
 
Exit Andrew and Sally. 
 
Change (darken) lighting – intense yearning music up… 
 
Fade up Cataclysm. Very gradually fade cataclysm from 
the screen… then screen over the photograph in a 
scrawled very fast writing… 
 
the earth is lichen, the sky is a skeleton dancing with 
black hair 
 
Fade monochord. Continue music…  
Segue into Scene 7… 
 
 
 
Scene 7 
 
Sally’s office… Enter Simon, agitated… Sally enters 
behind him… 
 
Simon (Quotes) No less than three medical specialist 
opinions regarding three hours of film taken of 
the plaintiff that demonstrates activities 
inconsistent with the injuries alleged. Alleged!!! 
Those fucks! 
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Sally You have to divorce yourself from this … 
Simon So long as I don’t have to divorce myself from 
my bunker?  
Sally You are still you… they can’t take that… 
Simon Look at me… 
Sally You know the power of your photographs 
Especially for people in pain! They see it – they 
see and just know! You know this… Simon. 
When we set up the programme… 
Simon My photographs are just a glimpse… 
Sally Glimpses are all any of us get, Si… In the 
history of language, they’ve found one word to 
directly voice pain – Ancient Greek – roughly 
translated its arrrrrgh! 
Simon Arrrrrrggh!! This order 24A is a bit more than a 
glimpse… What twisted fuck thought up that? 
Sally I don’t know… It’s meant to make people think 
twice before they take the commission to 
court…  
Simon Yeah but this time it’s the Commission that 
wants to take me to court?! (Pause) So was my 
lawyer right? Have people lost their houses 
over this?  
Sally Well… I have known people who have had to 
sell their houses to keep their heads above 
water but… 
Simon But in the end they lost their house? (Tense 
pause – Sal doesn’t answer) See, I just don’t 
get that… A drunk driver wrecks my life and I 
end up at the pointy end of a war I’m 
conscripted into just to keep my house – my 
bunker – from the very body responsible for 
compensating me? 
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Sally Only if their offer is higher than the amount of 
money the judge ends up awarding to you… 
You’ll still get some compensation…  
Simon Whatever that means. How much’ll be left over 
after I’m up for all the court costs – theirs and 
my lawyers… That’s how this thing works, 
right? 
Sally Yeah…and the difference between their offer 
and the amount the judge awards?  
Simon (Incredulous) Fuck…You know the worst thing 
about being in a fight like this? Knowing you 
can’t be anywhere else, doing anything else, 
just to preserve what you took for granted.  
 
Screen Pinnacles Dawn. 
 
Simon And blood seeps into the world and the world 
into blood! 
Sally Simon…  
Simon Bla bla bla!!! You don’t know what to say – do 
you? Cos there is nothing to say. 
Sally I know enough to know that I’m really worried 
about you. 
 
Screen the footage of Simon taking photos on the beach 
at night… 
Simon The straw man is a scarecrow... (Long pause) 
You’re thinking I might top myself! (Pause) I am 
not mad. Stop trying to help me. 
Sally Why… 
Simon Cos ya can’t. And all this just makes me worse! 
You can’t stop the storms I have in me... even if 
you did believe them, Sal…  
Sally I do believe you… 
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Simon (He holds his head) Storms… 
Sally If… I can’t… help you… then at least help me …?  
 
Simon pulls out a postcard… 
 
Simon You know when I first developed my 
photographs, right…? But I’ve never been able 
to describe the beauty of my photographs 
anymore than I can my breakage! (Slight 
pause) I’ve tried to find a way to tell you this so 
many times… I don’t see a storm anymore Sal, 
I feel it!  
 
Screen Atlantis - 
 
  
Simon It was all an accident. I knew Steph was 
leaving before she left… Nearly every door in 
the house had fist holes in ‘em… (Silence) 
Even then I was conscripted to a foreign land… 
I was still in the same house but in no-man’s-
land.  
Sally Le terrain vagues… 
Simon In the end, she was scared… so were the 
kids… I knew it couldn’t go on… So I did 
something dumb and bought the Nikon… 
Sally Dumb? 
Simon I’d lost my job – didn’t have any money… But I 
thought I’d photograph them before they left 
me. 
Sally You were sure they would? 
Simon You know those moments only a family 
shares? And I’m not talking about the Friday 
night movie…You know…Those smiles…just a 
211 
 212
finger running down a shoulder as you wait for 
them to get the milk out of the fridge? I wasn’t 
able to share them…So I thought I’d 
photograph them…To capture them 
Sally And did you? 
Simon (Nods) Sham amateur crap… 
Sally Can I see them? 
 
Screen bad portraits… then the empty house… then 
fade. 
 
Simon Nar… I destroyed them. When they left… (He 
pulls out the postcard) You remember me 
talking about my old mad uni mate, Tim 
McPherson?  
Sally Yeah?  
Simon  Every time he’d get manic you knew the crash 
had to come… I saw him the night before he 
died… He said to me everything ever created 
in the universe was inside him. I thought it was 
just manic bullshit.  
All I could think was thank Christ I’m not like 
him! Then two days after he’d hurled himself 
under that truck… (Points to the postcard) I 
got that in the mail… It was like getting a 
postcard from the other side…  
Sally No one saw a thing as the Seine swept Celan 
under its wheels like a truck…  
Simon It’s one of his one line poems: Monochords … 
Read the other one. 
Sally Come the Sabbath - Mr Celan – he dead…  
Simon I got hold of Paul Celan’s Selected Poems. So 
beautiful… stark as lightning yet broken… 
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(Pause) Beauty and pain woven in every word. 
Four weeks later, I’m sitting on the dunny, and I 
read the last lines Celan ever wrote before he 
threw himself in the river Seine: come the 
Sabbath… Sabbath – rest, refreshment, 
redemption. 
Simon That was the very night I was hit by my drunk 
driver. At the time I was talking to Steph on my 
mobile but I was thinking about what Tim 
meant, fuck, what Celan meant by come the 
Sabbath - when bang!! My own big bang 
happened and my new universe started to 
unfold.  
Sally And… 
Simon The beauty in the breakage, Sal. We’re all 
broken. Even God is broken… Especially 
God… 
Sally And that’s why you chose to photograph 
lightning. 
Simon What is it with you psychologists and choice?  
 
Screen photograph and monochord: 
It found me – it has never been about what I find… 
 (Pause) After I destroyed all those mug shots 
of Steph and the kids, I was about to throw the 
camera away…But I kept getting this strange 
calling from the sea…you know, my beach I 
surfed as a kid… I thought I’d go down and try 
to photograph the sunset… The sea’s 
Sabbath… instead there was this storm on the 
horizon… As it grew dark the storm seemed to 
come for me… So I just stood back and 
something said leave the shutter open and see 
what it sees out there. Just leave it open… it’s 
213 
 214
a feeling… a creation-ness - that’s all… It’s not 
something you can see – it’s something you 
feel..  
   
  Simon looks puzzled… 
 
Sally You’re seeing Andrew again tomorrow, aren’t you? 
(Pause) Simon… we will get through this…  
 Promise me… promise me, Simon … you will 
keep this appointment tomorrow? (Pause… 
exiting) I’ll talk to Andrew tonight, OK? OK? 
What Tim did – what Celan did – was suicide 
Simon! It wasn’t beautiful. But your 
photography is. 
Simon And I can’t do it without my bunker… (Slight 
pause) It’s my world… it’s my country… 
 
Segue into Scene 8… 
 
 
 
Scene 8 
 
Andrew is at his office desk studying from a journal and 
writing notes furiously. He suddenly stops writing – 
deep in thought. He sighs… then begins to reach for the 
phone. He stops himself and looks at his watch. Then he 
picks up the phone regardless and dials… 
 
Andrew Bonjour… C’est moi… (Slight pause) Oui… moi… 
(Looks perturbed) Oh! C’est  toi Luc? (Slight 
pause) Oui, c'est papa, en Australie… Oui… Sa 
va!? (Slight pause) In English? Ok… Is your Mum 
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there? (Slight pause – he nods) She’s gone out? 
Who with? Oh… Oui. Oui. Yes, I miss you too…  
(Slight pause) Is that a storm, I can hear? Oh… 
(Slight pause) Je t'aime aussi… I love you too… 
and Gabby – how is she? Give her a big hug from 
me… and a kiss, aussi… (Slight pause) I better 
get off the phone then… Oui…I love you, Luc. 
(Slight pause.) Ok… Oui… Oui… A’voir… 
He hangs up…   
The phone rings. He answers. 
Andrew (In French) Cecile, Salut… (Slight pause – he’s 
confused) I’m sorry, you must have the wrong 
number. (Becomes angry) Who is this? (Slight 
pause) Who are you? (Slight pause) Simon 
Sharrin… (Slight pause) Yeah, well… (Slight 
pause) You… are… not… on my side!  
Andrew looks at the receiver and hangs it up. The phone 
starts to ring again. He appears anxious and checks his 
watch. He stands and turns the answering service on... 
Phone (Answering Service) Hello, you have reached 
Doctor Andrew Mcleod, please leave a message… 
Thankyou… 
He stands as if paralysed… 
Cecile (Through the answering service speaker) 
Hello… Andrew… Hello!   Andrew, est – tu là? 
C’est moi, Cecile... Et l’echo répondis, mèrde! (In 
English) Ok, I will say this for you in English! What 
I have done is not a crime! I am sorry if I have hurt 
you… Ma douleur… Celui qui vous aime, parle de 
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mon coeur… Remember Gabrielle’s letter… 
remember what she said: Celui qui vous aime, 
parle de mon coeur: Celui qui vous aime, parle de 
mon coeur.  
Andrew moves towards the phone… Lighting change… 
Segue into Scene 9… 
 
 
 
Scene 9 
 
Andrew’s office… Andrew is deep in thought… Screen 
World War 1 photos of Passchendaele etc… 
Explosions/thunderclaps are heard emerging out of the 
music.  Enter Simon moving awkwardly through a no-
man’s-land … Fragments and Lightning is falling all 
about him… Fade music and change lighting back to 
office. Simon picks himself up and moves in pain to 
Andrew’s office… knocks…  
 
Andrew Simon… please come in… take a seat… 
Simon Sitting hurts… 
Andrew  Sure… 
 
Simon sits down but is in too much discomfort and 
stands again… 
 
Andrew Sally phoned me yesterday and told me things 
didn’t go well at the pre-trial conference. 
Simon They didn’t wanna conference. 
Andrew I agree… 
Simon What? 
Andrew I agree. They want a test case Simon. 
216 
 217
Simon A test case? 
Andrew How’s your pain? 
Simon Nuthin’s changed… 
Andrew Did you take those pills? 
Simon Opiates? Oh yeah… 
Andrew And? 
Simon Do you like the heat here? In summer? 
Andrew No – I hate it… Much prefer France’s 
weather… 
Simon You know those heatwaves we get in 
February? Being in constant pain is sorta like a 
February that never ends… and there’s no air 
conditioning… and… 
Andrew And the opiates gave you air conditioning…? 
Simon You’re the sorta bloke who interrupts a lot 
aren’t ya? (Pause) And the sun never sets into 
a blood red sky – there’s no colours or cool at 
the end of the day… It’s always high noon. No 
Sabbath…Those opiates were like the best 
sunset I’ve ever known in my life… 
Andrew Your not taking too many, are you? Opiates 
can enable you to get on with your life or they 
can take it over - but they’re not the magic 
bullet. They’re just another bullet (Slight 
Pause)… but very useful when you’re in the 
trenches… (Pause) That sunset story of yours 
is interesting… 
Simon  It’s not my favourite… 
Andrew Story? 
Simon I think that’s all we really have? 
Andrew  No! We have evidence – real evidence… 
Simon Yeah, well I looked up what you call evidence 
and it sounds like a story to me.  
217 
 218
Andrew Do you remember when I first examined you, 
how I tapped you on the shoulder? Well, if I 
were to tap someone who doesn’t have your 
pain state, initially it wouldn’t bother them. But 
after ten minutes it would start to feel dull and 
heavy. After thirty minutes it would begin to 
ache. After an hour they would hurt. And after 
two hours they would be begging me to stop. 
(Slight Pause) It’s called “wind-up” and it’s the 
brain’s response to a stimulus that builds up 
over time… 
Simon So why did the tapping hurt me straight away? 
Andrew Because your brain’s already built up the 
pain… like a …memory 
Simon Let me get this straight… You’re saying I 
received the equivalent of…like a fortnight’s 
tapping in the moment the truck hit me? 
Andrew Very probably, and it’s still building up in 
incredibly complex ways that intensify and flux 
unpredictably.  
Simon (Pause) So the story goes, right. 
Andrew Do you have favourite story then? (Pause)  
Simon Storms… 
Andrew Storms? 
Simon There’s a storm raging inside me. Like all 
storms it gets a life of its own and it’s difficult to 
predict how strong it will grow and for how long 
it’ll last but inside me there is thunder and 
lightning going off everywhere. And they’re 
looking for strained fucking muscles in my neck 
and back with the equivalent of polaroid 
snapshots. 
A silence… 
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Simon That’s what I call your CT Scans and MRIs and 
X-rays and whatnot. They just go ‘click’ and in 
a fraction of a second, expect to capture what’s 
going on. (Pause) But to photograph a storm 
you gotta be open to the world… patient… and 
only when yr in the dark the most, leave yr 
shutter open with the lens set to infinity… Then, 
what’s really out there comes to you – not the 
other way around. Trouble with all your 
evidence – it’s gotta be the hunter… But what 
yr searching for gets frightened off by ‘the 
hunt’. You should wonder more than you 
hunt… then, it’ll come to you.  
Andrew  How the accident came to you? 
Simon No! The storm! God for a bright guy…  
Andrew So when your portraits of your family failed you 
thought you’d conjure up a storm? 
Simon Sal has been telling you some stuff hasn’t 
she…? 
Andrew Like I said – we’re all on the same side. 
Simon Yr having trouble with this story, aren’t you?  
Andrew So the storm came to you? 
Simon Mmm. 
Andrew And? 
Simon And what? 
Andrew  You felt your pain go into the storm? 
Simon I hope yr not mocking me? (Pause) Lets just 
say that what was outside of me was inside me 
and what was inside me was outside of me 
(Slight pause) but they always had been and it 
all just… 
Andrew Went away… The pain? 
Simon Pain’s just a word… But what happened to me 
in that storm…  I dunno… Lets just say it was 
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better than the sunset those pills gave me. 
Then the storm passed overhead and… 
Andrew And what…? What! 
Simon I took some photos… 
Andrew Is that all… (Pause) I mean, how long before 
the pain came back…  
Simon I don’t think it went away exactly… Even when 
yr not in pain it’s still there – lurking in all of 
us… (Pause). Yr looking for the neurochemical 
that causes pain aren’t you? So you can find 
the nut to put on the bolt that kills pain once 
and for all? (Pause) Now that would be the war 
to end all wars. (He stands and moves to the 
portrait) Let me know what God looks like 
when you find him. But pain and God are alike 
like that – you don’t find them – they find you, 
eh.  
Andrew Do you think it’s that simple? 
Simon Do you think that is simple…? 
 
There’s a distant rumble of thunder…  
 
Exit Simon… Andrew, perplexed, stands and moves to 
the portrait… Turns and replays Cecile’s message: 
 
Message Ok, I will say this for you in English! What I 
have done is not a crime! I am sorry if I have 
hurt you… Ma douleur… Celui qui vous aime, 
parle de mon coeur… Remember Gabrielle’s 
letter… remember what she said: Celui qui 
vous aime, parle de mon coeur: Celui qui vous 
aime, parle de mon coeur. 
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Andrew Whoever loves you speaks from my heart… 
Whoever loves you… speaks… from my 
heart… 
 
Music up… Segue into Scene 10… 
 
 
 
Scene 10  
 
Screen Weather radar with an intense storm 
approaching. Continue music… 
 
Simon moves through to his computer… Andrew reads 
through papers then gathers some up while Sally tosses 
and turns in her bed… 
 
Simon’s computer chimes with an incoming message… 
 
Screen Hi Simon… Sorry I’ve been offline… 
Simon (Types) How ya doin’, Mary… 
Screen Billy’s funeral was beautiful… The pastor 
read out his letter… Billy’d been out with 
his seals again last week… The last time he 
dived with them for hours and hours. He 
said they had been calling to him for 
months and he could no longer ignore the 
things in our lives that call to us so strongly 
from that other world that is in this one…  
 
Andrew is calling at Sally’s door. He carries some 
papers and his Grandfather’s war letters… Fade music… 
 
Andrew Sally! Sal! It’s me – Andrew! Sally! 
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Sally  Oh God I remember this…Are you drunk?? 
Hang on… (Goes back inside –) It’s Ok…Its 
only a collegue, … OK… OK… (Back out to 
Andrew) What is it? 
Andrew Oh (Pause)  Am I interrupting something 
Sally (Blocks his entrance) Sorry… What is it? 
Actually I’m glad your here 
Andrew Look, I got this phone call…spooky... (She 
cocks her head) He seemed to have 
information about Simon’s trial. He said the 
Commission will be going for the jugular… 
Sally Slow down… 
Andrew He said that I would never be taken seriously 
because I wasn’t a member of the circle…  
Sally Andrew… 
Andrew What circle? 
Sally Andrew! 
Andrew He said that I should watch my back! 
Andrew He also said he was on my side… Prick. 
Sally He said he was on your side?  
Andrew Yes… But naturally, I didn’t believe him. 
Sally Oh… I think you can, actually. Just how good is 
this evidence of yours? 
Andrew It’s huge… In every reputable journal across 
the world. It will rewrite what we know about 
the brain, and not just pain, but memories, 
music, everything – maybe even love!  
Sally You’re sure? 
Andrew I’d stake my life on it. 
Sally (With a worried smile) You may have to…  
 
Lightning and thunder is seen and heard.  
222 
 223
Sally Is it true you’ve been referred to the Medical 
Board for administering inappropriate opiates to 
your patients? 
 
A louder and closer strike and thunderclap… 
 
Andrew It’s bullshit… It’ll never stick… This storm’s 
getting closer?  
Sally Is it true? 
Andrew Yes, it’s true…  
Sally And you know Simon is one of the cases that 
has been referred to them? 
Andrew What?!! 
Sally Didn’t you know! I too got a phone call - this 
morning…The Commission’s refusing to pay 
for any further consults Si has to see either of 
us.  
Andrew Oh fuck! I’ll either get struck off or driven out. 
Sally Thanks for your concern… We could all lose 
our bunkers in this. 
Andrew Well the commission knows we 
have to win this or we’re fucked… Jesus. 
Merde. These people just don’t realise this is 
something that can help tell the brain’s story. 
DNA has the double helix – the solar system 
has the atom… but pain – it only has 
Descartes’ bell… 
Sally It’s late Andrew…  
Andrew Until this guy stuck away in Perth, so burdened 
with his own pain has found the metaphor: 
Complex systems theory, self-organisation, 
neuroplasticity and lightning - it all fits! 
Eureka!!! And all two minutes from his house 
on his local beach. And what really gets me is 
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he had to lose nearly everything to find it. And 
he finds it in his only reason left to live!  
Sally Well I just hope it keeps him alive… 
Andrew Do you really think he would…? I’m doing it 
again aren’t I? 
Sally Yeah 
Andrew And you’re doing it too. I remember your eyes – 
getting to the heart of a thing – not just the 
idea, holding on to a thought warm until it was 
hatched…Thinking about who it was for and 
giving it to them, newborn…A warm beating 
heart 
 
Andrew moves to her.  
 
Sally You know when you asked me if I still had any 
feelings for you… Well… I’ve thought about… 
how to… tell you…for the longest time… 
 It’s been like walking a beach that backs onto a 
desert… And any rain that came always fell 
out-to-sea? But now this strange freshness fills 
the air… again…   
                                                                      
Music I miss you like the deserts miss the rain 
 
They kiss… 
 
Introduce an intense blue lighting.  
 
Simon (Types) Mary…  
Screen Billy said he’d had a dream about my bad 
arm… I was on his beach looking at the 
seals playing in the waves… He was 
standing behind me and playing my arm as 
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a violin. The seals danced in the waves… 
Afterwards, he wrote, he gently lowered my 
arm and then walked into the sea and sank 
into his beloved music…  
 
Wave wash up… Enter Simon who walks into Scene 11… 
 
 
 
Scene 11 
 
Music up… 
 
The beach… Enter Simon, transfixed by the storm that 
has built up off the coast. Thunder is plainly heard. 
Video footage of him in real time is screened… He stares 
up out over the audience… He is in great pain. He takes 
some pills… Simon shakes his head and smiles 
ironically…  
 
 Simon So this is it, eh! Mmph… No last words…? Oh 
well… (He takes some more pills and stares 
at his image on the screen… he waves to 
the camera) I wonder… who it was… they’ve 
been filming… all this time…? (He takes a few 
drugged steps towards his screened 
image… He squints and studies his own 
image on the screen… He waves to his 
other…) The Phantom… Phuck the Phantom! 
(Direct address) What – just cos I talk to you 
guys like this you think I can’t walk into the 
sea? Take at look at the person next to you – 
go on! You think for one tiny moment just cos 
you can talk with them, touch them, they can’t 
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disappear! (Takes out his mobile) If ya love 
‘em - keep ‘em close… That’s why we carry 
these things, right? (Throws his mobile into 
the sea/audience)   
 
The storm answers with Lightning and thunder…  
 
Simon Yeah yeah… (He turns and walks to the 
stage edge…) I’m coming…   
 
The video footage stills, which captures Simon on the 
screen like a photograph. Simon stands centre stage he 
takes some more pills and walks towards the stage 
edge… Introduce horizontal blue lighting to connote 
Simon walking into water, which rises as he goes. As it 
gets to his chest he dives into it … Music up. End Act 1. 
 
 
 
 
Act 2 
 
Scene 12 
 
Music up … 
 
Screen Sprite phenomenon (real footage from a storm, 
with commentary from a scientist about such 
phenomena which is played during the Sprite’s 
emergence) 
 
Commentary Sprites are things we had no idea 
existed in storms. We have still very little 
idea about how or why they happen… 
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other than they seem to be emergent 
phenomena… Storms are 
unpredictable… their complexity builds 
very quickly from what seem very simple 
systems… from which emergent 
properties like lightning and these 
sprites emerge… We need to 
understand why this is so… 
 
 Enter a surreal sea/storm Sprite…  
 
Screen Sprite circling him in a dance… Then slowly as 
her dance nears him the music intensifies and light 
flickers from above. She ushers him back to shore… 
Reduce lighting as she does. Fade music… Simon is on 
the shore…. He tries to get up but can’t and he sits 
holding his head in his hands…  
  
Intense dark blue lighting up… Music up (Come on baby 
light my fire)… Cease Video footage… Screen Sorrento 
series… 
Screen the photograph Seal in freefall for three seconds 
only. Simon struggles to get to his hands and knees. 
Then another photograph of the same series (of an 
individual seal) is screened for six seconds. Simon 
looks up at it and gets to his feet. He takes a step, 
staggers, but doesn’t fall. He takes another step, 
staggers even more but resists the fall. 
 
The first light of the dawn appears on the screen behind 
him... Dawn at Sugarloaf Rock. 
  
Simon turns and surveys the sea/audience. He staggers 
but steadies himself again… Simon walks to 
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the stage edge and starts playing ‘Arm as 
Violin’…Music up…  
 
Simon (Recitative) Argh Billy… Billy boy… Why did 
the seals take you… and send me back…? 
Dancers in the waves… that beloved music 
saves…  Billy… they took you but sent me in… 
Billy… Play that arm as violin…. 
 
Segue into Scene 13… 
 
 
 
Scene 13 
 
Multivalent scene…Sally is in her office… Enter Simon… 
dishevelled…  
 
Sally Simon what is it? What’s happened?  
Simon Nothing… everything… 
Sally What do you mean? 
Simon  I wanted to walk into the sea… Wanted to swim 
in to the storm… Wilder than Celan’s Seine but 
gentler than Tim’s truck… I did walk into the 
sea… Like Billy… Sal… 
 
Enter Andrew in Court… he enters the witness box… 
 
Andrew May I show the court a drawing completed by 
Renes Descartes in 1644? 
 
Simon How do you think it’ll go…? The court case… 
Sally I’m sure Andrew will give it everything he’s 
got… 
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Simon Will you come to court with me?  
Sally Yes 
Simon Are you going to tell Andrew about him 
Sally  I don’t know 
Simon You should tell him 
Sally  I know, but I’m… 
Simon (making chicken noises) 
Sally Yeah chicken (She hits him) you asked for that!  
I’m worried he might get hurt. 
Simon He might not 
 
The following image is projected on to the screen: 
The Hard-Wired Nervous System
Rene Descartes (1644), L’Homme
“If for example fire comes near the
foot, the minute particles of this
fire, which as you know move with 
great velocity, have the power to set
in motion the spot of the skin of the
foot which they touch, and by this
means pulling upon the delicate 
thread which is attached to the
spot of the skin, they open up at the 
instant the pore against which the
delicate thread ends, just as by pulling
at one end of a rope makes to strike
at the same instant a bell which hangs
at the other end.”
 
 
Andrew Descartes’ bell… is the basis for all the medical 
opinions heard so far in this court. It requires 
though, the brain to be a machine – like a 
computer. But if the brain was a machine then 
it had a ghost haunting it – the mind. If then, 
there was pain but no fire, then this pain must 
be all in the mind – like a phantom. But we now 
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know the brain cannot be separated from the 
body… 
Simon (Pinches Sally on the arm) Is that your brain 
or your body?  
Andrew All his scans and x-rays are normal. But all the 
recent evidence says there is a severe pain the 
brain itself creates. The plaintiff has suffered an 
enormous physical impact. 
Sally They will need to show the court the 
photographs of the car. Will you be Ok with 
that? (The photographs of the damaged car 
are screened, Simon winces) You know 
they’re going to have problems with your loss 
of consciousness. 
Andrew We can clearly see how destructive the impact 
was… He lost consciousness. But I am not 
convinced that he was knocked unconscious – 
in that his head was hit by or knocked against 
any object. 
Simon Wait til he brings up the shell-shock stuff! 
 
Screen photos of Passchendaele series… 
 
Andrew In World War 1 soldiers were subject to high 
explosive blasts that caused no obvious injuries 
yet they fell either unconscious or were killed 
instantly.  
Sally I still can’t work out why some were killed and 
some weren’t! 
Andrew  It was a mystery. It was termed commotio 
cerebri: meaning a commoted brain or shell 
shock. But the many soldiers who survived 
these blasts, woke up in pain, sometimes not 
being able to talk – they even lost the use of 
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limbs. Many of them, including the ones who 
were killed, had any obvious injuries. So, their 
symptoms were diagnosed as being “all in the 
mind”, when it was a brain and nervous system 
disturbance all along. 
Sally And that will take him to Andrew’s…  
Simon & Sally Playful brain… 
Andrew High explosive blasts and car accidents cause 
high-impact traumas upon the brain and 
nervous system, which, for want of a better 
language cause the brain to wire up pain 
states. Gold standard evidence exists from the 
most credible universities and medical journals 
across the world… its momentum builds like an 
incoming tide. Sometimes called Neuropathic 
Pain Syndrome where persistent and severe 
pain rages without obvious tissue damage. 
Neuropathic pain is far more complex and 
dynamic than merely tugging on a rope to ring 
a bell and… gets a life of it own… like lightning 
in a storm… A much better metaphor than a 
little bell that’s been ringing unchecked since 
1644!!    
Simon (Sings) The time to hesitate is through… No 
time to wallow in the mire… Girl we could only 
lose… and our love become a funeral pyre… 
 
Change lighting, music (slow powerful wistful rendition 
of Come on baby light my fire) up.   
 
Lighting change, music up and cue very distant 
lightning with thunder. 
 
Segue into Scene 14… 
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Scene 14 
 
Café Lavenir – screen Sunset Lightning photos…Sally 
and Andrew sit at their table drinking wine. There are 
distant rumbles and flickers of lightning (not flashes or 
strikes) of a receding storm throughout – but widely 
spaced.  
 
Andrew I’m glad you were able to make it   
Sally How do you think it went today?  
Andrew I think it went well. I want to talk to you about 
last night.  
Sally You don’t have to… 
Andrew No I do. Not have to, want to. Are you involved 
with someone? Is it serious? 
Sally What difference would it make. You and 
Cecile… 
Andrew Cecile…She rang the other night… 
Sally Is she missing you? 
Andrew Anything but!  
Sally Do you miss her? 
Andrew Not now… 
Sally What did she say? 
Andrew Her message told me to read Gabrielle’s 
letter…  
Sally  (Cocks her head) Who’s Gabrielle? 
Andrew  O’l Bob’s French lover…. They met in 
Arcachon, , during World War One. Bob 
returned to Australia promising he would send 
for her but he never did… In her letter Gabrielle 
scolded him for not honouring his promise. 
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Cecile’s last words on the answering service 
the other night were Gabrielle’s last words to 
Ol’ Bob: Celui qui vous aime, parle de mon 
coeur. (A long pause) Whoever loves you 
speaks from my heart…  
 
A silence… 
  
Sally Whoever loves you speaks from my heart… 
(Pause) Cecile is asking you to love her…  
Andrew To love her? 
Sally Enough to let her go… 
Andrew I think I have. 
Sally We’ll see. O’l Bob’s pain... stayed with him for 
the rest of his life… (Andrew nods) But what 
became of Gabrielle…? Did she just disappear 
like Echo? 
 
Musician gives a loud breath which echoes on a delay 
effect… 
Continue echo effect which builds into the music 
Narcissus and Echo… 
 
Segue into Scene 15… 
 
 
 
 
Scene 15 
 
Multivalent scene… Andrew  in court – Sally and Simon 
up stage… 
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Andrew The mind is just a word that echoes in us… like 
Aristotle’s heart.  We use it all the time – 
broken heart, heavy heart, soft heart, light 
heart… but none of us think this has anything 
to do with the cardiac system. Soon Descartes’ 
mind will be excluded from how the brain 
actually works. The idea that the human heart 
is the locus of our soul is just a story… but so is 
the mind… 
Sally So tell me about Billy? 
Simon I was searching the net to see if anyone apart 
from Tim wrote monochords… I came across 
Billy in California - he wrote monochords about 
his pain… 
Sally Do you have any? 
Andrew May I show the court an MRI scan? 
 
Insert Katherine Bushnell’s scans here… 
 
It defies common sense but our common sense 
has often misled us… Phantom Limb Pain. 
Pain in a limb that has been amputated is 
another one that defies all common sense. 
Simon The phantom haunting the machines’ ghost is 
pain… 
Andrew This pain cannot be caused by the limb – it’s 
gone – so there’s nothing to ring the bell… but 
the pain is real and shows up on MRI scans. 
Sally Wow… 
Andrew No credible medical practitioner doubts 
phantom limb pain now. 
Simon Yeah… Billy found what I found with my 
photos… We got talking on this chat line and 
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decided he would write some monochords to 
go with my photos… 
Sally Will you show me?”  
Andrew The first scan on the left is of a subject in 
severe pain… The red to yellow and green 
areas circled are areas of perfusion that signal 
pain… See how the second one, taken after 
the person has heard soothing music of their 
choice has come up as blue in the auditory 
cortex here… but has modulated – yeah ok - 
turned down the pain on the forebrain - circled 
here... As a traumatic experience may 
precipitate pain – a creative one may soothe it. 
Simon We were just starting to get them together… 
Sally Did they help with his pain too? 
Simon Yeah… 
Andrew Like turning down a volume knob on a hifi. May 
I show the court another Scan?  
 
Screen MRI (scan #2)… 
 
Andrew This scan is of a patient in persistent pain like 
the Plaintiff… 
Sally Yeah…and?  
Andrew There’s no bell in the brain… no one place 
where the pain is centred – rather the neural 
activity is noncentred – the brain’s going off all 
over the place! 
 
Exit Andrew… 
 
Simon It helped… him – but what’s going on is too… it 
comes back…  
Sally  So what happened with Billy? 
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Simon They were great… His monochords with my… 
Sally Yeah I got that bit… But you said you walked 
into the sea, like Billy… and met his seals?? 
Simon Did I? 
Sally  Yes! 
Simon Storms… You can’t conquer ‘em… Ya gotta 
wait for the bastards to come to you – get used 
to living in the dark, waiting… Otherwise you’ll 
scare ‘em off! 
Sally Scare off what, Si?  
Simon The things that emerge… The miracles… 
things… You gotta learn how to keep the 
companionship of sprites…  
Sally Sprites? 
Simon That’s what Mary’s been saying all along… 
Sally Mary? OK… You have to let me in on what’s 
going on. Either we’re a team or we’re not. I’ll 
stop being your clin psych if you stop being… 
Simon What! 
Sally OK… the King of Fucking Pain. (Pause) Simon 
…please… We’re all in this together…  
Simon I can’t lose my bunker Sal... I just, can’t. 
 
She nears him and he leans his head on her shoulder.  
Lighting change transition to Scene 16… 
 
 
 
Scene 16 
 
Simon is at his computer on the chat line with Mary…. 
 
Screen Hi Si…How’s the storms? 
Simon (Types) Met Billy’s seals in the last one… 
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Screen What happened? 
Simon They sent me back… I think… 
Screen You think? 
Simon They’re calling me back tho… 
Screen That could be a good thing? 
Simon Like Billy? 
Screen You’re NOT Billy… the future’s not that 
predictable. Maybe you need to photograph 
something other than lightning?  
Simon What locks our knowledge keeps out, enters 
without knocking… 
Screen ☺ Your monochord or Billy’s? 
Simon Mine… 
Screen Got anymore?! 
Simon Maybe… 
Screen Lovely…  
Simon Are you still coming out if Sal and I get this 
programme up? 
Screen Wild horses couldn’t stop me or should I 
say seals! Gotta go… xx 
Simon Me too… (pause – a moment here) x (pause) 
x 
 
Segue into Scene 17… 
 
 
 
Scene 17 
 
Andrew’s office… He sits at his desk, working on his 
laptop and with some papers. He picks up and looks at 
various WW1 photographs including the Passchendaele 
series. Flash these photos together with high explosive 
flashes of light and rumbles that are only just 
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distinguishable from the lightning and thunder of the 
storm outside. Enter Sally after knocking. Fade the 
photographs… Andrew looks at Sally and sees 
something is wrong…  
 
Andrew Salut… Are you OK? 
Sally (Nods) You were dynamic today. The witness 
box suits you … 
Andrew Are you mocking me? (A silence) I know that 
look…  
Sally What look? 
Andrew That come here, go away look. 
Sally Oh maybe just sniffing around for a little 
more… I don’t know… proof? Do you have to 
give anymore evidence? 
 Andrew Tomorrow morning… 
Sally What are these? 
 
She picks up and views some photos which are 
screened and faded respectively, as she views them. 
 
Andrew Some of Ol’ Bob’s photos…  
Sally I didn’t know he was a war photographer? 
Andrew He wasn’t. He was a linesman – but he carried 
a box-brownie disguised in his gear. (Pause) 
War...  
Sally Men and their big bangs! Jesus - there’s your it.  
Andrew What? 
Sally War. Remember. You said to me that you went 
back to France to see where it all began for Ol’ 
Bob.  
Andrew So… (She doesn’t respond – instead she 
moves on to his papers, but he places his 
right hand to protect them)  
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Sally Are these his letters? 
Andrew Yes… 
Sally Is Gabrielle’s letter here, too? (Andrew nods) 
What does it say? 
Andrew She just echoes the promises he didn’t keep. 
Sally What is the sentence just before… Whoever 
loves you speaks from my heart…? 
Andrew (Picks up the letter and reads) Je vous verrai 
en Australie… I will see you in Australia… 
Sally I will see you in Australia… 
 
Sally takes it off him and tries to read it… but can’t… 
 
Sally Je… vous… verr…ai… (Pause) Shit Drew! 
That’s just what you wrote to me – in the only 
postcard you ever sent me… I will see you in 
Australia… 
Andrew Hey, hey… stop, stop, stop.  
Sally  I think I know why your wife left you… 
Andrew What… 
Sally She didn’t feel loved… 
 
She looks at him… Studies his face… touches his face 
in the same way.  
 
Sally  (Examines him) Narcissus… 
Andrew Sal… 
Sally That’s why you came back and left your kids 
behind… Isn’t it? 
Andrew Steady! 
Sally You can’t bear pain! So when you can’t fight it 
you run from it! You love this courtroom stuff – 
don’t you! – cos it’s the big fight to conquer 
pain - the war to win all wars!  
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Andrew  (Confused) No… 
 
She moves to kiss him on the lips but he turns his face 
away enough for her to kiss him on his cheek. 
 
Sally (Takes his chin in her hand) Narcissus.  
 
Andrew  contemplates… Sally moves to the Narcissus 
and Echo print. 
  
Andrew No it’s my colleagues who gaze into the pond… 
Sally And we’re back! 
Andrew Only the phantom isn’t a nymph – it’s the image 
of themselves as all conquering medical 
experts. 
Sally (Snores) 
Andrew The real echoes are like my grandfather… All 
he could do when the pain was unbearable was 
echo the last words of the diagnosis they gave 
him: neurosis and one of the bravest men of 
the war was reduced to the shame of a sick 
mind… Something that doesn’t even exist!! 
Sally What and you don’t wanna be all knowing! 
Look me in the eye and say you don’t wanna 
beat pain?! You can’t fix everything…  (She 
takes his face in her hands  
Andrew Soulager la douleur est divin…  
Sally Whatever you’re saying in French... 
Andrew To relieve pain is divine… To relive pain is 
divine! 
Sally Oh Drew… but what if God is broken… what if 
God is in pain too? (A silence – lightning and 
thunder) Tell me… By pointing out where 
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they’re wrong – does it make you right? 
(Pause) This is something you can’t win! 
Andrew (long pause) That’s just what Si’s lawyer told 
me today – after my testimony… He reckons 
they’re gonna carve him up and serve him on a 
platter… Bad father, bad husband… 
Sally  Bad person… 
Andrew Worse – a weak mind… 
 
Haunting underwater music and lighting up… Exit 
Andrew as Sally… 
 
Segue into Scene 18… 
 
 
 
Scene 18 
 
Simon’s bunker... Screen Storm Radar scans…. 
Simon and Sal are at his computer. 
 
Simon Mary is a fellow pain sufferer I chat on-line 
with… She and Billy were… we talk a lot… 
How her arm became a violin…  
Sally Arm as violin… beautiful.  
Simon I dunno… Billy had this dream that he was 
playing her arm out of pain like it was a 
violin…. They were standing on his beach… 
When her pain’s bad she shuts her eyes and 
imagines Billy playing her arm outta pain… 
Sally So what’s Billy’s story. 
Simon Same old, same old. Billy was in an accident at 
work… He fell off a ladder and hurt his back… 
no one believed him. Years later he’s nothing 
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left except his pain – same ol’ deal, right – 
doesn’t matter where you are in the world, 
Descartes’ bell keeps fucken tolling yeah. 
Sally Yeah…And the seals? 
Simon Like me, he found himself walking the beach 
he’d surfed as a kid. And one time, he saw 
these seals surfing so close he could have 
touched them… So, against every piece of 
medical advice, he swam out to them. And 
voila! God’s a bastard!! 
Sally Billy swims with seals, so God’s a bastard? 
Simon For not letting us have joy without pain – yes! 
He’s a bastard!!  
Sally Because pain and joy sometimes get mixed up 
together? 
Simon Cos they are always mixed together - cos they 
can never be separated cos they come outta 
the same thing.  
Sally So God’s a bastard but he’s also beautiful? 
Simon Why is that so hard for people to get? 
Sally Maybe you gotta be in enough pain before you 
can get it. 
Simon (A silence) Maybe that’s why Billy wanted to 
be with his seals… He said they were calling 
him… into ‘the green world… of colours and 
play…’ One day he paid up all his bills and rent 
and… 
Sally Drowned himself… Is that what happened to 
you? 
Simon They sent me back… 
Simon Take a look at this. (Screen Atlantis).  
Everyone wants to know how I got all the 
colours, right?!  
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Sally Isn’t it something to do with the mercury vapour 
coming from the streetlights. 
Simon Yeah – but why green? And why does green 
make us feel it more. Take a look at this. 
 
(Screen Storm Radar) 
 
Simon Notice how the colours are more intense in the 
centre…. 
 
Enter Andrew with a CD rom… Simon checks his 
watch… 
  
Simon That was quick…I need to clear a few things 
up… these phantoms of the mind… you were 
talking about? Are these the scans? 
Andrew Yes… 
 
Simon puts the CD into the computer. Screen MRI Scan 
2… 
 
Simon These are the same Scans you used in court 
today…? 
Andrew Yes. 
Simon Scans of pain? 
Andrew In a round about way – perfusion - blood flow 
related to pain… yes. 
Simon Look if you have eyes…  
 These are what – different moments in time – 
like a cartoon flips from one frame to another? 
(Andrew nods) And the colours represent pain 
in all these different parts of the brain… right?  
Andrew Well yeah… Red’s the most perfuse, yellow the 
next, then green and blue. 
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Simon But you said their scans didn’t pick up my pain?  
Andrew Because they’re using the equivalent of a box 
brownie? But these are special scans more like 
your Nikon – expensive – limited to research 
projects in universities - the Commission won’t 
pay for these… 
Simon Or these!  
 
Simon plays the short film ‘Lightning from space’ which 
is screened… 
  
Simon It’s a lightning storm filmed from space…  
 
Lightning and thunder… Andrew slowly smiles… 
 
Andrew  It’s amazing… How did you think of this? 
Simon Think of it? I live it everyday of my life… 
Andrew My God… 
Sally  Maybe… just maybe…The beauty of the 
universe in pain…  
Simon (Clicks a button the computer – Screen 
Radar of storm approaching) And this little 
beauty is heading right for us!! 
 
Simon begins to gather all his photographic gear… 
 
Simon You’re gonna use this in court tomorrow, right?! 
Andrew It’s brilliant! But… 
Simon That doesn’t sound good! 
Andrew I’ll use it but, it may not… do it. 
Simon Whaddaya mean…? 
Andrew Unless your pain can be measured… the 
court… 
244 
 245
Simon Measure pain? Ya can’t! Even you said these 
scans are just measuring blood flow - like this 
radar is measuring water density – it’s not pain 
– it’s not the storm – it doesn’t tell you what 
lightning or the pain is!!! You just get pretty 
colours!!  
Sally  The court will want your specific brain 
measuring your specific pain… And the 
Commission won’t even pay for you to see us 
anymore let alone perfusion scans. It will come 
down to your word against theirs… 
Simon What, who tells the best story? 
 
Simon examines Sally and then Andrew… He starts 
breathing heavily… 
 
Simon Fuck… (Pause – incongruent laughter) … 
 
Simon’s pain nearly overcomes him. He squeezes his 
fists… 
 
Simon (To Sally) Did you know ? 
Sally Whatever happens, they can’t stop our 
programme. They can’t stop what you’ve 
found… 
Simon (Pause) What was that Ancient Greek word for 
pain again? Oh yeah – Arrrrrrrgh!   
 
Lightning and thunder… He continues to look upward 
and breathes as if to inhale the whole storm…  
 
Simon Moments like these you need mobile phones… 
Been putting this off too long. Sal, can I borrow 
yours – I threw mine in the sea the other 
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night… I’ll give it back to ya tomorrow 
morning… (Pause – she hands him her 
mobile) Ta… 
 
He gathers his photography gear up… 
 
Simon (Points to the radar) Time for me to go into all 
tha pretty colours again! 
Andrew They’ll film you… 
Simon I’ll be the belle of the storm, eh. Ring a fucken 
ding! (Dials the phone) Steph! I wanna talk to 
you about the house Chess Queen…It’s time to 
castle… (To Sally) It’s cool …don’t worry. 
 
Simon exits. Andrew looks at Sally…  
 
Andrew This programme of yours? You really think it 
could…? 
Sally Oh yeah. It could be huge! What we want to do 
is stop people blaming themselves for their 
pain. If we could help them to not only 
understand it better, but to actually harness it’s 
creative power like Simon. What we can’t win in 
court we could achieve in practice?  
Andrew They’d still need medications! 
Sally Of course! It’s not either or – it’s both and... 
Andrew That would be great, but I’m not giving up on 
this!!   
Sally Who says we’re giving up! 
 
Andrew exits…  
 
Segue into Scene 19… 
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Scene 19 
 
Coutroom… Andrew into the Witness stand…  
 
Simon walks obliquely through the multivalent space 
reciting monochords which are screened… 
 
Andrew In addition to the MRI scans – I’d like to show 
the court something that has just come to my 
attention that tells the story of pain beyond the 
bell?  
 
Screen film of thunderstorm taken from space over 
Argentina. 
 
Andrew (As the film is played) What we are watching 
is a thunderstorm taken from space – but it is, I 
believe, uncannily what the MRI scans of a 
subject in severe neuropathic pain, would look 
like if they could be taken over real time. I 
believe we are looking at is a God’s eye view - 
the universe’s equivalent of a brain producing 
pain - and somewhere down there on a beach, 
is Simon Sharrin photographing his own pain! 
Simon A PHOTOGRAPH NEVER HAS WHAT IT IS 
BECAUSE IT YEARNS FOR WHAT IT ISN’T 
 
First gentle chords of music up… 
 
Andrew What words will convince this court? Simon 
Sharrin is no different to the shell shock victims 
of World War One who were told its all in the 
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mind… But it’s all in the brain and our brain is a 
more complex and wondrous thing than we 
ever imagined!! Credible evidence for this from 
the most acclaimed universities and research 
facilities across the world rises like an incoming 
tide, while all the specific evidence presented 
against the plaintiff in this court heralds straight 
out of the Flat Earth Society in the hope the 
plaintiff will drop off its edge…  
Simon A SEA GLIMPSED IS OF EVERY OCEAN 
Andrew That’s why he is harassed, filmed and 
castigated in medical examinations and even 
risks losing his house under an order 24A to 
the very body responsible for compensating 
him!  
Simon YOU OBSERVE ME, ALWAYS ASKING 
SILENTLY, ‘PROVE IT’ 
Andrew This court has been told that he is a weak man 
– of body and mind – unable to look after his 
children or himself – someone unable to cope 
with a job or a marriage. But what he has found 
in the midst of this loss and staggering pain - I 
have only once before, in my Grandfather, 
seen courage like it. The Commission has 
made this a test case, conducted in the hope 
that he and all the countless thousands of 
others who suffer from the mystery pain, will 
just… go away. But this case is a test I 
personally, do not intend to fail!  
 
Segue into Scene 20… 
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Scene 20 
 
Storm Scene on the Beach. Commence ‘Digital Sky 3D’ 
Storm video… 
 
Music up… 
 
Enter Simon struggling with a tripod and camera case. 
He sets up the tripod and camera – in painful stages – 
keeping a weather eye on things. 
 
There is another brighter strike and louder thunderclap.  
 
Enter Andrew behind Simon - conscious of his safety. 
Simon looks up at the storm. Loud overhead lightning 
and thunder crack. Simon suddenly becomes animated 
and throws his fists at the storm.  
 
Simon So you want to take the house too do ya, ya 
bastard! Well have it! Take everything!!  
 
Slowly Simon becomes aware that his pain has abated…  
Enter Andrew… Another lightning and thunder crack… 
  
Simon continues to set up his camera… 
 
Andrew Jesus! That was close… You could feel it!!  
Simon  Sure you wanna be here? 
 
Lightning and thunder.   
 
Andrew How safe is this?! 
Simon  Safe as houses… 
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Andrew looks up at the storm. 
  
Simon stands and grabs his hand-held control switch, 
kneels, checks his camera one more time…  
 
There is another much closer and intense strike and 
clap. Andrew instinctively runs to Simon’s side, kneels 
for protection and holds his arm. Simon looks sideways 
at him and Andrew let’s go of his arm. Simon stands to 
welcome the storm. Andrew stays hunkered by the 
tripod. 
 
An overhead strike and clap occurs – cueing the strike 
to occur on stage (if possible with FX). Andrew throws 
himself on the beach as if to avoid a high-explosive 
detonation. 
 
Simon Yehaaa! 
 
Another strike occurs, followed quickly by another. 
Andrew is petrified but manages to look at Simon. Yet 
another strike occurs… 
 
Simon (Turns to Andrew) You want to know what 
happens to me in storms – well this is it, doc!! 
No pretty colours, no fancy words… just this!!! I 
betcha never felt so much alive!!!  
 
Andrew realises that he still isn’t safe. As if avoiding 
being shot at in a war, he moves to Simon…  
 
Simon From the madness of the stars we are born!! 
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The crescendo of the video is reached with the loudest 
and most dramatic strike and thunder clap. Then as 
sudden the storm eases, then passes… 
 
Andrew This is madness! You are mad you bastard! 
Simon The only bastard I know around here is the 
spitting image of you and he’s living at Sal’s 
place! 
 Andrew (Long pause) Of me? 
Simon Big bastard too. I’d say he was about sixteen. 
(Long pause) Your grandfather’s medal was 
for bravery right? 
 
Andrew steels himself and walks towards Sally in Scene 
21…  
 
 
 
Scene 21 
 
Enter Sally. Andrew walks to her… 
 
Sally Andrew…? Is the jury still out? 
Andrew Yeah… 
Sally And they’re likely to be for the next hundred 
years…  
Andrew Were you ever going to tell me?  
Sally I… Arrh…? 
Andrew What’s his name? Our son? 
Sally (A silence) Nearly two decades ago you came 
into my life like… a drunken accident… and I… 
I have no idea what is happening but I am so 
overwhelmed by something in my guts. Like 
being in a storm… Then one day the storm’s 
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gone but that thing inside - in my guts - is still 
there… and its growing… its alive… it makes 
you sick, it distorts you and everything about 
you rebels, breasts start spraying milk at 
delicate moments, and emotions that could 
clutch the sun from the sky… makes you glow 
as you vomit in the sheer bloody miracle of it – 
and then the agony of its birth… is the end of 
something that has only just begun… (Pause) I 
didn’t see the point of telling you… at the 
time… But I hoped he would… In some strange 
space… speak with most miraculous organ… 
the way a phantom limb haunts… (Slight 
pause) Phantoms… (Simon nods – Sally 
shakes her head) He’ll be… seventeen this 
October… He’s gorgeous…My sprite!! And his 
name is Robert… 
Andrew  Robert…… Sal, I’m so sorry… 
Sally I was so afraid you wouldn’t want our sprite – 
that you couldn’t give - him – us - the 
togetherness that we needed. I left us all in no-
man’s land. I should have had more of ol’ Bob’s 
courage. For all my talk about choice, I didn’t 
give it to you. If I couldn’t be certain I didn’t 
want to know. I’m the one who should be sorry. 
L’avenir. You can’t protect yourself from the 
unpredictable. - you faint in front of a café and 
Cecile comes into your life with her raining 
hair…  
Andrew Cecile’s gone.  
Sally Nothing’s secure that we can show… except 
the hope that the things we love always… 
always… do more than we know…. 
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Lighting to a light-blue wash… Continue slideshow but 
the theme of lightning segues into Nick Djordjevic’s 
underwater with seals, Pinnacles’ moon and landscape 
photography…  
 
Enter Simon who picks up the mobile phone and dials.  
 
Andrew Nothing’s secure? 
Sally (Puts two fingers on his lips) Shhhsh… 
Simon (Into the phone while walking slowly 
towards the stage edge) Hi Steph… It’s me… 
(Slight Pause) Did your lawyers think it could 
be done? (Pause) At least the commission 
won’t get my house that way – should the worst 
happen. (Slight pause) But the main thing is, 
whether they get it or not - it’s over…the war’s 
over… (Slight pause) Look - the reason I’m 
ringing is not about the house… (Pause) I’d 
like to start seeing the kids again… take ‘em to 
the beach – play in the surf… you know - just 
play… 
 
A silence…  
 
Simon Thank you… Thank you… 
Andrew (To Sally) Thank you… 
Sally For what…? 
Andrew For not disappearing… 
 
They kiss… Simon walks centre stage and addresses 
the audience… Music (opening to The Beauty in the 
Breakage) pianissimo throughout… 
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Simon Now I am most weak and being at your mercy, 
I ask, as you would of any jury, that I too may 
soon have cause to thank you for sparing my 
own disappearance. It’s true – all I can offer are 
glimpses of that which we cannot know, yet it 
goes, knowing as any of you do that touch 
beauty, the touching does more than it knows. 
Let sprites, seals and storms alike in most 
miraculous organ reign, that which plays in joy 
also plays in pain. Please… please as this 
music toys with both your ears and this air, 
don’t let this ending be one of despair…. 
  
As you from pain would pardoned be 
Let your indulgence set me free… 
 
Music up to end play. Play video footage of landscapes 
to portraits: of Simon with his children; Andrew with his 
children; Andrew and Sally with Robert, then to Andrew 
with his arms around Sally holding up a newspaper 
article PAIN PROGRAMME CREATES NEW LIFE; then 
with all of them together on the beach smiling…  
 
The End… 
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I dedicate this play to all those who suffer from the phantom pain … and to those who 
love them… and of course, to Nick and Dr John Quintner who have done it all… for so 
long… Soulager la douleur est divin… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 256
 
  To Fall without Landing 
     A play for Radio National 
by 
                      David Buchanan 
 
 
Cathy………….Melissa Cantwell (Aug 30th 1000-1700, Aug 31st 
1000-1400) 
Searle…………Richard Mellick  (Aug 30th 1000-1700, Aug 31st 1000-1400) 
Michelle……….Karen Rushworth (Aug 30th 1000-1400, Aug 31st 1100-1500)
  
 
PRODUCTION IN PERTH ABC STUDIO 621.   
Recorded 30th and 31st August 2005 
Sound Engineer David Le May 
Produced and Directed by Gillian Berry 
 
 
David Buchanan © 2005 
      
      
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
256 
 257
Characters 
 
 
Cathy A woman in her late twenties, suffering 
from ‘Vestibular Syndrome’ 
 
Searle Cathy’s treating Consultant Psychiatrist 
– mid 40s 
 
Michelle Searle’s wife 
 
 
Music 
 
Souvenir by Something for Kate 
 
Endless by Keith Jarrett Trio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scene 1 
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MUSIC Q 1 BEGIN THE PLAY WITH MUSIC CATHY IS 
HEARING IN HER HEADPHONES (SOMETHING 
FOR KATE’S SOUVENIR)  
 
Cathy  (dancing with complete abandon and singing 
along with certain lines in the song).  
 
Enter Searle… 
 
Searle (Muffled) Morning Cathy! (pause) Cathy! 
 
Cathy  (continues dancing and singing along…) 
 
Searle (Shouting through the music) Cathy! (Pause) 
Cathy!! 
 
SFX    SWIRLING – AN INTRUSIVE IN-HEAD NOISE 
WHICH SHE HEARS WHENEVER HER EYES ARE OPEN.  IT COMES 
AND GOES IN INTENSITY AND VARIES ACCORDING TO HER 
ACTIVITIES AND MOOD.  THE MUSIC SHE LISTENS TO ON HER 
HEADPHONES MANAGES TO DROWN MOST OF THE SWIRLING 
OUT.  
 
Cathy (pulls her head phones off). 
 
MUSIC STOPS  
 
Searle   Cathy – I need to see you now… 
 
SFX  THE SWIRLING BECOMES MORE 
PRONOUNCED – EVEN AGITATED. 
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Searle You need to close your eyes and just follow my 
voice?  
Cathy It won’t… 
Searle It worked last time… 
Cathy Nothing… works!!   
(She is going around in very small circles, 
which cause her to over-balance from time to 
time.) 
Searle   Cathy! Let me … 
Cathy   Stay still! Stay still you bastard! 
Searle   Close your eyes…  
Cathy   I’m not blind – am I! 
 
SFX    PEAK SWIRLING INTO A WHINE…  
 
Searle   Cathy please let me help… 
Cathy Leave me alone! Leave me! (She puts her 
headphones back on) 
 
MUSIC UP.  
 
(She recommences dancing and singing along and instantly 
regains her adroitness).  
 
Jump cut to next scene of a quiet office… 
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Scene 2 
 
Searle’s office where Cathy sits in a chair leaning back with her 
eyes closed.  
Searle Cathy! Open your eyes.  
 
SFX  SWIRLING STARTS AS SHE OPENS HER EYES 
 MAINTAIN UNDER  
 
Tell me what am I doing now? 
 
Cathy Hurtling through space… Like the rest of us… 
Searle And when your eyes are closed, do I slow down for 
you? 
Cathy Yeah… 
Searle So, when you’re listening to fast music… what 
happens? 
Cathy I close my eyes and I can dance… (Silence) It’s 
like being in a car or on a fast train – but planes 
are the best… 
Searle So, still objects – people sitting or standing near 
you - are they worst then? 
Cathy  Yes… They fall as the world falls. 
Searle So me sitting in my chair right now… I’m what… 
Cathy Flying around the room! 
Searle Which is why your head swirls so much – to try 
and catch up with me? (Pause) Right. And the 
things that are moving…? 
Cathy Resist the fall. Or struggle to… 
Searle Struggle? 
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Cathy I see the world as it is - falling through space, 
Searle… or should I call you doctor? 
Searle Searle’s fine…I’m not clear on this? At all… 
  
 
SFX  REDUCE SWIRLING  
 
Why have you closed your eyes? Is that better?     
 
Cathy Ever since the apple fell on Newton’s head, we’ve 
been coming to terms with the fact that everything 
is falling.  
Searle So what is a scary thought for the rest of us is a 
reality for you… 
Cathy Thanks to three tiny bones in my inner ears: 
Vestibular Syndrome. 
Searle There’s no conclusive proof of that – 
decompensating labyrinthitis has been ruled out 
and so has any structural vestibular abnormality… 
There are certain neurological conditions which 
may engender your condition… 
Cathy Engender? 
Searle Bring it about… conjure it… 
Cathy Conjure? 
Searle But you have been referred to me because the 
pathology may be in your mind… 
Cathy How old are you? 
Searle I don’t see what relevance… 
Cathy How old! 
Searle Forty-five… 
Cathy So is the fact that your face is slowly falling apart 
pathological or is pathology reserved for people 
like me? (Pause) Most middle-aged women I talk 
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to find their men unrecognisable at forty-five from 
the one they married in their twenties…  
Searle I can’t imagine how horrible it must be for you to 
see everything as it hurtles in real time through 
space. 
Cathy Everything’s falling Searle… even you… So let’s 
not make me out to be too special.  
 
 
SFX  SWIRLING UP. 
 
Searle What are you doing?  
Cathy I wanna see you! 
Searle Just let me fly off! Don’t try and find me Cathy! Let 
me go!  
 
FADE SLOWLY THE SWIRLING SFX… 
 
Searle No! Keep your eyes open…  
 
RE-CUE SWIRLING SFX – HIS VOICE MOVES AS IF CIRCLING 
THROUGH THE SPACE 
 
Searle But let me go… let me fly around… Don’t try to 
follow me. … keep your eyes open – just let me 
go… 
Cathy  You’re flying around, everything’s flying! 
Searle Yes! … I’ll be all right… Let me fly… 
Cathy How can you be all right!! How can you be!! How 
can any of us be all right!!??? This is crazy – 
freakin crazy!!! 
Searle  Don’t go there!  
Cathy I already am there!  
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Searle I’ll be fine – you’ll be fine! Let me go… Just let me 
go… 
 
SWIRLING SFX INCREASES IN INTENSITY AND ATTACK TO A 
WHINE. 
 
Cathy How is it that I’m the one seeing a psychiatrist 
when it’s the whole universe that’s crazy…? 
 (She stands) 
Searle   Sit down Cathy…  
Cathy   (She breathes rapidly, agitated)  
Searle    (grabs her by the arms) 
 It’s Ok… I’m here… I’m here… I’m not going 
anywhere… 
Cathy  You are everywhere but here!! 
 
SFX DOVETAIL WHINING SFX INTO THE SLOW 
GENTLE SIGHS OF A BEACH WAVEWASH…  
 
 
Scene 3 
 
Searle and Michelle at a beachside café table.  
 
SFX  KNIVES AND FORKS AND CUPS AND 
SAUCERS AND SUNDRY CAFÉ BACKGROUND 
WHITE NOISE… 
 
Searle Are you sure you wouldn’t like something to eat –  
Michelle A coffee’s fine…  
 
Awkward silence… 
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Searle Well… 
Michelle Yes… well …  
Searle Just calm down…  
 
(She hands him a letter… he opens it) 
 
Searle What’s this…??  
Michelle My terms… 70% of the matrimonial home, 50% of 
all other assets including the beach house, 
superannuation, stocks and bonds. I’ll leave your 
private hospital alone if you agree to four-
thousand-a-month maintenance… plus schools 
fees. Otherwise I’ll let the lawyer off his leash!! I 
may be doing many things to you right now – but 
being unfair is not one of them. 
Searle Jesus… Michelle? 
Michelle Let me go, Searle… I’ll be fine… you’ll be fine…  
 (she stands and leaves) 
 
SFX  SWIRLING SLOWLY AND PIANISSIMO AT 
FIRST…  
 
Searle (Stands).  
 
SFX SWIRLING INCREASES IN PACE AND 
INTENSITY AND VOLUME.  
 
Searle (overbalances) 
 
A Male Stranger  Are you right there mate?  
 
MUSIC UP…  FADE SWIRLING… 
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Segue into Scene 4… 
 
Scene 4 
 
Michelle (Intensely intimate, close mic) I just want to 
thank you for hearing me out…I know most of you 
won’t touch a psychiatrist’s wife… especially a 
soon-to-be-ex-psychiatrist’s-wife.  At first I didn’t 
care… Or I thought I didn’t. The dinner parties 
weren’t enough to dent my love… yes… love… for 
him. Once we were hitched I started to notice 
things… Like how they all live in the same suburb 
– there were three other psychiatrists living in our 
street alone. Their private practices were in the 
adjoining suburb next to the CBD. But by then 
John had been born and then Walter and before I 
knew it we had the nannies from Sweden and he 
travelled more – he must have seen more than 
twenty different countries through the singular eye 
of the psychiatric conference. Still I managed to 
get Searle to buy a few acres in the hills so I could 
escape - but after only two years, ten months and 
five days, he managed to get the thing sold. 
Course he then bought the beach house at 
Prevally but it wasn’t the same. It wasn’t mine. By 
then my focus was little by little more and more 
taken up by doing what was required.  
One night I found myself in yet another fusion 
cooking class as the spices fell into the bowl – 
asking myself - why am I so stressed over this new 
recipe? And it boiled down to this… so much 
depended upon the way the first sip of red wine 
went down at about 8.45 pm on any given 
Saturday night’s dinner party. Was the dinner not 
265 
 266
only well cooked but hip to please them? Was my 
hair right, my cleavage revealed without being 
revealing - were the kids well behaved and 
performing in an age appropriate way – were the 
downlights refracting the stained glass as Searle 
liked it?  Would Searle’s first sip of red wine have 
in the moment of its savouring that glance he 
would give me – thumbs up or thumbs down …  
My first panic attack came to me like a thief in the 
night on a warm still Sunday morning – sudden, 
fast and devastating…. It was prompted not by the 
ignominy of a failed dinner in front of all Searle’s 
guests – but by my son John’s perfect shining face 
smiling at me through the clear blue waters of 
Cottesloe beach. He ran out of the surf so happy 
and beautiful and innocent and I saw everything I 
treasure about him swept up in a wave of some 
terrible expectation that flung me to the four 
corners of nothingness… 
 
Segue into Scene 5… 
 
 
 
 
Scene 5 
 
Searle’s office - Cathy sits in a chair opposite Searle.  
 
Searle Does the falling ever go away? 
Cathy We’ve been through this. 
Searle I mean apart from when you’re dancing or in a car 
or plane or have your eyes closed… 
Cathy When I’m asleep… when I dream, I think. 
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Searle You think? 
Cathy I’m not sure… I just am. There’s no-one in my 
sleep saying anything is wrong. 
Searle Wrong? 
Cathy Judging me. 
Searle You think I’m judging you. 
Cathy Of course. 
Searle How does that make you feel? 
Cathy How do you think it makes me feel? 
Searle I don’t know – it’s why I asked I guess. 
Cathy My guess about you Searle – is that you’ll never 
die guessing.  
Searle Are you saying I do know how it makes you feel? 
Cathy I think we all know how I feel… because the bigger 
reality is we’re all just… like… me. 
Searle How so? 
Cathy Falling through space on the third rock from a tiny 
sun…  
Searle You make it sound so nihilistic? 
Cathy I get to see the way it is more than most. That’s all. 
Searle So what do you make of the chair you’re sitting in? 
Cathy A deceptive security - like your house, your wife, 
and two point two children you must have.  
Searle I might be gay? 
Cathy Unlike you I’m guessing you’re married or have 
been with two point two kids, oh and the big house 
and convertible BMW – besides if you were gay 
you’d look after yourself better… 
Searle Excuse me… 
Cathy Be thinner, better groomed, not so bloated. 
Sorry… 
Searle No apology required… 
Cathy Are you sure…? I think that you think of yourself 
as different enough – even collect the odd bit of art 
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but the reality is you pathologise the rest of us for 
a living, so the dominant can feel better about 
being pathologically normal. 
Searle (Pause) How can you be pathologically normal? 
Cathy You tell me? 
Searle I have just told you that you can’t be pathologically 
normal. 
Cathy Then what’s normopathy about? 
Searle Normopathy? 
Cathy It’s the latest psychiatric diagnosis. 
Searle  I’m a senior consultant psychiatrist – I think I would 
know of such a condition. 
Cathy Do a Google search – voila!  
Searle Google… 
Cathy Then while you’re at it do another search for the 
DSM five… Diagnostic Statistical Manual volume 
five – it’s been delayed until the year 2010 … Why! 
(Pause) Because it’s over Searle! 
Searle What is… 
Cathy In 1952 there were 60 psychiatric diagnoses. By 
1994 there were 410. You get it, right. Being 
normal was getting harder and harder… The DSM 
5 cannot be published… 
Searle Never? 
Cathy Your profession requires pathology to be distinct 
from what is normal. But  to find what is normal 
was more difficult that you thought – so you only 
know what is normal by diagnosing what is 
abnormal – so you had to pathologise more and 
more things until finally you lot pathologised 
normal as well. But the moment you did that, 
normal ceased to have any meaning because it 
was pathological too... You can’t tell them apart 
anymore.  
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Searle So we’re both pathological? 
Cathy Hey don’t worry - its normal… 
Searle  So why are you sitting in this chair in this office?  
 
SFX SWIRLING 
 
Cathy A much tougher question Searle, is why are you 
flying around this fucking office?    
   
Briefly increase swirling SFX then fade… 
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Scene 6 
 
Michelle I met this couple at an art exhibition in an old 
church. Searle figured collecting art would be a 
good hobby for me to distract me from my 
condition. I don’t remember the name of the gallery 
– just that it was in an old church.  I liked his 
paintings – the wife managed his work. I thought I 
wouldn’t like them but I came to love them. I 
bought two of his nudes and they invited me to 
their soirées. So I went. At first I just watched a lot. 
Searle had no idea where I was, which was the 
main reason I was there in their garden  and 
everywhere there are paintings and pottery and 
sculptures and colour – colour is everywhere you 
are and look. And there is this one far room made 
completely of glass with a piano in the middle. This 
one particular night happened to be a New Years 
Eve. I was leaning against the table when 
suddenly he was talking to me. I don’t remember if 
we told each other our names. Everything was 
effortless – nothing contrived. I don’t know how 
long we were talking but suddenly I felt my head 
want to touch his and I swear in that instant his 
went to touch mine. When they touched it was not 
a bit self-consciously… we spoke about music and 
he told me he played double bass for a trio that 
was neither jazz nor classical but engendered 
both… Engendered both… I repeated those words 
to myself for weeks afterwards almost ritualistically 
– as if to invoke his re-appearance. He took me in 
to the piano room made of glass and played me 
something very slowly… (Cue wistful piano…) 
270 
 271
“Do you see what I mean?” “Piano too?” (I said 
very quietly). “A bit” (he whispered). (Cease 
piano) We went back outside and didn’t say a 
word to each other just stayed side by side. Then 
he said to me “Is this just me or is there something 
really strong happening between us?” “No…” I 
said, “It’s not just you…” 
 
Scene 7 
 
 
Searle You seem to have an awful lot of knowledge about 
psychiatry for someone who lists their occupation 
as a puppeteer? 
Cathy Internet… 
Searle But… how do you manage to read the screen? 
Cathy Sometimes after I sleep… there’s this hiatus… So 
I jump on the net… I look for causes, names, 
cures… for my condition. Then little by little the 
screen begins to move… then it begins to swirl 
and then my neck gets sore and then my head is 
turning and then the world flies off again and 
resumes its falling… 
Searle Tell me about your puppetry?  
Cathy You and I aren’t so different in that regard.  
Searle Again we’re the same…? 
Cathy (Pause) We both resist falling for a living. 
Searle You’ll need to enlighten me? 
Cathy No I won’t, it’s so obvious – all you have to do is 
see a show and you’ll get it straight away…  
Searle Get what? 
Cathy How the puppets come alive! How gracefully they 
move – their arms, their legs, heads, torsos, how 
effortlessly they leap and supply they bend and 
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adroitly they spin and turn… Any dancer would 
give their soul for such freedom of movement. It’s 
irresistible to the eye and then voila! – it happens – 
they become real… 
Searle Wonderful. 
Cathy Yes…  
Searle For you… 
Cathy For both of us… 
Searle Both… 
Cathy When the punters forget what they’re dealing with 
is wooden or plastic – they forget that at the very 
moment the puppets seem most real they are 
being most manipulated… by us … Doctor 
puppeteer. 
Searle You think I am a puppeteer? 
Cathy Yeah, an illusionist, just like me! You can x-ray a 
broken leg, operate on appendicitis, MRI scan a 
tumour. But your trade is my trade – nothing’s real 
- only puppets with names… a contrivance of 
strings being pulled so cleverly, skilfully that their 
dance and grace is so lifelike the audience’s jaw 
drops and their eyes widen… and magically they 
forget about the puppeteer. The trick is not to let 
go of the strings even though each movement can 
only happen by allowing the thing to fall but they 
must never land or they will crash into a terrible 
lifelessness – into the thing we both fear the 
most… 
Searle Loss of audience? 
Cathy Worse… nothingness. 
Searle (After a long silence) Your condition maybe 
neurological… 
Cathy Meaning…? 
Searle It’s not in your mind. 
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Cathy Meaning it is caused by my body? 
Searle Your brain… 
Cathy Isn’t that my body and not my mind? 
Searle It engenders both… 
Cathy Engenders both…? (Pause) You mean it’s a 
mystery? 
Searle Yes… 
Cathy Are you referring me on to a neurologist? 
Searle Would you like that? 
Cathy (A silence) No… 
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Scene 8 
 
Michelle So I said to him “Come out and see me off.” We 
just seemed to… I mean it was so gorgeous… I 
use that word more and more these days – 
gorgeous. Gorg-e-ous….Then he saw me get into 
my car… It’s a convertible BMW. He flinched. He 
definitely flinched at the car I drove… I noticed 
that. Suddenly he was tall… and slender. Although 
he wasn’t, in that light, he seemed beautiful… 
fleetingly. So… diffident. It drew me in… I moved 
towards him and then he came to me. Then I got 
the softest kiss I think I’ve ever known. I let go. Not 
him. Even when I had backed off, he lingered –
perfectly still. Next day he rang – later than I 
thought he would. (Pause) I told him that I had to 
take my son to a party and would be away for the 
rest of the eveningI told him I couldn’t talk – that I 
was too busy.  
Three days went by… I couldn’t… not think about 
him. I literally had my fingertips on the phone 
numbers when he rang… His voice was so soft. I 
admitted straight away I was just about to ring him. 
I told him I thought it wasn’t a good idea to see 
each other again. I told him I was too busy. There 
was a silence.  
. He then told me that what he had felt with me he 
hadn’t felt in the longest time. That he would wait. 
He would wait until I wasn’t busy. I gave him my 
email address. He sent me two really 
sanctimonious emails – setting himself up as an 
impossible good guy and me being some notorious 
A list social celebrity. (Pause) Is that true? Was I 
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an A list socialite? (Pause) He said we could, no 
matter how different our two worlds, engender 
both… Engender both…  
 
Segue into Scene 9… 
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Scene 9 
 
Searle’s office… 
 
Searle No? 
Cathy Would a neurologist want to know about my 
dreams…? 
Searle No. But you can discuss your dreams with 
someone who you are intimate with surely – you 
don’t need a psychiatrist. 
Cathy Are we even talking about the same thing? 
Dreams – as in what happens to you when you’re 
asleep. Not the ones of a waking ambition… like 
the house in Subiaco and the convertible BMW… 
Searle My point still holds – talk to your lover... 
Cathy Thoughts tending to ambition do plot unlikely 
wonders… 
Searle What, don’t you talk with…? 
Cathy I don’t have a lover or any thing like a lover to talk 
with… What makes you think anyone would put up 
with… (Pause) You happy now? 
Searle (Begins to write out a referral) A neurologist has 
the best chance of dealing with your condition… 
Cathy I keep having this dream… Instead of the world 
falling I’ve let go like you said I should… and I’m in 
sync with the things that are falling so they have 
stopped swirling… just like when I’m on a plane or 
in a car… I can just…. be. (Pause) I’m actually 
doing what you asked me to do… I’ve let 
everything go… Everything stops swirling and I 
move gracefully like a dancer through the air… 
effortlessly. 
Searle Cathy, I still think… 
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Cathy And then it happens… 
Searle (Stops writing) What happens? 
Cathy Arrgh – you are curious after all.  
Searle What happens? 
Cathy He’s there… 
Searle Who? 
Cathy It’s nothing grand or spectacular or romantic or 
anything. It’s more like being on a plane and 
suddenly there’s someone sitting next to you. You 
don’t notice why or how they’re there. They’re just 
there. And little by little this pull starts to happen. 
And you know it’s the same force that makes you 
fall… Only this time it’s pulling… Very very gently 
at first – gentle enough to almost miss… then you 
sense it growing – internally – you know… what’s 
the word… 
Searle Visceral? 
Cathy That’ll do… No… Muscle and guts pulling! No – 
like hunger. Yeah that’s better. And he’s nothing 
like you thought he might be – not even your 
type… Inexplicably you are talking, quietly, yet this 
pull is irresistible... when you lean your head 
towards each other and let them touch… and then 
bang – you’re together. 
Searle And then! 
Cathy What? 
Searle What happens next? 
Cathy That’s what I need to talk to you about… 
  
Segue into Scene 10… 
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Scene 10 
 
Michelle in her chair… 
 
Michelle For four weeks I heard nothing. Then another 
email. It was an invite to a concert his trio was 
performing at my favourite venue among the 
Norfolk pines. Jesus… I mean I it read on a 
computer screen but somehow it spoke to every 
blood cell in my body. I didn’t answer it and I didn’t 
go to the concert. But two days later I found myself 
replying,  
 
Re your e-mails.........nice to see you're one of the good 
guys!! 
  
I'm still focused on the work..... looking forward to some 
time off soon.   
  
With kind regards 
M 
    
 He responded with too much haste. It was the 
haste that … I don’t know… made me pull back. I 
didn’t respond. Why should I? (Pause) Three 
weeks later another email – but in between the first 
of these dreams where I’m on a plane and I sit 
down next to him… (Pause) His email said he had 
posted me some CDs – of Keith Jarrett, Arvo Părt, 
some others... names names, I don’t care about 
names anymore… He said there was also a 
DVD… of his trio’s concert. In a similar haste his 
discs arrived - like they had fallen from the sky. 
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(Pause) I listened to this music… (Cue music 
Keith Jarrett Trio’s Endless)  
God…I didn’t expect anything and half wanted to 
hate it. But then… there it was…  (A long pause 
while the music plays…) I put the others on like a 
diabetic with a secret lolly jar. Then I looked up at 
my grandmother’s clock and at precisely two 
minutes to midnight I put on the DVD… There he 
was… playing this gorgeous music on Searle’s 
widescreen television… and as if pulled I inched 
towards the screen… It might have been a short 
DVD cos suddenly I’m at the bit where he’s 
patched in an ending of his own and there he is 
before me again… He says one word only … and 
walks slowly towards the lens and gently… very 
gently… lets his head touch my own head now 
leaning against the same screen. (Pause) I rang 
him straight away. He was out. I got in the car. He 
was lugging his double bass up his driveway in the 
headlights when I arrived. He turned with his arms 
held around his bass like a lover. I left the 
headlights on with the driver’s door flapped and let 
his eyeshine guide me in…  
 
Music into Scene 11… 
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Scene 11 
 
Fade music… Searle’s Office 
 
Searle My guess, is that you’ll never know while you’re 
living your life with your eyes closed... 
Cathy Ditto… 
Searle Touchè… 
Cathy Know what? 
Searle  Isn’t that what you wanted to talk with me about? 
(Silence) Are you playing dumb? (Silence) My 
guess is you’re not that worried about the world 
falling and everybody swirling around… That’s not 
the tough question is it? (Pause) No, the tough 
question is about you never being able to be with 
someone… to love and be loved? Like the rest of 
us! Isn’t it? (Silence) You are playing dumb? 
 
SFX  SWIRLING.  MAINTAIN UNDER 
 
Cathy You think this is dumb!? 
Searle You talk better with your eyes closed young lady… 
Cathy Bastard! 
Searle That’s better – now you’re getting it!  
Cathy (Stands)  
Searle  I’m over here! You’re too busy keeping the world 
the way you’d have it – nice and still and safe… 
Well bad luck sister – it ain’t – so where are my 
strings, eh? Come on, pull me in and make me 
dance? What, no strings, ms puppeteer.  
Cathy Prick! 
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Searle Oh you dish it out but take yr own medicine with 
difficulty…  
Cathy (She overbalances a bit.  She is beginning to 
panic and grabs for her headphones) 
 
MUSIC A BRIEF BURST FROM SOUVENIR  
 
Searle Nar arrh – leave your headphones off, thankyou! 
(He takes them from her) Dancing is such antic 
gesture – don’t you find?   
Cathy Give them back, you smug prick!! 
Searle Come on, I’m over here – I haven’t moved – I’ve 
been right by you all along, Cathy! Just like the 
rest of the world! No need to shut your eyes – 
everyone’s right where they should be – all you 
have to do is to keep your eyes open and let 
yourself fly! 
 
SFX    SWIRLING BECOMING A WHINE  
 
Cathy  (lunges at him with a determined yell before 
wrapping her arms around him crying)  
 
Searle (Catches her…)  
 
SFX DOVETAIL SWIRLING SFX INTO THE GENTLE 
WHIRRING OF LEVEL FLIGHT.  
  
Searle Its ok… Its ok… relax… relax… Look at me – just 
look… See…  
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(Long silence during which her tears subside. 
Then he reaches over and turns on a CD - cue 
Endless)  
Some music someone special left behind to help 
me appreciate the flight? (Pause – close mic - 
whispered) Lately… (Pause) I’ve come to 
appreciate the terrible beauty of keeping your eyes 
open as you fall… (Long pause) Hi… I’m Searle… 
Pleased to meet you… 
Cathy (Long pause – close mic - whispered) I’m 
Cathy… Pleased to meet you… too… 
 
MUSIC    ENDLESS UP TO END PLAY. 
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Part 3 
 
The Poetry 
 
Monochords 
 
Secrets of the Driftwood 
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Introduction 
 
 
It is hoped that these monochords will accompany the selected 
photographs of Nick Djordjevic’s landscape and lightning 
photography, for a book that mutually speaks of poetry and 
photography’s ability to creatively reference the inseparability of 
unexplained persistent pain and joy. Nick and I are currently 
negotiating with a number of publishers to this end and have enlisted 
Dr Ben Horgan from the ‘Bone and Joint Decade” to speed this 
process up for us. 
 
Aside from the discussion in Chapter 7 of the exegesis, I am intensely 
uncomfortable about discussing my poetry in any domain. I agree 
with Randolph Stow’s afterword on his own poetry: 
I really have nothing to say about poetry in general (except that mine 
tries to counterfeit the communication of those who communicate by 
silence). And these poems are mostly private letters. (Stow, 1975, p 
175). 
 
If anyone has tried to communicate through a kind of enforced 
silence, it has been my own deeply flawed attempts to communicate 
this thing the English language calls ‘pain’. I wrestle with my pain and 
this flawed communication in my day to day existence. It is a deeply 
volatile and at times violent struggle that has often led me to sense I 
will not survive. It is a violence born within – a kind of corporeal 
deconstruction of the self – the self undoing the self. But it is also a 
self that does more than we can know and offers me extraordinary 
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moments, not despite my pain but because of it. I gather a sense 
from Stow’s counterfeit of silence that there is a translation going on 
from one volatile body to another not unlike the acts of erotic love – 
beautifully flawed in their ambition of a communication of union – a 
doomed reclamation of the an ideal sense of self in the other.  In this 
sense the poem is itself a kind of volatile and self-referential body.  I 
could not hope to speak of this volatility better than Jacques Derrida 
did in his attestation to the body of Paul Celan’s poetry: 
There is a hand to hand, bodily struggle “within” every national 
language. Each time there is writing.  No writing opens a passage 
without this bodily violence. How otherwise does one explain the 
charge – others would say the investment – the libidinal, even 
narcissistic charge that everyone brings to his own texts? It is my 
body, this is my body. Every poem says, “This is my body,” and the 
rest: drink it, eat it, keep it in memory of me. There is a Last Supper 
in every poem which says: This is my body, here and now. And you 
know what comes next: passions, crucifixions, executions. Others 
would also say resurrections… (Derrida, 2005, p169).  
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Secrets of the Driftwood 
 
 
 
 
 
--white lines of the highway her face in the sky— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--seagulls peel either side of her gait the wake from a boat— 
 
 
 
 
 
--silence lies behind your eyes closing— 
 
 
 
 
 
--Cable Station’s beach lands an edge all tides forget— 
 
 
 
 
 
--my daughter’s overnight bag - the divorce begins— 
 
 
 
 
 
--this bed breathes without you a torso missing a lung— 
 
 
 
 
 
--her hair in the plughole the shower’s rain on my face— 
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--motifs and chords your voice softens under breath-swells— 
 
 
 
 
 
--the mornings are worse the moon drowns in the sea— 
 
 
 
 
 
--that five year old – left – jumps up and down on my fence— 
 
 
 
 
 
--not a word spoken your sigh turns the sea green— 
 
 
 
 
 
-tonight there is no moon only the sirens call to your dark hue— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--epiphany is a fashion worn only as you undress— 
 
 
 
 
 
-locks keep out only the honest – you enter without knocking— 
 
 
 
 
 
--I was five – she was twenty-five – and both awaited the fall— 
 
 
 
 
 
--the bullseye men targeted was no reference – that was the fall— 
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--a bullseye made her fall and in falling she referred— 
 
 
 
 
 
--her reference was her eyes forgiving us this fete and my love— 
 
 
 
 
 
--dragged away from her kicking and screaming— 
 
 
 
 
 
--riddled as the tides, puzzled as a five year old— 
 
 
 
 
 
--her death their target, her beauty the bullseye— 
 
 
 
 
 
--the Fete’s there again in Claremont park but her attraction’s left— 
 
 
 
 
 
--if they were lucky she waited and waited and waited— 
 
 
 
 
 
--it’s just that she wanted the end to come soon— 
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--when she broke the water their hands flew as gulls over a chip— 
 
 
 
 
 
--even now a housewife in the sixties prepares her escape— 
 
 
 
 
 
--even now the five year old waits and waits and waits— 
 
 
 
 
 
--even now she leaves the horned man each day— 
 
 
 
 
 
--a rainsquall darkens the sea locusts sweeping a crop— 
 
 
 
 
 
--fifteen years… its silence spans our time left— 
 
 
 
 
 
--the metaphor in a poem I never quite make up the difference— 
 
 
 
 
 
--smoke gyres up your cheekbone, scars the air, dissolves— 
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--your head against hers in the parisienne café one cup is full— 
 
 
 
 
 
--and arm-in-arm under the Eiffel tower heads tilted, just so— 
 
 
 
 
 
--photos taken in the hope their secret is not safe— 
 
 
 
 
 
--island blues and whites bleached to salt sprays to fecund sky— 
 
 
 
 
 
--nationalism is in the air I stay inside & board up my windows— 
 
 
 
 
 
--Lesbos? Rottnest will do— 
 
 
 
 
 
--lithe her clothes wild as driftwood on our bed— 
 
 
 
 
 
--how does this night, its cold, make you whisper?— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Celan’s Seine my Hampton Road eyes its current: a black truck— 
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-droplets fall off her chin her cheek turns sunset red in the rain— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the earth is lichen the sky is a skeleton dancing with black hair— 
 
 
 
 
 
-knowing out there something swells rises makes her veil fall— 
 
 
 
 
 
-I saw you in Vespers café now you’re in every cafe I see— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the space of poetry mottles its air glimpses visibility— 
 
 
 
 
 
-marriage felled logs the stochastic colour of tree rings— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the figure in the tapestry the threads of each in the other— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the mystery of blood and sunset through her fingertips held to sky— 
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-would we trade Celan’s work for the man? one body left the other— 
 
 
 
 
 
-no-one saw the Seine sweep him under its wheels like a truck— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Mr Celan – he dead— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-left, left, left, left, (right!) left, left………………….left…— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-the noon-sun freckles her moonless night sky— 
 
 
 
 
 
-my death, is it possible on this perfect day her hands are cupped— 
  
  
 
 
 
-my pain cannot be held as pain itself holds what I am— 
 
 
 
 
 
-hope is to die before my children - not to wake as they burn— 
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-selling the house: removal vans, art, beds, couches, that vase— 
 
 
 
 
 
-she didn’t feel loved but was, I felt loved, but wasn’t— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Somme – the green silence of their songs the birds won’t sing— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Passchendaele - impassioned dales the locals leave to fallow— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Pozierres – my grandfather was nowhere, anywhere, everywhere— 
 
 
 
 
 
-so I rode all day through Biscay storms south south south— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Archachon - I fainted & woke wet with her hair raining on my face— 
 
 
 
 
 
-her hand on my cheek is the snow on Mt Everest— 
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-And here she is with fish on the menu— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Pyla – her husband is in Paris I’m in her medoc— 
 
 
 
 
 
-even dying on Mt Everest mobile phones keep us close— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the storm is out to sea insistent so insistentl— 
 
 
 
 
 
-light aircraft drone in Eb it’s the music of Nelson, Paris, her eyes— 
 
 
 
 
 
-my fingers type trying to touch your email softly through glass— 
 
 
 
 
 
-a seahorse dead in my cupped hand still clings to its kelp— 
 
 
 
 
 
-her death in France comes to me in an email – late late late— 
 
 
 
 
 
-beach-sand sieves the break leaves her lines of salt on your face— 
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-what we all do what we all have done is fall…-- 
 
 
 
 
 
-eyes combing tidal shores for seahorses— 
 
 
 
 
 
-a poem is not you mapping their kelp in your eyes— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Good Friday, a black dog is touched by a tipuana everything shines- 
 
 
 
 
 
-still clouds fray curtains of rain tears Celan’s heartblue to grey— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-moonlight cups a breast your eyelids close like lips in a nocturne— 
 
 
 
 
 
-you are a boat harbour gulls settle on masts that ache for sails- 
 
 
 
 
 
-we hear the thunder but doubt the lightning was more than a flash- 
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-as for pain as for joy the most we can say is yes— 
 
 
 
 
 
-doctor on a scale of 1 – 10 how much of an expert are you?-- 
 
 
 
 
 
-you observe me always asking silently “prove it”— 
 
 
 
 
 
-I learn to think of you the way a farmer thinks of drought— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the four-wheel-drive that burst my car into this universe was drunk—   
 
 
 
 
 
-a four-wheel-drive drunk or just the whole universe?— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the phantom haunting the machine’s ghost is pain— 
 
 
 
 
 
-intensely I hear silence tonight. Without you is everywhere. 
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-I will not sleep in case you end and go on forever— 
 
 
 
 
 
-taunted by mellifluous signs, symptoms always regret the honey— 
 
 
 
 
 
-those storms came at us from in us hurled across each ocean— 
 
 
 
 
 
-why storms form is inexplicable as rain forming prepares only its fall- 
 
 
 
 
 
-soon a grace will descend a sunset after air-burst heat— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the bath is running, the meal eaten, the incense burns, touch wafts— 
 
 
 
 
 
-I dreamt your arm was a violin & played away my pain my joy- 
 
 
 
 
 
-is there some record of what happened? What happened?— 
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-what happened is always always always still happening— 
 
 
 
 
 
-yes our eyes yes the storm howls, outside holed buckets fill— 
 
 
 
 
 
-bent over hair wet and flayed to ground your bum is a loveheart- 
 
 
 
 
 
-braided hair, those beads run like your children by your side- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-and then the spring was here and the storms had passed— 
 
 
 
 
 
-green poured from yellow canola fields all over us— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the dawn pitches the land arcing like star trails into the sea— 
 
 
 
 
 
-you walk head bowed among the ancient headstones— 
 
 
 
 
 
-but the cold brings back this cry the stones rise up against— 
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-the dark a tabula rasa dawn pinnacles will soon clutter like verbs— 
 
 
 
 
 
-did you get them? Words run everywhere on the dawn’s aperture— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the moon is in my bed her face is in the sky— 
 
 
 
 
 
-awake I hunger but asleep her hands come touching— 
 
 
 
 
 
-how do I mourn something this unfaithful yet persistent? 
 
 
 
 
 
-you name me one thing we hold without being held— 
 
 
 
 
 
-I meet you in the same moment you begin your leaving-ness— 
 
 
 
 
 
-holy water in my palm… it leaks only what clutched would be spilt— 
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-earth shadow’s lilac dawn hues seals dismissed as sprites— 
 
 
 
 
 
-but that moon in blue was there in me still— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the moment pain is a set of neuronal assemblies it’s all over— 
 
 
 
 
 
-unless those molecules defy the cipher and just play play play— 
 
 
 
 
 
-this doctor is a bachelor of medicine wedded to affairs of the state— 
 
 
 
 
 
-in his rooms he makes us strip before he strips us in court— 
 
 
 
 
 
-rule 1 - do no harm – rule 2 – be an expert – rule 3 – ignore rule 1— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Hippocratic oath – h y p o cratic oa…ph – h y p o crite – i – cal oaf— 
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-last night again your spooned thighs a cantus are you awake?— 
 
 
 
 
 
-sleepless we sleep together it ebbs and flows into distance— 
 
 
 
 
 
-The ogre will come in any case more god-like than they thought— 
 
 
 
 
 
-Come the Sabbath? A bridge the Seine’s waves nape your neck— 
 
 
 
 
 
-your cheek pressed against glass curling lip and tongue— 
 
 
 
 
 
-déjà vu always already does more than we know— 
 
 
 
 
 
-under the lightning a flash is this pain— 
 
 
 
 
 
-your eyes Bret Whitely’s bridge and a boat’s wake widens blue- 
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-each wave’s a miracle so ordinary our eyes scan the horizon— 
 
 
 
 
 
-we name things in hope but it’s in how they touch that hopes— 
 
 
 
 
 
-what’s ultramarine in a view spills colourless from your hair— 
 
 
 
 
 
-always on the beach this music begins after every wave’s sigh— 
 
 
 
 
 
-edges let go of always if only to meet who I am already falling— 
 
 
 
 
 
-a sea glimpsed is of every ocean— 
 
 
 
 
 
-so much is about timing and the spaces it defers in us here now— 
 
 
 
 
 
-outside, your eyes eye the morning, a dew-swollen tree-fern— 
 
 
 
 
 
-when the frond unfurls its music it opens to rain swept like grain— 
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-not even these chords sustain the motifs of your hair— 
 
 
 
 
 
-vines march through the valley fog like swimmers wading into surf— 
 
 
 
 
 
-the fingers of your right hand slide down the glass like rain— 
 
 
 
 
 
-I’m dancing with my black dog her tail and eyes smile bark— 
 
 
 
 
 
-your words flat-stones skip across a calm dusk sea— 
 
 
 
 
 
-your hand on your breast a tide rises against a shore— 
 
 
 
 
 
-a dead mother’s silent face. Kelp swaying in the driftwood’s grain— 
 
 
 
 
 
-remember when we would rub noses with more warmth than a kiss?- 
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-each land elsewhere to each hand a distance our touch never joins- 
 
 
 
 
 
-I sink under fitful sleep, scissor-kick, rollover & float on my back- 
 
 
 
 
 
-alone in this bed adrift— 
 
 
 
 
 
-terns fan out from my gait a dawn swim lights the shore— 
 
 
 
 
 
-a sea-breeze billows a curtain spinnakers dissolve into sunshine— 
 
 
 
 
 
-my hand tests yours like breath on a window— 
 
 
 
 
 
-meeting at Claremont jetty the winter river’s still and brown as tea— 
 
 
 
 
 
-I knew I would love you, a migrating bird knows when to land— 
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-your head tilts fifteen degrees as you fold your wings up tight— 
 
 
 
 
 
-a face as between your hands a whetstone— 
 
 
 
 
 
-rain hues auburn hair your fingers spread like spilt dye— 
 
 
 
 
 
-footprints and bits of red seaweed wind-strewn as your hair— 
 
 
 
 
 
-after storms a still small voice the surge behind breakwater- 
 
 
 
 
 
-my daughter bursts out of the backdoor water from a faucet— 
 
 
 
 
 
-spectres return every night, we wake to a dust on every shelf— 
 
 
 
 
 
-when at last I surrender fog to winter air— 
 
 
 
 
 
-our joy has its spectre in the entropy of its enjoyment— 
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-a photograph never has what it is but always yearns for what it isn’t- 
 
 
 
 
 
-I have been here digging, digging, Ritsos buries his bottles— 
 
 
 
 
 
 -you lie on the beach, from Tehran, Paris, secrets of the driftwood– 
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Appendix 1 
 
The program for A Bell in the Storm, produced by deckchair 
theatre. 
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